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Abstract 
 
While some scholars continue to insist that the concept of sustainability is vague and 
unwieldy, this thesis seeks to explore multidimensional elements of sustainability and 
seeks to offer an integrative, transdisciplinary approach to policy design for its 
attainment. Sustainability and the related concepts of development, globalization, and 
economic and environmental justice are interwoven with technological, social and 
institutional change, and with trade as drivers of the transformation of industrial and 
industrializing societies. 
 
The discussion begins by an analysis of the dominant existing models of economic 
growth and innovation and advances to the effects of economic growth on sustainability. 
Included is an analysis of the limits of the GDP growth paradigm, the effects of growth 
on the developed and the developing world and the relationship between economic 
growth and ecological collapse.   
 
The focus of analysis then shifts from the domestic to the international. Trade and the 
International Financial System are examined both with respect to their primary theories 
and characteristics, but also in relation to their effects to sustainability. The discussion is 
then concluded by an examination of the different policy options and analytical tools that 
could be employed for a transition to a more sustainable economic model.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Growth and Development Distinguished 
Economic growth has been at the heart of economic analysis since the first founding 
documents of economic theory. Economic growth was, in essence, the topic of Adam 
Smith’s treatise on the “Wealth of Nations.” Growth, however, should not be considered 
as an end in itself. Economists have focused their efforts on analyzing the causes of 
growth for centuries since it has the potential to decrease poverty, increase the standard 
of living, support goals such as education and healthcare, and substantially affect the 
quality of life of the citizenry.  
 
It is essential to note here that as an area of study of national economies, development is 
generally distinguished from economic growth. Economic growth is generally used to 
describe how already-developed nations further enhance their economies, while 
development is not a purely economic phenomenon. Todaro and Smith (2009) note that 
“development should […] be perceived as a multidimensional process, involving the 
reorganization and reorientation of entire economic and social systems. In addition to 
improvements in incomes and output, it typically involves radical changes in institutional 
social and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes and, in many cases, 
even customs and beliefs. Finally, although development is usually defined in a national 
context, its widespread realization may necessitate fundamental modification of the 
international economic and social system as well.” 
 
According to Todaro and Smith (2009), economic and social development in all societies 
should have at least the following three objectives: 
 
• To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining 
goods such as food, shelter, health, and protection.  
• To raise the quality of life (securing more meaningful jobs and enhancing cultural 
and human values). 
• To expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and 
nations, by freeing them from dependence to other nations, but also from the 
forces of ignorance and human misery. 
 
The role of national governments in the context of economic development is essential. 
Contrary to the view of many economists of the neoclassical mainstream, this role should 
not be limited to ensuring the proper functioning of markets and the correction of market 
failures.  
 
Traditional economics focuses on the efficient, least-cost allocation of scarce resources 
and the optimal growth of these resources over time in order to produce an expanding 
range of goods and services (Todaro and Smith 2009). Furthermore, traditional 
economics also focuses on neoclassical economics as taught in introductory and 
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intermediate economics textbooks in universities. Markets, in that context, are considered 
to be “perfect,” while the consumer is perceived as a rational utility maximizer.  
 
On the other hand, development economics has a more extensive scope. Apart from being 
concerned with the optimal allocation of scarce resources and with their sustained growth 
over time, development economics also deals with the economic, social, political, and 
institutional mechanisms necessary to bring about rapid and large-scale improvements for 
developing countries (Todaro and Smith 2009). In this context, market imperfections are 
the rule rather than the exception, and limited consumer rationality is taken as a given, 
while disequilibria often prevail in the economy.  
 
Formal economic thinking remains essentially confined to static equilibrium, instead of 
examining the dynamics of the economy (Niehans 1990). The historical perspective and 
the empirical observations of the first classic economists (Smith, Ricardo, and Marx 
among others) led to some key intuitions about the growth process but not to coherent 
theories of economic growth (Niehans 1990). However, this was something which was 
destined to change in the era of model building, through the contributions of a series of 
scholars who dramatically shifted the way their contemporaries ended up viewing the 
process of economic growth.    
 
1.2 The Meaning of Sustainable Development: Economic Welfare, Employment and 
Environment 
The above discussion exemplifies the differences between a paradigm rooted on 
neoclassical economic growth metrics and a more comprehensive development 
framework, which focuses not only on economic efficiency, but also equity, quality of 
life and environmental quality.  
 
During the last decades and especially the last years, there has been a significant increase 
in interest and important political/legal developments in the advancement of a new 
notion, that of “sustainable development”.  The term sustainable development has been 
widely used to describe an alternative path of socioeconomic advancement. However, the 
many different definitions of sustainable development have been proposed, and many 
people end up using the same term to refer to different notions and policies. Different 
interpretations include those of “environmentally-friendly” growth, growth with less 
macroeconomic fluctuations, equitable development etc. The most widely used definition 
of sustainable development, according to the United Nations (1987), is that of a 
development paradigm “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Smith and Rees 1998). This 
definition, however, is too broad for policy purposes.  
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Source: (UCN 2006) 
Figure 1.1: Prevalent Scheme of Sustainable Development 
 
While the ‘sustainability sphere is often defined as the economy, the environment, and 
society (Figure 1.1), Ashford and Hall (2010) propose a different scheme (Figure 1.2), 
arguing that considerations of social impact and equity occur in each corner of the 
triangle. Thus, “social” is replaced with employment since technological change and 
globalization have direct implications on employment in both developed and developing 
nations, and labor market policies share importance with government policies focusing on 
improving economic competitiveness and environmental quality1. In addition, if we are to 
meet the basic human needs for food, clothing, shelter, etc., the only practical way to do 
this is to satisfy the basic need for a sustainable livelihood by creating employment 
opportunities with adequate purchasing power (Ashford and Hall 2010).  
 
                                                
1 Most governments, for instance, do not have a Ministry of Social Affairs. 
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Source: (Ashford and Hall 2010) 
Figure 1.2: The Dimensions of Sustainability 
Figure 2.2: The Dimensions of Sustainability 
It is possible to consider the impact of rapid technological change and globalization on 
employment through three broad lenses: the international division of labor, the creation 
of purchasing power, and technology-enabled capital mobility. While it is recognized that 
technological innovations in products, industrial processes, and services can enhance our 
quality of life, these innovations can also bring with them social and environmental 
consequences.  
 
Hence, a sustainable society could be characterized by at least the following (Ashford and 
Hall 2010): 
 
• Economy – The economy provides goods and services adequate to satisfy the basic 
material needs of all members of society and provides abundant and equitable 
opportunities for the realization of human potential; 
• Work – Livelihoods that are secure and available, which provide equitable reward for 
labor, permit the maintenance of a decent standard of living, and are conducted in a 
safe working environment; and  
• Environment – Long-run flows of environmental services are maintained at a level 
sufficient to maintain a stable ecosystem and to support human health and welfare.  
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In order to move towards these goals on a worldwide basis, sustainability policy must be 
made in a dynamic environment in which economic linkages between nations are 
increasingly deep and pervasive, and changes in technology and these economic linkages 
are becoming more rapid and interconnected, respectively. 
 
In general, sustainable development decries a simplistic definition, but rather constitutes 
a multidimensional concept characterizing development that seeks to (Ashford and Hall 
2010): 
 
• meet needs and avoid adverse effects of industrialization within and among 
nations and on subsequent generations 
• provide an adequate and fair distribution of essential goods & services 
• provide for good health, safety and an environment without environmental 
injustices 
• provide for fair working conditions/occupational health & safety 
• provide for fair and meaningful employment 
• provide for adequate and fair purchasing power 
• meet and expand the potential for a nation’s self reliance, capacity for innovation, 
and participation in the global economy 
• engage individuals in the society to realize their human potential 
 
1.3 Growth in the Context of Globalization2 
Overall, the international economy appears to be composed of the following five highly 
interrelated aspects: 
 
• trade in goods and services3 
• international distribution of production4 (more commonly called the international 
division of labor) 
• flows of capital across national borders 
• flows of information and knowledge 
• flows of labor across national borders 
  
The inter-relatedness of the first three features of the international economy is quickly 
apparent: trade in goods and services reflects the geographic distribution of the 
production/generation of services – inputs must go to production/service centers; 
products/services (which may be used as inputs in turn) go to consumption 
centers/consumers. Capital flows, in part, as a consequence of production/service system 
investments, and, in part, as speculation on the future value of produced goods and 
services, and currencies. 
                                                
2 Drawn heavily from Ashford and Hall (2010). 
3 As explored later in this section, this kind of industrial globalization is known as internationalization. 
4 As explored later in this section, the location of production/assembly/service operations outside the parent 
country is a kind of industrial globalization known as multi-nationalization. 
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In the age of the so-called “knowledge-based” economy and information systems using 
sophisticated Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
information/knowledge transfer is crucial not only for optimizing industrial activity, but 
also for the transfer of financial information and assets. 
 
Labor mobility has two important, but different dimensions: (1) the flow of intellectual 
capital (~ the ‘brain drain’) to places where it is most highly valued and (2) labor 
migration to areas with shortages of people to perform physical or so-called ‘low-skilled’ 
work. 
 
Not all aspects of globalization are seen to be positive. Stiglitz (2002, p. 248) notes: 
 
Globalization has helped hundreds of millions of people attain higher standards of living, 
beyond what they, or most economists, thought imaginable but a short while ago. … But 
for millions of people globalization has not worked. Many have actually been made worse 
off, as they have seen their jobs destroyed and their lives become more insecure. They have 
felt increasingly powerless against forces beyond their control. They have seen their 
democracies undermined, their cultures eroded.  
 
Soros (1997, p. 45) as early as 1997, cautioned:  
 
Although I have made a fortune in the financial markets, I now fear that the untrammeled 
intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of 
life is endangering our open and democratic society. The main enemy of the open society, I 
believe, is no longer the communist but the capitalist threat. 
 
When Nobel Prize economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002) and the legendary investor Gorge 
Soros (1997; 2002) expressed such concerns about economic globalization it sent a strong 
message that the current trajectory of economic development is flawed. Six years later in 
2008, we saw the beginning of the worst world economic crisis since the 1930s. 
 
In contrast to the early international debates around environment and development – 
which focused mainly on national issues – today’s discourse places sustainable 
development within the much broader concept of globalization. Indeed, globalization is 
described as adding a ‘new dimension’ to sustainable development in the Johannesburg 
Declaration.  
 
Globalization can be conceived as a process by which the world is becoming more 
interconnected, both in economic relations – encompassing trade, investment, finance, 
and the organization of global production systems – and in social and political 
interactions among organizations, communities, and individuals across the world 
(WCSDG 2004). 
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There is no universally agreed upon definition for globalization and the concept is still 
being formulated (Held and McGrew 2002; Saha 2002).5 Thus, the discourse on 
globalization can be described as representing an area for discussion rather than an 
established mode of thought. Three main theories are often used to frame the process of 
globalization: [1] the World-System Theory (the spread of the capitalist system across the 
globe); [2] the World Polity Theory (the theory that “a rationalized world institutional 
and cultural order has crystallized that consists of universally applicable models that 
shape states, organizations, and individual identities”); and [3] the World Culture Theory 
(the formation of a ‘world consciousness’ that gives meaning to living in the world as a 
single place).6 
 
An important element of the globalization discourse is its links to discussions on the 
“nature and existence of the nation state, economically, politically and culturally” 
(Voisey and O'Riordan 2001, p. 34). Since the ‘nation state’ has a responsibility to move 
towards the objectives of sustainable development (see the Stockholm, Rio, and 
Johannesburg Declarations and Agenda 21), any forces that might influence the 
effectiveness of government in this task will have important implications for the design 
of national and/or international strategies to address sustainable development. Hence, it is 
important to understand how globalization could enhance, undermine, or provide new 
opportunities for government action. 
 
The OECD (1997, p. 19) viewed globalization “as a process in which economic markets, 
technologies, and communication patterns gradually exhibit more ‘global’ 
characteristics and less ‘national’ or ‘local’ ones.”7 More useful definitions (see the 
                                                
5 For a useful list of definitions of globalization, see Streeten (2001, pp. 167-173). For a review and critique 
of the globalization scholarship see Marshall (1996). Marshall analyses the ideological content of 
globalization commentary and rhetoric and provides a useful counterpoint to the proponents of 
globalization. 
6 Source: Emory University, The Globalization Website, Globalization Theories, 
http://www.emory.edu/SOC/globalization/theories.html (accessed on 04/09/06).  
7 OECD’s (1997) four ‘effects’ of globalization are: 
 Scale effects: increased world output, thought to arise from the increase in economic efficiency which 
results as resources are freed to flow to uses which reflect their greatest marginal contribution [a very 
neoclassical argument]. 
 Structural effects: shifts in the composition and location of production and consumption activities. 
Note that following the reasoning above shifts in production are required to realize scale effects. In 
general, “market structures [become] deeper (more geographic specialization in production; more 
contracting-out to independent, but related firms.) and wider (more countries participating actively in 
the global economy.” Further, foreign investment flows become larger, there is “an increase in 
overseas commercial transactions (especially for primary and intermediate products), and a greater 
tendency to export final goods. Expansion may also be expected in the number and extend to 
international co-operative agreements between firms, notably in the fields of R&D, product supply, 
distribution, and marketing. ...” 
 Technology effects: promotion of different technology paths, and increases in the rate of technological 
change. [This is difficult, as technological change is seen both as an enabler of globalization – e.g., 
modern capital markets would be impossible without sophisticated information and communication 
technology – and as a consequence of globalization. (For example, free trade increases direct 
competition between manufacturing industries in “northern” and “southern economies.” Pressures 
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example below) characterize globalization as a linked set of trends in the international 
economy and elaborate on these trends by identifying their approximate cause. Lee (1996, 
p. 485) comments: 
 
The rapid growth in world trade, foreign direct investment, and cross-border financial 
flows over the past decade has been the main manifestation of the increasing 
“globalization” of the world economy. This phenomenon has been driven primarily by a 
worldwide wave of economic liberalization – the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to international trade, the encouragement of foreign investment, and the deregulation of 
financial markets. At the same time technological developments have magnified the 
effects of this liberalization by reducing the costs of transportation and communications, 
hence expanding the scope and volume of goods and services that are internationally 
tradable. 
 
In contrast to Lee’s remarks, Judt (2005) argues that globalization is not about trade 
liberalization or expanding communication networks, but rather “about the 
disappearance of boundaries – cultural and economic boundaries, physical boundaries, 
linguistic boundaries – and the challenge of organizing our world in their absence.” In 
addition, the disappearance of boundaries has placed limitations on the ability of national 
governments to address problems adequately and has enhanced the importance of 
international law and institutions. 
 
While consensus on a definition of globalization has not yet been reached, there appears 
to be some agreement on its core drivers (Held and McGrew 2002; Lall 2002; Saha 2002; 
Stiglitz 2002). These drivers are: [1] the gradual removal of barriers to trade and to the 
movement of capital, services, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people between 
nations; [2] the rapid reduction in the costs of transportation and communication; and [3] 
the creation of new institutions to supplement existing ones to formulate and oversee 
normative rules of engagement (especially for trade, but also increasingly for the 
environment) at the international level. The first driver highlights an interesting 
observation. While the mobility of goods, firms, and capital has grown significantly over 
the past two decades, the ability of people to crisscross national borders has not, which is 
an important difference to previous episodes of globalization (Bordo et al. 1999; 
WCSDG 2004).  
  
These drivers have the effect of bringing nations, people, societies, cultures, economies, 
and markets closer together, affecting them “in different ways through space and time” 
(Voisey and O'Riordan 2001, p. 34). A concise description of the wide range of elements 
that form the process of globalization is put forward by Held and McGrew (2002, p. 3, 
emphasis added):  
 
                                                                                                                     
towards continuous innovation as a means of maintaining comparative advantage thus become more 
intense in the north.) 
 Product effects: production and consumption of different product mixes; “globalization might lead to 
more uniform consumer tastes, influenced by transnational mass media and advertising.” 
Interestingly, one effect which is not articulated is the effect upon financial systems which are affected by, 
as well as affect, economic welfare. 
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Globalization has been variously conceived as action at a distance (whereby the actions 
of social agents in one locale can come to have significant consequences for ‘distant 
others’); time-space compression (referring to the way in which instantaneous electronic 
communication erodes the constraints of distance and time on social organization and 
interaction); accelerating interdependence (understood as the intensification of 
enmeshment among national economies and societies such that events in one country 
impact directly on others); a shrinking world (the erosion of borders and geographical 
barriers to socio-economic activity); and, among other concepts, global integration, the 
reordering of interregional power relations, consciousness of the global condition 
and the intensification of inter-regional interconnectedness. 
 
Like the sustainable development discourse, the globalization debate is somewhat 
polarized by those who are skeptical that such a phenomenon exists and those who 
believe it is an integral and unavoidable aspect of our lives. Held and McGrew (2002) 
provide a useful summary  of the perceptions of those who believe in the existence of the 
globalization process and those who are skeptical (Table 1.1). It is important to recognize 
that the perceptions presented do not necessarily represent the views of all skeptics and 
globalists. By the very nature of the subject, it is highly likely that views on certain issues 
may begin to diverge within the skeptic and globalist camps.  
 
 
Table 1.1: The Great Globalization Debate 
 Skeptics  Globalists 
Concepts Internationalization not globalization 
Regionalization  
One world, shaped by highly extensive, 
intensive and rapid flows, movements 
and networks across regions and 
continents  
Power The nation-state rules 
Inter-governmentalism 
Erosion of state sovereignty, autonomy 
and legitimacy 
Decline of nation-state 
Rise of multilateralism  
Culture Resurgence of nationalism and national 
identity 
Emergence of global popular culture 
Erosion of fixed political identities  
Hybridization  
Economy Development of regional blocs 
Triadization 
New imperialism  
Global informational capitalism  
The transnational economy  
A new global division of labour  
Inequality Growing North-South divide 
Irreconcilable conflicts of interest 
Growing inequality within and across 
societies  
Erosion of old hierarchies  
Order International society of states 
Political conflict between states inevitably 
persists 
International governance and geopolitics  
Communitarianism  
Multilayered global governance 
Global civil society  
Global polity 
Cosmopolitanism  
Source: Held and McGrew (2002, p. 37). 
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A relatively skeptical view of economic globalization is presented by Hirst and 
Thompson (2002), who provide a convincing set of evidence to show that: 
 
1. The present highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented. … In some respects, 
the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that 
prevailed from 1870 to 1914. 
2. Genuinely transnational companies appear to be relatively rare. …[8] 
3. Capital mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment from the 
advanced to the developing countries. …  
4. As some of the extreme advocates of globalization recognize, the world economy is far 
from being genuinely ‘global’. Rather trade, investment and financial flows are 
concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan and North America and this dominance seems 
set to continue. 
5. These major economic powers, the G3, thus have the capacity, especially if they 
coordinate policy, to exert powerful governance pressures over financial markets and 
other economic tendencies. Global markets are thus by no means beyond regulation and 
control, even though the current scope and objectives of economic governance are limited 
by the divergent interests of the great powers and the economic doctrines prevalent 
among their elites. 
 
Held and McGrew (2002, p. 20) support the notion of the “triadization of the world 
economy,” but argue that economic integration has occurred between the broader group 
of Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas. This broader grouping incorporates the 
formation of the APEC, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN multilateral agreements 
and the recent economic integration of the EU. It also suggests that reducing 
globalization to a purely economic or technological discourse is misleading since it does 
not take into account other important forces shaping modern societies. 
 
One additional aspect of globalization that has important challenges for sustainability, 
and an issue often neglected in discussions focusing on technology and industrialization, 
is the movement of labor/human resources in response to pressures for immigration and 
migration.. 
 
Globalization connects the world through the transfer and sharing of 
knowledge/information, financial systems, labor, and the production and consumption of 
goods and services. The latter is termed industrialization. It is possible to identify three 
main types of industrial globalization – i.e., Internationalization, Multi-nationalization, 
and Trans-nationalization (Gordon 1995)9 – the first two of which can have a direct 
impact on environmental degradation.  
 
                                                
8 A transnational company, or corporation, is “an economic entity operating in more than one country or a 
cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in 
their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively” (ECOSOC 2003, 
p. 7).. 
9 For an insightful (early) discussion of how competition in global industries drives the geographic 
configuration and coordination activities of firms/industries, see Porter (1986). 
 19 
Internationalization is the expansion of product/service markets abroad with the locus of 
production remaining within the parent country. The process of internationalization is 
primarily facilitated by cheap transportation services, with information and 
communication technology (ICT) and e-commerce taking a secondary – but nevertheless, 
increasingly important – role. Technology, or products, that are produced in industrial 
nations and exported overseas can provide significant benefits to governments, firms, 
communities, and individuals in the importing nations. However, these technologies and 
products can also introduce new problems or worsen existing problems in these nations. 
For example, the sale of pesticides to a nation that previously had never used such 
chemicals can result in negative environmental and human health impacts. These 
problems are exacerbated by improper, or uncontrolled, use that can occur as a result of 
inadequate warnings, training, or monitoring. Of course, the impacts of such products 
need to be considered against the likely conditions that would exist had they not been 
introduced.  
 
Multi-nationalization is where a (multi-national) company establishes production/service 
facilities abroad to be nearer to foreign markets and/or to take advantage of more 
industry-friendly labor, and environment and tax policies while maintaining research-
and-development (R&D) and innovation-centered activities in the parent country. In this 
situation, the parent company is no longer sending products overseas, but is 
manufacturing or assembling its products overseas. However, it is important to recognize 
that very few companies actually operate branches abroad that are a direct extension of 
the parent company itself. As Clegg (1996, p. 104) comments, “[t]he preponderance of 
firms work through foreign affiliates incorporated according to local law. The parent 
firm in the home country will normally own significant equity in the foreign affiliate.” 
Clegg (1996) argues that the increased turbulence of international business environment 
combined with cheap and effective communication and transportation services provides 
the incentive for parent firms to coordinate with foreign affiliates.  
 
In a study of the U.S. manufacturing industry, Whitford (2006) provides a more nuanced 
description of how firms have outsource their much of their productive capacity to other 
firms in the U.S. and abroad. He describes that “most of what matters to manufacturing 
firms no longer happens under roofs they own or control. This has made the quality of 
relationships between firms much more important and their structure much more 
complex. … How (and where) these large firms choose and direct their armies of 
suppliers has tremendous consequences for the regional economies in which they are 
embedded, because firms selling in the more profitable markets where competition 
depends as much on innovation and quality as it does on price are more likely to use 
skilled and better-paid workers” (ibid, p. 3). Whitford (2006) also argues that the 
structure of manufacturing networks has more to do with how a firm is embedded in a 
particular historical and institutional context, than with factors such as trade policy or 
international regulatory arbitrage.  
 
As with internationalization, the process of multi-nationalization has provided significant 
benefit to societies outside of a multinational enterprise’s (MNE’s) home nation. 
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However, MNEs are also responsible for some of the world’s worst industrial accidents.10 
The more industrial globalization that occurs in this second category, the more concerned 
we should become since the impacts on other nations can be extensive.11  
 
Benton and Redclift (1994) present another way to consider multi-nationalization by 
discussing how the spatial relocation of the Japanese car manufacturing industry has led 
to both positive and negative environmental impacts. On the one hand the relocation of 
car manufacturing plants in other nations is seen to have reduced the environmental 
pollution problem in Tokyo. On the other hand, the creation of new consumer markets for 
Japanese cars is seen to have increased the per capita consumption of energy and material 
at the global level, with a corresponding increase in the amounts of total pollution and 
waste. Hence, the authors argue that this second type of industrial globalization has the 
effect of redistributing environmental costs and benefits.  
 
What is evident from these first two types of industrial globalization is that when 
technology is transferred between nations – primarily by MNEs - both the positive and 
negative aspects of the technology are transferred with the equipment and products. If the 
receiving nation’s ability to control the new technology or industrial processes is limited, 
then what might well be an environmentally-sound technology in an industrialized nation 
can become environmentally destructive if used in an uncontrolled manner.  
 
The third type of industrial globalization, what we will call trans-nationalization, is the 
creation of strategic alliances in which two different foreign enterprises merge/share their 
R&D and other capabilities to create a new entity or product line, reduce expenditures, 
and open up new markets (Gordon 1995; Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). A now 
unsuccessful example of a strategic alliance was the Daimler-Chrysler merger, where 
different technological and managerial capacities were combined ostensibly to create a 
whole that was expected to be greater and more efficient than the sum of its parts. This 
form of industrial globalization is not as common as the first two and is most likely to 
occur between developed nations as opposed to between developed and developing 
nations.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Chapters 
The motivation of this work stems from a dissatisfaction with the current state of the 
world and from a desire to identify those policies and strategies that will transform firms, 
                                                
10 Ashford and Hall (2010) mention that an example of where a MNE’s operation had devastating 
consequences to society in the recipient nation was the Bhopal incident in India. A leak of deadly 
intermediate methyl isocyanate at a Union Carbide pesticide plant killed some four thousand people and 
affected the health of tens of thousands more in the city of Bhopal. While Union Carbide batch processing 
plants in the U.S. are subject to strict health and safety and environmental controls, the Madhya Pradesh 
province in India did not have the motivation to deploy a similar monitoring/control regime. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the health and safety violations at the Bhopal plant were overlooked in the name of 
industrialization and agricultural self-sufficiency. In this case the problem was not due to the sale of 
products or equipment, but the transfer of manufacturing capacity – see Lopatin (2004). 
11 Note, however, that MNEs have come under greater scrutiny by NGOs and stockholders, and have 
increasingly responded to these concerns by adopting “at-home practices” abroad. 
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institutions, governments and societies in a more positive direction. The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the international and domestic pillars of the economic and industrial 
system, in light of their consequences for society and the environment. At the same time, 
this thesis attempts to assemble the literature on alternative assessments of the economy, 
society and the environment, while trying to advance the notion of sustainable 
development, and proposes a series of policies and proposals for such a transition. 
 
While some scholars continue to insist that the concept of sustainability is vague and 
unwieldy, this thesis seeks to explore multidimensional elements of sustainability with 
respect to the economy. Furthermore, it seeks to offer an integrative, transdisciplinary 
approach to policy design for its attainment. Sustainability and the related concepts of 
development, globalization, and economic and environmental justice are interwoven with 
technological, social and institutional change, and with trade as drivers of the 
transformation of industrial and industrializing societies. 
 
The discussion begins by an analysis of the dominant existing models of economic 
growth (chapter 2) and innovation (chapter 3). Despite the fact that innovation has been 
considered the engine of economic growth, here it receives a distinct treatment from the 
literature of economic growth models. This is mainly due to the fact that the various 
economic growth models have omitted technological change until the recent decades, and 
the richness of the literature on innovation merits a chapter on its own right. The 
discussion then advances to the effects of economic growth on sustainability (chapter 4). 
This includes an analysis of the limits of the GDP growth paradigm, but also of the 
effects of growth on the developed and the developing world and the interconnection of 
economic growth and ecological collapse.   
 
The focus of analysis then shifts from the domestic to the international. Trade (chapter 5), 
the international financial system (chapter 6) are examined both in respect to their 
primary theories and characteristics, but also in relation to their effects to sustainability. 
The discussion is then concluded by an examination of the different policy options and 
analytical tools that could be employed for a transition to sustainability (chapter 7).  
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Chapter 2: Economic Growth and Prosperity 
2.1 Factor Endowments and the Classification of Capital 
Economic historians speak in terms of “factor endowments” that nations might possess to 
explain their economic growth. Early lists included land, material resources, energy, and 
a physically-strong labor force. When nations were essential agricultural, land was the 
most highly valued factor – explaining the driving force behind colonialism – and only 
after the industrial revolution, did material resources, energy, and more skilled labor take 
on importance.    
 
Advanced nations are often described now as being in the post-industrial era, in which 
services, rather than manufacturing, become increasingly important and “knowledge-
based” work replaces physical work. Today an expanded list of factor endowments might 
include (Ashford and Hall, 2010): 
 
● Land 
● Material Resources (natural and physical capital) 
● Energy 
● Labor capable of performing physical labor 
● Know-how (intellectual human capital) 
● [innovation systems] 
● Built capital (i.e., infrastructure such as railways, bridges, roads, ports, airports, 
dams, etc.)  
● Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
● (Health and Environment)12 
● Structural capital (knowledge and productive routines held by organizations)  
● Networks and Outsiders (linking organizations, people, and entrepreneurs) 
● Social capital (knowledge held by consumers and citizens) 
 
While not listed in order of importance, nor in strictly chronological order in terms of 
when these factors emerged as important for growth, the list does describe an unfolding 
of factor endowments and characteristics that more-or-less parallels the phases of 
successive industrial development that have occurred and are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
2.2 Theories and Perspectives on Economic Growth 
The relationship between different factor endowments/types of capital and economic 
growth has been the subject of volumes of analysis, predictions, and reinterpretations. It 
is the beyond the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive recantation of that 
                                                
12 Good human health (both physical and mental) and an unpolluted and preserved environment (what 
could be called ‘environmental capital’) are increasingly regarded as essential for maintaining the 
productiveness of human and natural/physical capital even if the are not factors of production per se.  For 
this reason we place them in round brackets.  
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literature. What we do provide is the salient evolution of major thinking that has guided 
economic and industrial policy from Adam Smith to Ricardo to current innovation-based 
perspectives, including the so-called ‘knowledge-based’ economy. Below, we borrow 
heavily from the scholarship of Niehans (1990); Todaro and Smith (2009); Drucker 
(1994; 1999); and Schumpeter (1939).  
 
2.2.1 Linear Stages of Growth Models: The Harrod-Domar Model 
After the end of World War II, the question of economic growth became particularly 
prevalent, especially in the case of poor or underdeveloped countries. Western 
economists, however, only had one economic growth paradigm to draw conclusions from 
– that of the economic development of the western world. Their rationale lay in the fact 
that all developed western societies were in essence agrarian at some point of their 
histories, but industrialized through a series of steps or stages. Success in rebuilding 
Europe through massive financial aid in the Marshall Plan suggested that what was 
needed to advance the faltering economies of Asia, Africa, and Lain America was an 
influx of large injections of capital into those economies. Thus, a particular emphasis was 
placed on accelerated capital accumulation, (Todaro and Smith 2009), which is also 
known as “capital fundamentalism.”  
 
In the context of this analysis, the mobilization of foreign investment and domestic 
saving was also deemed necessary for economic growth. The Harrod-Domar model offers 
a description of the economic mechanism by which increases in saving and investing 
would lead to accelerated growth. 
 
The Harrod-Domar model, today often cited as the AK model because of the employment 
of a linear production function with output of the economy (Y) defined as the product of 
the capital stock (K) times a constant (A), was one of the first models to suggest that the 
economy could grow in perpetuity (Todaro and Smith 2009).13  
 
The main point of the model is that if actual growth is above the warranted (i.e., expected 
or achievable) growth, the existing production of capital goods is below the required (i.e., 
demanded) level of capital goods; hence, growth will be stimulated through increases in 
orders. If growth, on the other hand, appears to be sluggish, the capital stock will appear 
as underutilized and growth will be further slowed down (Niehans 1990). Hence, the 
growth path appeared to be on a knife’s edge, with significant centrifugal forces at work.  
                                                
13 The equation  is a simplified version of the famous equation in the Harrod-Domar model of 
economic growth. The equation states that the GDP growth rate (ΔY/Y) is determined by the net national 
savings ratio s and the national capital-output ratio k, which in the Harrod-Domar model, is fixed. In fact, 
equation (1) can be interpreted simply as determining the savings necessary to achieve a certain growth rate 
depending on the capital/output ratio. One of the fundamental intuitions of the model was that doubling the 
savings rate would double the rate of economic growth, for a given capital-output ratio. An increase in the 
propensity to save and in the average productivity of capital appeared to be a sine-qua-non of rapid 
economic growth (Niehans 1990). For a given k, the corresponding growth rate is the warranted or justified 
rate of growth.  
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Furthermore, the stability problem of the model also related to the full employment of 
labor. For given rates of population growth and technical progress, continued full 
employment would result in a certain rate of output growth – or a “natural rate.” If the 
warranted rate appeared to be less than the natural rate, the implication of the model is 
that there is no reason why the economy should not enjoy boom conditions, which can 
also be potentially inflationary (Niehans 1990). Nevertheless, if the warranted rate 
surpasses the natural rate, actual growth must fall short of warranted growth most of the 
time. The consequence of that is that depressions will be long and considerable while 
booms ephemeral.  
 
Aside from its potentially inadequate descriptive capacities, the model appeared to have 
other limitations. Labor force growth and technological progress constitute two other 
components of economic growth, apart from savings and investment. Labor force growth 
is omitted from the Harrod-Domar model and labor is assumed to be abundant, an 
assumption which can be valid in the developing-country context, though not always 
(Todaro and Smith 2009). Finally, technological progress can be expressed in the context 
of the Harrod-Domar model as a decrease in the required capital-output ratio for a 
specific growth rate target. Nevertheless, the fixed capital-output ratio does not allow for 
the most efficient use of each factor of production. However, this limitation of the 
Harrod-Domar model was one of the driving forces behind the introduction of Solow’s 
model, which is examined later. 
  
While the linear stage of growth the model may be incomplete, it could be argued that 
high domestic savings and/or the injection of foreign capital are necessary, though not 
sufficient, conditions for economic growth in an under-developed economy.   
 
2.2.2 Structural Change Models 
Structural-change models focus on the mechanism by which poor or underdeveloped 
economies manage to transform their domestic economic structures from agrarian to 
more modern and industrially diverse manufacturing and service economies (Todaro and 
Smith 2009). The most well-known and representative example of the structural-change 
approach is the “two-sector surplus labor” theoretical model of W. Arthur Lewis.  
 
Lewis’ model focused on the structural transformation of a primarily subsistence 
economy and became the general theory of the development process in surplus-labor 
developing nations during most of the 1960s and 1970s, while having a lot of adherents 
still today (Todaro and Smith 2009).  
 
According to Todaro and Smith’s (2009) analysis, “in the Lewis model, the 
underdeveloped economy consists of two sectors: a traditional, overpopulated rural 
subsistence sector characterized by zero marginal labor productivity – a situation that 
permits Lewis to classify this as surplus labor in the sense that it can be withdrawn from 
the traditional agricultural sector without any loss of output – and a high-productivity 
modern urban industrial sector into which labor from the subsistence sector is gradually 
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transferred. The primary focus of the model is on both the process of labor transfer and 
the growth of output and employment in the modern sector.”  
 
The key point of the model is that the process of self-sustaining growth of the modern 
sector along with employment expansion will continue until all surplus rural labor is 
absorbed in the new industrial sector. After that point, additional workers can be 
withdrawn from the agricultural sector only at the cost of lost food production. The above 
process shifts the balance of economic activity from traditional rural agriculture to 
modern industries (Todaro and Smith 2009).  
 
However, even though the Lewis model reflects the historical experience of economic 
growth in the industrialized nations, a series of concerns have been voiced about the 
descriptive capacity of the model in the context of contemporary developing countries. 
Todaro and Smith (2009) focuses on four different points of criticism: 
 
1. The model implicitly assumes that the rate of labor transfer and employment 
creation in the modern sector is proportional to the rate of modern-sector capital 
accumulation. However, Todaro and Smith notes that if capitalist profits are 
reinvested in more sophisticated laborsaving capital equipment rather than just 
duplicating the existing capital, then, even though output does increase, wages 
and employment rates remain unchanged, and all of the extra output accrues to 
capitalists in the form of profits. This is a process that some have described as 
“antidevelopmental economic growth,” with all of the extra input and output 
growth distributed to the owners of capital rather than the working classes. 
2. The assumption of the Lewis model that surplus labor exists in rural areas while 
there is full employment in the urban areas is contradicted by the latest research 
that indicates that there is little surplus labor in rural locations.  
3. An additional questionable assumption is linked to the notion of a competitive 
modern-sector labor market that can guarantee the continued existence of constant 
real urban wages up to the point where the supply of rural surplus labor is 
exhausted. Todaro and Smith (2009) notes that up until the 1980s, “a striking 
feature of urban labor markets and wage determination in almost all developing 
countries was the tendency for these wages to rise substantially over time (both in 
real and nominal terms), even in the presence of rising levels of open modern-
sector unemployment and low or zero marginal productivity in agriculture.” This 
was due to a series of institutional factors, such as unionization, civil service wage 
scales, etc.  
4. Finally, Lewis made the assumption of diminishing returns in the modern 
industrial sector. However, evidence suggests that increasing, rather than 
diminishing returns prevail in that sector.  
 
Technological displacement (or the tendency of technology transfer to be biased towards 
labor-saving changes) may offset technology gains that accrue to workers. Finally, this 
model – as well as others – may not apply uniformly in all developing countries (Rodrik 
2007). 
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2.2.3 The International Dependence Revolution 
International-dependence models gained increasing support during the 1970s, as a result 
of increasing disenchantment with the linear stages of growth and the structural change 
models (Todaro and Smith 2009). This theory, even though it became less mainstream in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, has resurfaced in various versions in the last decade, and has been 
adopted by proponents of the anti-globalization movement. The main intuition of these 
models is that developing countries are “beset by institutional, political and economic 
rigidities, both domestic and international, and caught up in a dependence and dominance 
relationship with rich countries” (Todaro and Smith 2009). There are three major streams 
of thought in the context of the international dependence models: 
 
• The Neocolonial Dependence Model 
• The False-Paradigm Model 
• The Dualistic-Development Thesis 
 
The neocolonial dependence model is a direct byproduct of Marxist analysis. Its basic 
thesis is that the existence of underdeveloped countries is a direct consequence of the 
highly unequal capitalist system. Even though it might not be the case that rich countries 
intentionally exploit poor and less developed countries, the very structure of the system 
which is dominated by unequal power relationships between the center and the periphery 
(the developed and under-developed nations) makes any attempt of poor nations to be 
self-reliant and independent difficult or even unattainable (Todaro and Smith 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the false-paradigm model does not attribute underdevelopment to the 
inherent structure of the global economic system, but rather to “faulty and inappropriate 
advice provided by well-meaning but often uninformed, biased and ethnocentric 
international expert advisers from developed-country assistance agencies and 
multinational donor organizations” (Todaro and Smith 2009). These experts are 
considered to offer complex and theoretically sound, but often faulty and misleading 
models of development that often lead to inappropriate or incorrect policy approaches.  
 
Central to the understanding of the dualistic-development thesis is the notion of dualism. 
Dualism is “a concept widely discussed in development economics. It represents the 
existence and persistence of substantial and even increasing divergence between rich and 
poor nations and rich and poor people” (Todaro and Smith 2009). This notion underlines 
that different sets of conditions – some superior and some inferior – can coexist in a 
given space. Wealthy, educated elites, for instance, can coexist with poor, uneducated 
masses. According to the dualistic-development thesis, this coexistence is not a mere 
systemic transition but it is actually chronic and hardwired in underdeveloped societies.  
 
In developed nations, the growth of an ‘underclass’ parallels this dualism, with one part 
of a nation’s economy linking producers, workers, and consumers (even across borders), 
and another part of the nation’s economy comprised of low-wage workers or the 
unemployed, possibly but not necessarily subsidized by welfare programs of the state. 
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2.2.4 Neoclassical Growth Theory: The Solow Model 
The Solow Neoclassical growth model, for which Robert Solow received the Nobel Prize, 
encapsulates the main features of the neoclassical growth theory and is probably the most 
famous model of economic growth to-date.14 Solow’s basic innovation was to construct 
his model of production in a different way to that of the Harrod-Domar model, which did 
not allow for the substitution of labor for capital in production. The labor/capital ratio 
was fixed in the Harrod-Domar model, and steady growth occurred only under certain 
specific conditions. Solow substituted the fixed labor/capital ratio with a production 
function in which both capital and labor could vary. This had significant advantages. 
First, it allowed the producer to switch from capital to labor when capital became too 
expensive and vice versa (Warsh 2006). Furthermore, the model also allowed for an 
exogenous parameter which described the rate of technical change. Because the rate of 
technological progress is given exogenously, the Solow neoclassical model is sometimes 
called an exogenous growth model. Thus, the model has no explanatory power with 
respect to the source of technical change. 
 
The key implication of the Solow model is that unlike the Harrod-Domar model, an 
increase in savings in the Solow model will not by itself increase growth in the long run. 
In fact, according to the model, growth depends only on population and technology. An 
increase as a result of increased savings will occur, but it will only be temporary, and the 
economy will eventually return to the level of steady state growth. An increase in 
savings, on the other hand, will only increase the equilibrium level of capital (Todaro and 
Smith 2009). However, Mankiw et al. (1992), from analyzing cross-national data, note 
that it appears that if the rate of savings is increased, then the economy may not return 
even half-way to its former lower steady state for decades. Furthermore, even though the 
model predicts that an increase in savings does not change the equilibrium rate of growth, 
it does increase the equilibrium output per person. Hence, from an empirical standpoint, 
even if the Solow model does depict the economy accurately. Mankiw et al. (1992) argue 
that an increase in the savings rate can boost the rate of economic growth for decades. 
This expectation, however, remains controversial for some – see Todaro and Smith 
(2009).  
 
Another key point in Solow’s analysis was the estimated contribution of technical change 
to the rate of US GDP growth over the period 1909-1949. Through the use of a modified 
                                                
14 The equation Δk = sf(k) - (δ+n)k is the fundamental equation of the Solow model. The intuition behind 
this equation is that the change in the capital-labor ratio k (or growth in capital intensity in the course of 
time) depends on aggregate savings sf(k) (savings rate s times f(k) which is the output of the economy) 
after allowing for the amount of capital required to service depreciation, δk, and after providing the existing 
amount of capital per worker to new workers joining the labor force, nk (Todaro and Smith 2009). If 
sf(k*)=(δ+n)k* then the capital intensity remains unchanged and the economy grows without any change in 
its structure. This, according to the model, is the path of balanced growth (Niehans 1990). 
The notation k* denotes the level of capital per worker when the economy is in steady state. 
Solow deemed this equilibrium level of capital to be stable. If k<k* then (n+δ)k<sf(k). But from equation 
(2) we see that when (n+δ)k<sf(k) then Dk>0. As a result, k in the economy will grow towards the 
equilibrium level k* (Todaro and Smith 2009). Similar reasoning applies when k>k*.  
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production function Y=f(K,L,t), where K = capital, L = labor, and t represents technical 
change over time, Solow found that technical change accounted for approximately 50% 
of the increase in output per capital, which corresponded to a contribution to GNP growth 
of the non-farm sector of about 1.5% a year (Todaro and Smith 2009). Solow’s finding 
underlined the importance and provided a means of including technical change explicitly 
(even though only as a residual) in the mathematical modeling of economic growth.  
 
2.2.5 New Growth Theory: Romer’s Model 
The New or Endogenous Growth Theory was developed during the late 1980s by Paul 
Romer, but many of its basics elements and intuitions were already present in the work of 
Joseph Schumpeter. The motivation behind the introduction of this new theory originated 
from the limitations of the neoclassical theories in illuminating the sources of long-term 
economic growth (Todaro and Smith 2009). In these models, technological change is 
treated as mostly exogenous. In contrast, Romer’s (1990) model treats technical change 
as endogenous.  
 
Endogenous growth simply means technological change generated from within a system, 
versus technological change that was treated as a “black box” in the case of exogenous 
growth models. In the 1990s, output was much higher than what it was in the 1890s. 
Economics needed some economic theory to account for that level of growth. In 1990, 
output per hour worked in the US was calculated as 10 times as valuable as output per 
hour worked 100 years before (Romer 1990). Technological progress provided a good 
quality explanation for that level of growth, along with the growth in human capital, or 
the development of an effective labor force.  
 
Romer’s (1986) and (1990) papers, which some regard as the centerpieces of the new 
growth theory, emanated from a main contradiction laying at the heart of economic 
theory since Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” was released in 1776 (See Box 2.1). As 
described earlier, Smith’s central point lay in the increases in productivity that could be 
achieved through both competition among economic actors and through the division of 
labor, which was illustrated by the now famous example of the pin factory. The pin 
factory involves a factory whose employees, by focusing on narrow tasks, end up 
producing more output than what they could if each worked independently. This point, 
however, hid a contradiction. The example of the pin factory describes the reality of an 
increasing return to scale: more workers produce a bigger factory and consequently more 
pins. Moreover, increasing returns to scale are associated with the emergence of natural 
monopolies, because larger business can achieve lower costs through the advantages of 
scale. This is the opposite of Adam Smith’s description of the “invisible hand” which 
requires a large number of competitors and the absence of monopoly power. In the theory 
of perfect competition, the idea that free markets operate smoothly and optimally largely 
depends on the assumption of diminishing returns to scale. Even if the emergence of a 
natural monopoly were possible, scale advantages of a natural monopoly could be offset 
by greater incentives for profit-seeking competitors who try harder, assuming there are 
low barriers to entry. Also, neoclassical economics predicts that competitive prices are 
generally lower and output greater than under monopoly conditions. The most important 
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fact assumed by the new endogenous growth theory is the expectation of increasing 
returns on capital because of technological change (Warsh 2006). 
 
This model fills the gap unexplained by the neoclassical theory that considers 
technological progress as being independent from decisions of economic agents. 
Neoclassical theory also fails to explain big differences between growth in countries with 
similar technologies. Furthermore, at the core of endogenous growth theory lies a 
criticism for globalized trade. In traditional neoclassical models, growth emanates from  
trade. Neoliberal economists have interpreted the association between higher growth rates 
and a larger volume of trade as one where causality flows from the second to the first 
rather than the other way around (Gill and Law 1988). However, as the criticisms made 
for Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (see Box 2.2) suggest, an increasing 
volume of trade does not necessarily lead to sustainable growth. What the endogenous 
growth theory did was to show how countries can work in the context of a globalizing 
economy to focus on complementary activities, such as education and retraining, and 
coherent regulatory frameworks, which can facilitate their economic development.  
 
In his 1986 paper, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Paul Romer essentially 
set the foundations for the endogenous growth theory. In that paper, he proposed a model 
where economic growth is driven by the accumulation of knowledge, which is the really 
important form of capital (Romer 1990). Romer essentially tried to discard the 
neoclassical hypothesis of diminishing marginal returns in capital investments, permitting 
for increasing returns in aggregate production and focusing on the role of externalities 
(specifically knowledge spillover effects) in determining the rate of return on capital 
investments (Todaro and Smith 2009). According to Romer, investment in knowledge 
leads to increasing returns in marginal products, since technological innovation can lead 
to the deployment of new technologies, which can reduce the cost of production and put 
one company ahead of its competition. Romer’s last point in his 1986 paper was that 
knowledge has what he described as a “natural externality,” since it cannot be perfectly 
patented or kept secret. Hence, new knowledge has a spillover on the production 
possibilities of other firms as well.  
 
In his 1990 paper, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Romer set out the preconditions 
for the deployment of endogenous growth. His model has four basic inputs: capital, labor, 
human capital (education, training) and an index of the level of technology. Romer’s key 
intuition is that the most important precondition of growth lies not in the population 
dynamics but in the human capital dynamics. Hence, it is investments in new research, 
education and human capital rather than investments in physical capital accumulation that 
should be fostered. 
 
In general, the endogenous growth theory, by focusing on knowledge and 
externalities, provides a way for countries to enter the new knowledge economy by 
making the best use out of their available resources. The main weakness of this model, 
however, is that it overlooks inefficiencies that arise in developing countries (poor 
infrastructure, poor capital and goods markets) that can significantly affect one country’s 
growth prospects. 
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BOX 2.1: ADAM SMITH (1723-1790) 
Box 1.1: ADAM SMITH (1723-1790) 
Adam Smith is regarded as the patriarch of classical economic growth theory. In his 
magnum opus, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” 
which is considered the founding document of the science of economics, Smith linked 
the division of labor and the pursuit of self-interest to the general welfare of society 
and outlined the guiding behind the allocation of resources in a growing economy. 
 
Perhaps the most famous phrase emerging from his work the “Wealth of Nations” is 
Smith’s “Invisible Hand,” a term that describes a process that advances the interests of 
a society through the individual’s search of self-interest and self-advantage. Thus, 
what Smith essentially argued was that greed will drive actors to socially beneficial 
behavior. This is nothing different than the process of “competition,” working though  
the interdependent system of prices and quantities that is known today as the price 
system.   
 
Smith’s central message with respect to growth was that the division of labor 
increases labor productivity. In his analysis, Smith used the examples of workers in 
several different disciplines to make the case that, under an optimal division of labor, 
they would end up producing more output than what they would produce if they 
worked independently to satisfy their various needs. In Smith’s view, this was the 
locomotive behind increasing productivity and improving standards of living.  
 
At its core, Smith’s growth model is an optimistic one. In Smith’s viewpoint, an 
increased division of labor will lead to increases in productivity, incomes and 
consequent increases in demand which will increase the size of markets and, through 
this virtuous spiral, cause further increases in the division of labor, productivity etc. 
However, this process was neither automatic, nor inevitable. “Good government” was 
necessary in order to maintain a competitive environment and avoid the emergence of 
monopolies, that would restrict output in order to increase prices and, consequently, 
their profits. Even though the role of the government was not needed for the 
functioning of the market for Smith, except to maintain a competitive economy and 
avoid monopoly, it played a central role in other areas such as defense, administration 
of justice and the consolidation of public institutions. He also made a forceful case for 
the mutual benefits of free trade among nations introducing the principle of 
comparative advantage. For him, it was better to buy a cheaper commodity from 
another country and pay for it with the resources obtained from a local industry with 
some advantage in comparison to other countries. The concept of comparative 
advantage was, however, later further developed by David Ricardo. 
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BOX 2.2: DAVID RICARDO (1772-1823) 
Box 2.2: DAVID RICARDO (1772-1823) 
Ricardo’s most famous contribution to economics lies in the ‘theory of comparative 
advantage.”*  Ricardo’s theory argues that a nation is economically best off for doing 
whatever it is best at, even if others are better at it (We 1994). According to that 
perspective, when countries specialize in the production of those goods for which they 
have a comparative advantage, and trade ensues, there is an absolute gain in welfare 
for both economies (Gill and Law 1988).  
This theory, however, appears to have significant limitations. In globalization, foreign 
direct investment is the rule, rather than the exception. Hence, the export sector of one 
nation can be owned by capitalists from another, and nothing prevents these foreign 
owners from repatriating most of their profits (Gill and Law 1988). This was exactly 
the case for countries like India, most of whose resources were depleted by England. 
In general, relying on trade for economic growth can be problematic, especially in the 
case of developing countries. This does not mean that growth cannot be achieved in 
that scenario. However it can only be achieved at the cost of escalating international, 
North-South and internal inequalities, along with increasing dependence on 
transnational firms (Gill and Law 1988).   
Unlike Smith, Ricardo did not offer a new model of economic growth. While Smith 
had tried to explain the growth of wealth, Ricardo deemed the proper task of an 
economist is to study the distribution of wealth among the three major classes of the 
society: the workers, the landowners, and the capitalists (Warsh 2006). However, 
Ricardo did modify Smith’s existing model of economic growth to include 
diminishing returns to land.  
According to his analysis, unlike labor, the output of which could be increased 
through increases in productivity, Ricardo deemed land to be “variable in quality and 
fixed in supply.” Hence, as growth increases, more land is necessary, but land cannot 
be just created, since it already exists in limited supply. This significantly affects 
growth. First, the limited supply of land will lead to increases in rents and 
consequently decrease entrepreneurial profits. Furthermore, the prices of agricultural 
goods will increase over time and this will lead to workers requiring wage increases. 
This leads to a quicker barrier to growth than what Smith allowed for, but Ricardo also 
claimed that this decline can be happily checked by technological improvements in 
machinery and the specialization brought by trade. 
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Chapter 3: Innovation & Economic Growth 
3.1 Technological Change 
For almost three centuries societies have experienced the transformative power of 
technological innovation. This chapter looks at why technological innovation has been 
and is such an important driver of economic progress, especially during the last 100 years 
which has been an era of unprecedented technological change. Technology – defined here 
as the application of science for the achievement of practical purposes (Dorf 2001) – is 
considered in the context of society, the economy, employment, the environment, and 
national governance. 
 
The characteristics and capabilities of modern technology far surpass any forms of 
technology that supported earlier societies. One major point of distinction between the 
technologies of the industrial revolution and those used by hunter-and-gatherer and 
agricultural societies concern the energy sources which technologies depend upon. 
Modern technology is predominantly dependant on fossil fuels and other sources of 
nonrenewable energy (oil, coal, gas, and nuclear), whereas the more primitive 
technologies were powered by the three Ws – wind, water, and wood (Wetlesen 1999).15 
In this regard, the first industrial revolution was primarily an energy revolution. Perhaps, 
a future industrial transformation will be characterized by a shift to renewable energy 
sources away from a reliance on nonrenewable supplies (Jänicke and Jacob 2008).  
 
3.2 The Long Waves16  
The first person to identify the occurrence of major technological transitions during the 
ninetieth and twentieth century was the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff 
(Kondratieff 1935 [1925]). Kondratieff’s notion of a long wave cycle (known as a 
Kondratieff-wave, or K-wave) was originally used to describe long wave economic 
cycles, or structural changes in the world economy.17 By observing the behavior of prices 
and interest rates in the UK and U.S. between 1789 to 1926, Kondratieff identified long 
wave cycles of S-shaped growth (i.e., initial slow growth that is followed by a period of 
rapid growth towards saturation) that occurred over a period of 50-60 years. His ideas 
were later adopted and further elaborated by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter 
(1939) who argued that K-waves were caused by the clustering of innovations that led to 
rapid technology-based economic growth, which either opened up new markets or 
disrupted existing ones.18  
                                                
15 However, the muscle power of humans and domestic animals also played an important role in helping 
these societies achieve their objectives (Wetlesen 1999). 
16 Drawn heavily from Ashford and Hall (2010).  
17 Source: Modelski, G., The Evolutionary World of Politics, Kondratieff Waves, 
http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/IPEKWAVE.html (accessed on 11/10/08).  
18 Schumpeter (1934) was the first person to distinguish diffusion from invention and innovation by 
describing technological innovation as the linear process of invention-innovation-diffusion. His theory was 
that entrepreneurs not only innovate by taking an invention to market, but by creating new manufacturing 
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Within the modern era of technological development, there have been four distinct 60 to 
70-year K-waves (or periods) of technologicaly-driven economic development (Grubler 
and Nowotny 1990). Each of these waves can be characterized by growth sectors, 
emerging technologies, and by new concepts of management and industrial organization 
(Table 3.1). In each case, the emergence of new technologies resulted in a technological 
transition that tended to follow a sigmoid curve (S-curve) (Figure 3.1). While the fifth 
technological cycle of development (1985 - 2050) is still in the process of being defined, 
the characteristics identified are those emerging in many industrial societies today, with 
the possible exception of the nuclear sector being a growth sector.19 A potential growth 
sector that has been added to Table 3.1 is NBIC convergence (i.e., the convergence of 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information and communication technology, and 
cognitive sciences into major new areas of research and development). Important 
emerging technologies that have been added to the list in Table 3.1 are nanotechnology 
and ubiquitous computing (i.e., computers/technologies that are embedded and networked 
into all aspects of our lives to such an extent that we are not fully aware of their existence 
or simply take them for granted)20.  
 
Perhaps what is the most striking about the waves of economic development (represented 
by the pace of innovation) is how the scientific and technological breakthroughs that 
fueled them have also shaped the modern era by improving public health and changing 
the fabric of modern society (Langford 2004). From the steam engine to the combustion 
engine and from the telegraph to satellite and laser communications, each transition has 
provided new opportunities to improve our quality of life. These transitions in technology 
have been paralleled by major scientific advances in areas such as medicine and genetic 
engineering, which have improved the health of those societies with access to the new 
medicines or knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
processes (e.g., Eli Whitney’s ‘American System’ of manufacture of interchangeable parts), identifying 
products for new consumer markets, and developing new forms of industrial organization. However, a 
limitation of Schumpeter’s theories is that he was preoccupied “with the individual entrepreneur and the 
individual innovation” and was reluctant to “conceptualize invention, innovation, and technology 
accumulation as a social process” (Freeman 1990, p. 24). Schumpeter (1934, p. 228) explained clustering 
by stating that “the appearance of one or a few entrepreneurs facilitates the appearance of others,” and 
provided no real explanation for what caused clustering or why Kondratieff’s long wave cycles occurred in 
non-uniform but necessarily periodic intervals (Ruttan 1959). Today, it is widely recognized that the 
institutional or legislative framework within which businesses operate (what might be called ‘institutional 
capital’) play an influential role in the formation of innovation clusters (Kingston 2004; Freeman 1990). 
19 Ashford and Hall (2010) state that public unease with the safety of nuclear technology, nuclear 
proliferation, long-term waste management requirements, and life cycle costs are four important factors 
limiting the growth of the nuclear sector. However, if a greater emphasis is placed on electricity production 
that does not produce CO2 and the four factors above are adequately addressed, the nuclear sector might 
experience a resurgence (Deutch et al. 2003; Nuttall 2004). However, nuclear power is likely to remain a 
highly controversial energy option. 
20 This is an approach adopted by Ashford and Hall (2010). 
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Major Technological Complexes 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Major Technological Complexes 
 1770-1830 1820-1890 1880-1945 1935-1995 1985-2050 
Growth 
sectors 
Water power 
Ships 
Canals 
Coal 
Railroads 
Steam power 
Mechanical 
equipment 
Cars 
Trucks 
Trolleys 
Chemical industry 
Metallurgical 
processes 
Electric power 
Oil 
Airplanes 
Radio and TV 
Instruments and 
controls  
Gas 
Nuclear 
Information 
Telecommunications 
Satellite and laser 
communications 
[NBIC] 
Emerging 
technologies 
Mechanical 
equipment 
Coal 
Stationary steam 
power 
Electricity  
Internal combustion  
Telegraph 
Steam shipping 
Electronics 
Jet engines 
Air transport 
Nuclear  
Computers 
Gas 
Telecommunications 
Biotechnology 
Artificial 
intelligence  
Space 
communication and 
transport  
[Nanotechnology 
Ubiquitous 
computing] 
Management  Economy of scale 
Interchangeable 
parts 
Administrative 
management 
Professional 
management 
Participatory and 
interconnected 
systems management 
Industrial 
organization 
Concept of the 
industrial firm 
Division of labor 
Concept of  
mass production 
Interchangeable 
parts 
Concept of 
management 
structure and 
delegation 
Concept of 
decentralization 
Concept of systems 
structure 
      
  Source: Grubler and Nowotny (1990), from NRC (2002, p. 73). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Source: Ashford and Hall (2010) 
Figure 3.1: Stulized Graph of Schumpeter's Waves of Technology-based Economic 
Development 
 
With each transition, the complexity of new technological systems is increasing, placing 
greater demands on our ability to understand how these new systems interact and behave. 
The task of defining and understanding the dynamic and evolving nature of technological 
systems will be a major undertaking of the 21st century. One might argue that our 
inability to understand or predict, and then counteract or respond to the behavior of these 
systems is the main reason why there exists so much concern about the future prospects 
of developed societies.21 We need not look far to see the numerous events that have 
devastated communities and the natural world as a result of technological and scientific 
advances.22 
                                                
21 See the discussion in the next section of the Information Revolution raising the question of whether its 
advances can be measured by the metrics developed for the first and second industrial revolutions. 
22 Ashford and Hall (2010) note a few salient examples which include the 1969 oil spills on the Cuyahoga 
River in Ohio and off the coast of Santa Barbara, U.S.; the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 
Pace of 
Innovation 
Time 
First Wave Second Wave Third Wave Fourth Wave 
? 
Fifth Wave 
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At the turn of the millennium, the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) undertook a 
study to identify the twenty greatest engineering achievements of the twentieth century 
(Table 3.2).23 A look at how these achievements (shown below) relate to Table 3.1 is 
instructive. For example, several of the achievements identified by the Academy have 
been emerging technologies during one wave of economic development that later became 
one of several technologies supporting growth sectors. The internal combustion engine 
(ICE) and electronics were emerging technologies during the second (1820-1890) and 
third (1880-1945) waves of economic development, respectively. Both technologies 
subsequently supported the growth sectors in the following waves of economic 
development. The ICE played a critical role in the car and truck growth sectors (1880-
1945) and electronics (transistors in particular) were crucial in the development of radio 
and TV (1935-1995). The chemical industry was part of the third wave and could almost 
be considered a revolution of its own. The first and second wave, and the third and fourth 
wave, are often known as the first and second industrial revolution, respectively 
(Hagemann 2008). 
 
These trends provide an indication of how individual technologies can follow an S-
shaped curve of growth. Their rate of growth is slow during the emergent state, but rapid 
when part of a growth sector. Once market saturation occurs the pace of innovation (and 
economic growth) falls as new growth sectors begin to emerge.  
Table 3.2: The NAE's Twenty Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century 
Table 3.2: The NAE’s Twenty Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th 
Century 
1. Electrification 
2. Automobile  
3. Airplane 
4. Water Supply and Distribution 
5. Electronics 
6. Radio and Television 
7. Agricultural Mechanization 
8. Computers 
9. Telephone 
10. Air Conditioning and Refrigeration 
11. Highways  
12. Spacecraft 
13. Internet 
14. Imaging 
15. Household Appliances 
16. Health Technologies 
17. Petroleum and Petrochemical Technologies 
18. Laser and Fiber Optics 
19. Nuclear Technologies 
20. High-performance Materials 
 
It is hard to imagine what the modern world would be like without the above list of 
technologies. For example, in industrialized nations the computer has infiltrated almost 
all aspects of contemporary life. Even those members of society who do not directly use 
                                                                                                                     
Pennsylvania, U.S.; the 1984 Bhopal incident where a leak of deadly methyl isocyanate at a Union Carbide 
pesticide plant in Bhopal, India killed some 3,800 people; the 1986 nuclear reactor meltdown at Chernobyl 
power station which released radioactive material throughout the Northern Hemisphere; and the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill which released 11 million gallons of oil into Alaska’s Prince William sound. While 
preventing such disasters is a primary objective of systems engineering, some argue that no matter how 
many warnings and safeguards are designed into our modern large scale technological systems (such as a 
nuclear power or petrochemical plant), growing systems complexity means that failures are inevitable 
(Perrow 1999). Ashford and Hall (2010) also note that  what is missing from the above list are incidents 
that occurred through the intentional use of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons.  
23 Source: National Academy of Engineering, The Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century, 
http://www.greatachievements.org/greatachievements/index.html (accessed on 04/08/06).  
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computers are required to interact with them indirectly (Marx and Smith 1994). 
Supermarkets, banks, libraries, schools, hospitals, trains, buses, automobiles, and airlines 
all rely on or use computers. Hence, individuals are required to interact with computers 
on a daily basis whether they are aware of it or not.  
 
Implicit in the above discussion is the idea that technology has played, and will continue 
to play, an influential role in shaping modern industrial societies. This idea of 
technological determinism - a technology-led theory of social change - can be traced back 
to the early stages of the industrial revolution. 
 
Largely due to the early technocratic views of America’s forefathers, who believed that 
economic and political independence could be achieved by developing machine-based 
manufacturing, and big business advertising, the American technological culture was 
firmly established by the mid twentieth century (Pursell 1996; Smith 1994). Tables 3.3 
and 3.4 provide some evidence of the emergence of this culture by highlighting the rates 
of adoption and ownership levels of several major technologies in the U.S.  
Table 4.3: Speed of Adoption of Technology in the U.S. 
Table 3.3: Speed of Adoption of Technology in the U.S. 
Technology Year Invented Years until 25% of the U.S. 
population adopted 
it 
Electricity  1873 46 
Telephone 1875 35 
Auto 1885 55 
Television 1925 26 
Microwave oven 1953 30 
Personal computer 1975 15 
Cellular phone 1983 13 
Source: Dorf (2001, p. 72). 
Table 5.4: Percent of U.S. Households with the Technology in 1999 
Table 3.4: Percent of U.S. Households with the Technology in 1999 
Television  98% 
Cordless phone 72% 
Personal computer 46% 
 Source: Dorf (2001, p. 72). 
 
3.3 The Information or Post-Industrial Revolution  
It is now apparent, at the turn of the 21st Century, that developed economies are 
transitioning towards a post-industrial, or information-based, society (Castells 1999). Bell 
(1999) describes a post-industrial society as one which relies on the economics of 
information (or intellectual capital) as opposed to the economics of goods (from 
manufacturing) or reliance on the services sector of production versus the manufacturing 
sector of production. Where the steam engine was argued to be the catalyst for the 
industrial revolution, global information technology is argued to be the catalyst for the 
information revolution. Therefore, the signs of an emerging post-industrial society are a 
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growing services sector and an increasing reliance on information technology. However, 
the post-industrial society will not displace the older one; instead it will overlay some of 
the previous layers in a similar way that the industrial society did not eliminate the 
agricultural sectors of society (Bell 1999). People will still rely on agriculture and 
manufacturing to survive. The development of new technological forms for the post-
industrial society will need to respond to this new era of human development, where 
information and products and services become intertwined. 
 
In the insightful article The Age of Social Transformations, Drucker (1994) charts the 
major changes that have occurred in the structure of society from the early agricultural to 
the new knowledge-based societies. In particular, he describes how two technology-based 
shifts in the nature of employment have occurred.  
 
It is evident that before War World I, the single largest group in every country was 
comprised of traditional farmers, followed in developed nations by live-in domestic 
servants (Drucker 1994, p. 54). By the 1950s, the industrial revolution - triggered by 
emerging technologies such as the steam engine - had gathered full momentum and 
industrial workers now formed the single largest group in developed nations (ibid, p. 56). 
The core tasks of these workers were manufacturing and serving the products of 
manufacturing (such as car and appliance repair). However, around the turn of the 
millennium, the traditional industrial worker was being replaced by the technologist - 
“someone who works both with hands and with theoretical knowledge” (ibid, p. 56). 
Good examples of technologists are dentists and computer and x-ray technicians. More 
generally, Drucker (ibid, p. 62) refers to the newly emerging dominant group as 
“knowledge workers.” He argues that although the foundation of the knowledge worker is 
a formal education, this is only the beginning. If the new comparative advantage lies in 
the application of knowledge, this means that the knowledge worker must be able to learn 
continuously to bring value to his/her firm or business (ibid, pp. 62-63). Modern day 
knowledge-based workers form what is now termed the service industry, which includes 
health care services (such as dentistry and medicine), knowledge-based services (such as 
banking, information management, etc.), and food and retail services. However, it should 
be recognized that the first two job categories are likely to require higher levels of 
educational achievement than the two categories.  
 
Drucker (1994) argues that the problem with this latest transition is that displaced 
industrial workers cannot simply move into knowledge-based or service employment 
since they lack the education necessary to do such a task. Hence, if industrial workers are 
to succeed in knowledge-based employment, they must “change their basic attitudes, 
values, and beliefs” (ibid, p. 62). It also means that good education becomes paramount. 
 
What Drucker fails to acknowledge, though, is that displaced industrial workers may 
have no choice but to accept low-wage employment in the service sector. While working 
in a fast food establishment, for instance, will bring in a certain income, it is debatable 
whether such employment is fulfilling to the worker given his training and preferences. 
Hence, the future does not look particularly promising for those industrial workers caught 
in the transition between the industrial and the service economy. 
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Productivity growth in the US in the second half of the 1990s had been attributed to the 
information revolution and Europe adopted its famous “Lisbon Strategy” in 2000 to 
emulate the ICT-driven knowledge-based economy as explaining the apparent cause of 
the US economic success (Hagemann 2008). 
 
There have been many disappointments associated with the performance of the 
Information Revolution. The tech bubble burst in 2001 and the ICT productivity 
“miracle” may have imploded at the same time. As early as 1987, Solow famously said, 
“you can see the computer age everywhere, but in the productivity statistics” giving rise 
to the productivity or Solow Paradox. In 1997 in the Financial Times, Stephen Roach, 
chief economist for Morgan Stanley, opined: “[t]he productivity gains of the Information 
Age are just a myth” (Griffith 1997). Acknowledging the greater productivity growth in 
the U.S. compared to Europe, Roach attributes greater output to longer working hours in 
the U.S.  
 
Lynch (2008) argues that investments in human capital, information technology, R&D, 
and physical capital appear to be complementary with investments in organizational 
innovation. She observes “even after accounting for capital deepening, total productivity 
growth has been a very important determinant of the growth of average labor 
productivity.” Citing her earlier work (Black and Lynch 2004; 2005), she repeats her 
argument that during the 1990s changes in organizational innovation may have accounted 
for as much as 30 percent of output growth in U.S. manufacturing. 
 
In examining the relationship between ICT and trends in labor productivity and 
employment in the 1990s in Europe and the US, van Ark et al. (2003, p. 86) found: 
 
“The inverse relationship between employment and productivity growth has been 
much more prominent in manufacturing industries than in service industries. 
Secondly, during the 1990’s, the relationship has turned positive in many 
industries, in particular ICT-using industries in the service sector. Finally, the 
employment-reducing effects of productivity growth have remained considerably 
stronger in Europe than in the US.” 
 
Commenting on the sources of economic growth in the 90’s, in 2003 the OECD 
nonetheless voiced optimism about the New Economy, saying “the use of ICT may be 
increasing the efficiency of innovation, further contributing to long-term growth 
potential” (OECD 2003, p. 14).   
 
ICT is identified as a general purpose technology (GPT) which may take a long time to 
become manifest in macro-economic growth and productivity data. Alan Greenspan’s 
characterization of the large price-to-earnings ratio in the late 1990s as “irrational 
exuberance” following Robert J. Shiller’s analysis in his Homonymous Book, published at 
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the end of the 1999 just before the 2000 stock market crash,24 represented further doubt 
about ICT as a source of significant economic growth, as did a failure to find rises in 
multifactor productivity (MFP) that varied across countries and could have been 
attributed to increases in R&D and organizational innovations, rather than directly to ICT 
(Hagemann 2008). 
 
Hagemann (2008, p. 61) offers three possible explanations for the Solow Paradox: 
1. some of the benefits of ICT may not be picked up by the productivity statistics, 
such as improvements in the quality and diversity of services; 
2. the benefits of ICT such as organizational change and the upskilling of workers, 
may be slow to emerge; and 
3. creation and expansion of networks takes time to occur and may not show up in 
the statistics. 
 
Liagouras (2005) on the other hand, raises more fundamental questions about the useful 
of metrics of progress in ‘post-industrial capitalism’ that had been developed for 
industrial societies:  
 
“[P]erhaps the most serious difficulty is to find convenient indicators in order to measure 
what is intangible or invisible. … [T]his is a more general problem, which concerns not only 
investment but also all basic concepts, such as product, productivity, growth, etc., which we inherited 
from the industrial era” (p. 24).  
 
“The essentials of business organization in industrial capitalism can … be found in the writings of 
classical economists: the long-term performance of the enterprise is identified with productivity. And 
productivity is obtained in three correlated ways: the deepening of the (technical) division of labour, 
the mechanization of the labour process, and economies of scale” (p. 23). 
 
“The notion of productivity no longer makes sense in an economic context where quality and variety 
take precedence over quantity. Investment in intangible capital (R&D, training, software, and long-
term marketing positioning) becomes more important than the mechanization of labour processes. Last, 
but not least, the secular tendencies towards specialization and de-qualification of labour – and the 
vertical-horizontal expansion of the firm – are clearly reversed” (p. 23). 
 
In commenting on the currency of the need to resolve the Solow Paradox, Liagouras 
(2005) asks: 
 
“If the inventions in ICTs and in biotechnologies are so revolutionary as it is said, why after 
two decades of unprecedented technical progress is this not reflected in output and 
productivity statistics?” (p. 29). 
 
“The first explanation concerns the incapacity of national account systems, constructed 
within and for industrial capitalism, to measure the economic performance of post-industrial 
societies. In industrial societies, the wealth of individuals and nations takes the form of an 
accumulation of standardized commodity goods. The production of the latter is achieved 
through the use of other goods like machines and materials. In this schema of ‘production of 
                                                
24 The 2008 global stock market crash and financial crisis are generally acknowledged to have stemmed 
from excessive borrowing driven by unjustifiable optimism in continual high growth of both housing and 
financial markets.  
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commodities by means of commodities’, even work is reduced to unqualified (simple) labour 
and then to the goods required for its reproduction. Thus, increases in the wealth of 
individuals and nations are identified with increases in the quantities of goods that they 
produce and sell. However, given that the value of the total product also depends on the 
evolution of prices of different goods, the elaboration of cost-of-living indexes – like the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) – permits the isolation of the quantity-effect from the price-
effect, and thus the measurement of the real growth of output. Still, the above framework 
becomes problematic when (a) there are important and/or continuous changes in the quality, 
variety, and convenience of the goods, (b) new goods are introduced very often, (c) 
investment in different forms of intangible capital becomes important, and (d) service 
relationships become dominant in the whole economy (and not only in the service sector). 
This means that what exactly characterizes postindustrial capitalism cannot be easily 
measured, and by consequence, contemporary national accounts overstate inflation and 
understate growth in output and in productivity” (p. 29). 
 
“In activities like healthcare, education, culture, insurance, knowledge-intensive business 
services and environmental services, the objective is not to accumulate commodities, but to 
maintain and ameliorate the state of a human or a natural system in the long run. This implies 
first of all that long-run outcomes cannot be reduced to a measurable immediate output – as is 
the case with manufacturing and agricultural goods” (p. 30). 
 
“In conclusion, the more we move towards post-industrial society, the more the notions of 
growth, output, and productivity that we inherited from industrial capitalism will become 
obsolete. This means also that, with time, it will be necessary to invent a new national 
accounts system, and not simply improve on the existing one. Note however that the 
elaboration of new conventions for post-industrial economic performance go far beyond 
measurement issues. The ultimate question is what kind of (post-materialist) development do 
we want, and in what kind of (post-industrial) society do we want to live?” (p. 30). 
 
3.4 Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” 
The now renowned term “creative destruction” was coined by the famous Austrian 
economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, to describe how innovative products and processes 
displace old ones in the context of a dynamic market economy (McCraw 2007). Contrary 
to the Smithian/Marshallian description of the economy as being in a state of equilibrium, 
Schumpeter described capitalism as being “by nature a form or method of economic 
change (that) not only never is but never can be stationary” (Schumpeter 1962).  
 
Schumpeter’s description of the process of creative destruction challenged the 
fundamental premise of neoclassical economics with respect to the notion of price 
competition at the epicenter of the capitalist process. In “Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy,” Schumpeter argued that that the new products and processes that result 
from technological competition and product and process innovation are more important 
in understanding the essence of capitalism than the standard model of price competition 
that places emphasis on decentralized markets as the means to lowering prices, for a 
given set of goods and technologies (Diamond 2006). Capitalism, according to 
Schumpeter, could be better understood as an evolutionary rather than a static process, 
whose basic drivers of change were not social and natural transformations, but the 
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introduction of new goods, new methods of production and processes, new markets and 
new forms of industrial organization inherent to the capitalist process.  
 
Schumpeter considered the forces of creative destruction to be the locomotive of the 
capitalist process and the driving force behind economic growth. To disregard creative 
destruction, would be, in the words of Joseph Schumpeter, similar to having “Hamlet 
without the Danish prince.” An increasing number of economists are arguing that it is 
conceivable that policies that would make a national economy more open to creative 
destruction would entail a higher rate of economic growth (Diamond 2006).  
 
 
 
Source: Clark (2007) 
Figure 3.2: World Economic History in One Picture 
Figure 4.2: World Economic History in One Picture 
Figure 3.2 is constitutes what perhaps is the most convincing proof of Schumpeter’s 
conceptual framework of the economy. As Clark (2007) notes:  
 
“Before 1800, income per person – the food, clothing, heat, light, and housing available per head – 
varied across societies and epochs. But there was no upward trend. A simple but powerful 
mechanism, [...] the Malthusian Trap, ensured that short-term gains in income through 
technological advances were inevitably lost in population growth.” 
 
What Clark (2007) argues is that the average person of 1800 was essentially as well off as 
the average person of 100,000 BC. While this assumption might initially seem to be 
mistaken, it is corroborated by the facts. In essence, the median citizen of the 1800 world 
was actually worse off than her remote ancestors. Life expectancy in the 1800s was as 
high as it was for hunter-gatherers (30 to 35 years), while average stature, a measure of 
health, was actually higher in the stone age (Clark 2007).  
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Clark (2007) notes that this lack of progress was due to a mechanism he calls “The 
Malthusian Trap”, named after the person who first described this economic logic, the 
Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus (see Box 3.1). The Malthusian model had three main 
assumptions about the economy (Clark 2007): 
 
1. The birth rate of each society is determined by customs regulating fertility, and 
increases with material living standards 
2. The death rate of each society declines as living standards increase 
3. Material living standards decline as population increases 
 
Hence, the main intuition of the model is that any benefits from technological increases 
before the 1800s were absorbed by population increases, and where thus not reflected in 
the per capita standard of living analytics. However, at some point between 1770 and 
1860 something occurred. The English population tripled, however real incomes, instead 
of collapsing, increased (Clark 2007). There exist many competing explanations on why 
the Industrial revolution occurred, why it took place in the given time frame or why it 
began in England. However, all explanations contain a central element of technological 
innovation, and justify Schumpeter’s perspective that technology and innovation lie at the 
epicenter of economic growth.  
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BOX 3.1: ROBERT THOMAS MALTHUS (1766-1834) 
Box 3.1: ROBERT THOMAS MALTHUS (1766-1834) 
Malthus central contribution to the early discussions behind the causes and effects of 
economic growth lied in the publication of his much debated 1798 work “An Essay on 
the Principle of Population, As it affect the Future Improvement of Society, with 
Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Goodwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers”. The 
historical context sheds significant light to Malthus’ insights. In the 1800s, the 
population of London had increased from 200,000 to 900,000 people, with most of the 
new residents being underprivileged (Warsh 2006). 
 
Both Malthus and Ricardo focused on the principle of diminishing returns. The central 
argument of Malthus’ analysis, however, lied in a single comparison between 
arithmetic and geometric growth rates. Malthus argued that population increases could 
only, be stopped by misery and vice in the long-run. He based his arguments on two 
variables: Population and Food. The claim central to his theory was, however, that 
these two variables had two fundamentally different potential growth rates: geometric 
and arithmetic. 
Malthus declared that there was empirical evidence for populations to grow with a 
fixed amount of time to double. He noted, especially, the resource-rich United States, 
where he claimed that the population doubled every twenty-five years. This fixed 
doubling time is what is called geometric growth. In contrast to population growth, he 
asserted that food resources could, at best, exhibit arithmetic growth, which means 
food increasing by a fixed absolute amount in a fixed amount of time. 
In general, Malthus's analysis made the case that the actual population has the 
propensity to push above the food supply.  Because of this propensity, any effort to 
improve the quality of life of the lower classes by increasing their incomes or 
improving agricultural productivity would be futile, as the extra resources would be 
entirely absorbed by an induced increase in population.   
Malthus later proposed a series of practical policies commensurate with his analysis of 
demographics. His goal was to instill middle-class virtues to the lower classes, which 
were responsible for boosting the birth rate.  His proposed policies included the 
introduction of universal voting rights, state-run education for the poor. the abolition 
of the Poor Laws and the creation of an free nation-wide labor market.  In his view, 
once the poor would develop a taste for comfort, then they would require a better 
standard of living for themselves before starting a family.  Hence Malthus suggested 
that sufficiently high incomes may be enough by themselves to reduce the average 
national birth rate. 
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3.5 Market Structure and Innovation 
Innovation, and, consequently, the forces of creative destruction, appear to indeed be the 
locomotive not only of economic growth, but also, if we adopt Clark’s (2007) 
perspective, the forces responsible of taking most of the world out of the Malthusian 
Trap, towards increasing levels of prosperity and affluence. From a policy perspective, 
thus, it is significant to focus on what forces, or what market structures, could lead to 
increasing levels of innovation in a society.  
 
In “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (1962, first published in 1942), Joseph A. 
Schumpeter outlined that large firms operating in concentrated markets, often enjoying 
monopoly power, are the main engine of technological progress and innovation. Very 
important in the Schumpeterian paradigm was the monopolist’s ability to bear risks, 
attract the best workforce, and enjoy a superior financial position (Scherer 1992). 
Schumpeter argued that giant firms could afford to gamble on new techniques and were 
being willing to absorb losses in some of their new ventures because they could be 
confident of profits in others (McCraw 2007). This position contrasted the one that he 
previously outlined in his “Theory of Economic Development” (1934, first published in 
1912) in which he insisted that innovations emanate from new and characteristically 
small firms. These firms would eventually grow large; however, they would start as 
“outsiders” in Schumpeter’s analysis.  
 
Schumpeter, partially influenced by the German Historical School’s approach to 
economics, which consisted of detailed histories of various industries and institutions, 
was not trying to devise elaborate mathematical theories on paper, but rather to observe 
his surroundings in order to derive tangible conclusions. He cites the United States as his 
most favored example. Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century firms such as 
General Electric, Eastman Kodak, and DuPont founded research departments explicitly 
for the purpose of developing new technologies and products. In that way, innovation 
was made part of their normal business routine, which constituted a profound change in 
business structures. However, at the same time new companies continued to bud and 
innovate alongside the large-scale establishments, which lent support to what Schumpeter 
had predicted in 1912, but it did contradict his stated thesis in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy published in 1942.  
 
This latter view was particularly radical given the mainstream economic thought of the 
era, which was encapsulated in Adam Smith’s treatise on the merits of competitive 
markets and of the invisible hand as heralds of affluence and prosperity. The 
Schumpeterian hypothesis was making the exactly opposite assumption: that innovation 
which was the cornerstone of economic progress and prosperity directly relied on the 
expectation of a monopoly position or the possession of it.  
 
Economists appear to be split on the issue. Arrow and Fellner have argued that the 
incentives to innovate are greater in a framework of competitive market pricing (Scherer 
1992). On the other hand, John Kenneth Galbraith suggested that it is in a strategic 
interactions environment among few oligopolists that innovation is optimally fostered 
(ibid). Moreover, some found evidence for the original Schumpeterian assumption of a 
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linear relationship between firm size and R&D, while others, such as F.M. Scherer, 
Morton Kamien, and Nancy Schwartz found an inverted U relationship, with 
diseconomies of scale after a certain point (ibid).  
 
On the whole, there is little empirical support for the view that large firm size or 
concentration is directly associated with a higher degree of innovative activity. Even 
when such a correlation is present we are not in the position be sure about the direction of 
causality. In specific industries that are research-intensive, such as pharmaceuticals, a 
high degree of concentration or monopoly power may be unavoidable because of the 
significant fixed costs and indivisibility of research that are associated with the 
characteristics of the specific industries in question. In the pharmaceutical industry’s 
case, monopoly power is provided through comprehensive patent rights. Finally, as 
Rodrik (2007) argues, the results may be context specific, reflecting differences in the 
entirety of governmental policies in different countries. See also the work of van Ark et 
al. (2003) where the growth experience in the ‘new economy’ vis-à-vis large versus small 
firms is different in the U.S. and the EU.  
 
The Schumpeterian “more is better” hypothesis, as a “one-size-fits-all” approach does not 
display a significant level of descriptive capacity in the case of industries such as 
computer software and semiconductors. Industry behavior is better explained in that case 
by the following scenario: firms with dominant market positions maximize their profit 
margins by choosing a “leisurely” and inexpensive level of R&D. Then, if smaller rivals 
or potential entrants threaten profit-making through innovation, dominant firms are then 
provided with incentives to further innovate and accelerate their development efforts 
(Scherer 1992). The theory of “the fast second” relies on this logic. In that theory, 
dominant incumbents permit smaller rivals to be the technological pioneers at the 
beginning. IBM exploited this strategy by repeatedly announcing a new product in 
advance on actual deliveries. This allowed IBM, as the dominant incumbent, to retain its 
existing customers despite the fact that it marginally lagged behind rivals in product 
deliveries. Another example of this is the extensive leapfrogging activity on behalf of 
industry leaders such as IBM and Microsoft. The “browser wars” between Microsoft and 
Netscape or the operating system competition between Microsoft and Apple easily come 
to mind as cases where Microsoft’s rivals had the initial technological advantage but 
where Microsoft managed to effectively emulate them by “leapfrogging” the first 
mover’s technology.25  
 
On the other hand, the Schumpeterian hypothesis seems to have increasing explanatory 
power in the case of the Japanese and European industries. Japan’s national industrial 
strategy appears to be very close to the Schumpeterian paradigm, through the formation 
of large enterprises which undertake collaborative R&D efforts. At the same time, 
Japan’s high technology start-up sector was limited by the beginning of the 1990s. 
However, the European and particularly the Japanese case could be attributed to a series 
of reasons, like the increasing scale pressure from globalization, the possible increases in 
the cost of conducting R&D, the existence of cultural differences which facilitate such 
                                                
25 See also the discussion of the computer hard-drive industry by Christensen (1997) where there was 
constant displacement of the dominant technological firm by a new entrant. 
 46 
industry structures, and the technical problem in question which the specific 
organizational structures aim to address (Scherer 1992). 
 
It is useful to note, however, that while Schumpeter wrote about innovation in general, 
not all innovations are qualitatively the same. Christensen (1997) distinguishes between 
two types of innovative activities: a) sustaining innovations and b) disruptive innovations 
Sustaining innovations are innovations that will be generally valued by the incumbent 
firm’s customer base (Diamond 2006). This is the sort of innovations that the incumbent 
firm is expected to generally pursue. On the other hand, disruptive innovations are 
generally discontinuous and possibly involve the displacement of dominant firms and 
institutions, rather than their evolutionary transformation (Ashford et al. 2002; Luiten 
2001; Moors 2000; Partidario 2003).  
 
The most recent body of literature has focused on modeling the desire of firms to 
innovate. Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (2005) studied the relation between 
innovation and competition, trying to address the issue of whether or not increased 
competition stimulates innovation. This analysis concludes that the effect of competition 
on innovation decisively depends on where firms are relative to the technological 
frontier. In sectors, for instance, where competition is significant for firms that are close 
to the technological frontier, an increase in competition will induce firms with additional 
incentives to innovate in order to move ahead and reap some monopoly profits. However, 
if firms are far behind from the technological frontier, competition discourages 
innovation because there is little profit to be made from catching up with the 
frontrunners.  
 
Finally, empirical evidence on the correlation between market size and innovative 
activity has provided us with mixed results so far, and thus, at the bottom line the 
question of the validity of the Schumpeterian hypothesis will need to be questioned 
empirically.  
 
3.6 Creative Destruction: The Case of Green Jobs 
While creative destruction appears to indeed be the locomotive of economic growth, it is 
useful and important to examine it not only from the perspective of the state or the private 
sector, but also from the perspective of the labor force.  The case of “Green Jobs” 
provides a particularly interesting case study of certain aspects of innovation and 
sustainability.  
 
In general, green energy is considered to be highly labor-intensive, at least initially. The 
Obama administration has promised a cumulative $150 billion investment in green 
energy technologies and infrastructure, which is projected to create 5 million jobs in the 
US. Green jobs at this moment are estimated at 2.3 million worldwide, a rather 
conservative estimate, with half of that number employed at the biofuel industry (UNEP 
2008). Along similar lines, in a report published by the influential Center for American 
Progress, Pollin et al. (2008) made a calculation of how many jobs would be created with 
a $100 billion green stimulus program. According to their model, $100 billion green 
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stimulus is projected to create 2 million jobs in the US, while a “traditional” stimulus in 
household consumption would create 1.7 million jobs. Notably, spending $100 billion 
within the US oil industry would create only around 542,000 jobs (Pollin et al. 2008). 
Needless to say, apart from the elevated performance of a green stimulus in terms of jobs 
creation, it also entails a series of long-term benefits. These benefits include increased 
consumer savings through the reduction of energy bills, the stabilization of oil, gas and 
coal prices through reduced demand and increased energy diversity and, obviously, a 
cleaner, low-carbon environment (Pollin et al. 2008).   
 
The green stimulus would create three kinds of jobs: (Pollin et al. 2008) 
 
• Direct jobs. Construction jobs created by retrofitting buildings to make them more 
energy efficient or manufacturing jobs created to build energy turbines. 
• Indirect jobs. Manufacturing and service jobs in associated industries that supply 
intermediate goods for building retrofits or wind turbine manufacturing, such as 
lumber, steel and transportation.  
• Induced jobs. Retail and wholesale jobs created by workers in these construction, 
manufacturing and service industries when they spend the money they earn on 
other products of the economy. 
 
The first two categories are straightforward, while the third category is an attempt of the 
model to capture the “Keynesian multiplier” effect. In terms of the breakdown of the 2 
million jobs, the model predicts that 935,200 jobs will be direct, 586,000 jobs will be 
indirect, while 496,000 jobs will be the multiplier effect, through increased spending.  
 
However, different models of green jobs lead to different conclusions. Getzner (2002) 
reaches a conclusion that, while the qualitative impact of green technologies is 
significant, its quantitative impact in terms of job creation is marginal. Furthermore, 
Pollin et al. (2008) have essentially conducted a classical economic “ceteris paribus” 
analysis. It sees investment and job creation as a one-step policy, and disregards 
significant economic processes outside the focus of the model. There are two main 
criticisms to be made: 
 
• The model disregards the 3.5 million workers in the traditional energy industry in 
the US, many of which could be displaced. 
• The model calculates the jobs that will be created in the immediate short-run. 
 
The first criticism is fairly straightforward. Green technologies constitute a clear-cut case 
of innovation in the Schumpeterian sense. However, as Schumpeter elaborated, 
innovation unleashes powers of creative destruction, and while the creation of “green” 
jobs is indeed “creative”, there is also an element of “destruction”, which is typically 
expressed by the dislocation of competitive industries that were deemed to be 
technologically inferior. In the case of green energy, the potentially disrupted industries 
are the traditional energy industries (i.e. oil, gas, coal). Hence, a truly comprehensive 
calculation, useful for state policy, would actually focus on the “net” amount of jobs 
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created, and would include a calculation of the amount of jobs that will actually be lost in 
the process. 
 
 In the European Union (EU), the broader impact of environmental protection measures 
on employment is now an emerging issue. The European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) et al. (2007) recently completed a study on the link between both climate change 
and the EU’s policies to reduce CO2 emissions and employment. The study focused 
specifically on four key sectors: [1] energy-intensive industries (iron and steel, and 
cement); [2] transportation; [3] energy production; and [4] building/construction. The 
impacts on employment were found to vary by region and sector. Under an optimistic 
scenario of moderate climate change (i.e., +2oC at the planetary level), the impacts on 
employment were found to be more negative in southern Europe than in northern Europe 
and more severe in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries than others.  
 
Furthermore, an introduction of green energy technologies will most certainly have to be 
assorted with a series of regulations and policies, which will seek to correct the 
externalities of pollution in energy prices. Hence, these policies should be expected to 
increase traditional energy prices (such as CO2 taxes or cap-and-trade). Thus, an 
additional and equally important consideration lies in the fact that higher energy costs 
could have an adverse effect on the payrolls of energy-intensive companies, such as 
manufacturers (Wolgemuth 2009).  
 
An additional issue is the question of average compensation. In general, not all green jobs 
are equally green, both in terms of compensation, but also in terms of how 
environmentally friendly they are (UNEP 2008). In general, it is very important that a 
significant amount of new jobs will be created through a green stimulus program, 
however the nature, quality and compensation of these jobs are of equal importance. In 
general, the $100 billion green stimulus program is projected to generate significant 
numbers of well-paying jobs, but also a relatively high proportion of lower, entry-level 
jobs (Pollin et al. 2008). According to Pollin et al. (2008), the average compensation of 
employees associated with green investment areas is about 20% less than the average of 
those in the oil industry. Pollin et al. (2008) claim that this number is deceptive, since the 
true comparison should be made not with already existing jobs in the oil industry, but 
with the jobs that would be created if the stimulus were not spent in green technologies 
but in alternative ways. This is a valid statement to make, however the fact that green 
jobs are paid less remains, and cannot be disregarded, especially given the displacement 
of jobs in the traditional oil industry, which will also occur and has not been calculated.  
 
A key criticism lies in the fact that the model assumes a certain labor-intensity for green 
jobs, which, while realistic in the short-run, is certainly unrealistic in the long- and 
perhaps even the medium-run. In general, as new innovations appear in the market place, 
the form in which they are introduced originally tends to be the most labor-intensive. 
However, as new process innovations take place, labor tends to be increasingly replaced 
by capital, and many jobs are lost in the process. This paradigm is particularly relevant in 
the case of ICT, for instance. Hence, while green jobs are accurately considered to be 
labor-intensive, more light needs to be shed on the duration of their labor-intensiveness. 
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For instance, what fraction of the jobs created will involve the initial installation of the 
facilities, versus the operation of the facilities or green service jobs?  
 
There is no objective answer to such questions a priori. Nonetheless, such questions are 
key for policy planners, and the considerations that they entail should not be disregarded. 
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4. The Effects of Economic Growth on Sustainability 
While the need for sustainable growth is increasingly being discussed, and environmental 
concerns have started becoming prevalent in the priorities of the global citizenry, a 
significant shift in the policy priorities of orthodox economic growth hasn’t been 
witnessed as of yet. At the same time, the financial crisis of 2008 has helped shed light to 
a series of unsustainable components of the GDP-based growth model. This chapter 
attempts to identify the consequences of the existing growth dogma for the developed and 
developing world, while codifying its limitations.   
 
4.1 The GDP Growth Paradigm 
 
The above discussion conceptualizes why a different growth model appears to be not 
only necessary, but also possible. Of course Kerala and Costa Rica (which are examined 
in Section 7.3) do not constitute absolute development ideals. They do, however, 
underline that the GDP growth paradigm fails to capture many aspects central to the 
wellbeing of the citizens of a country, such as life expectancy, education, income 
distribution, environmental quality, quality of the health system etc.  
 
As a measure, GDP tries to examine the economy from a macro perspective. The 
acronym GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product, and measures the total output 
produced by a country. GDP is the value of all final goods and services26 produced in a 
particular country in a one-year period.  
 
GDP’s fundamental equation is: 
 
GDP = C + I + G + (X - M) 
 
Where C stands for consumption, I for investment, G for government expenditure, X for 
exports and M for imports.  
 
In very broad terms, output can be divided into two basic forms of production. The first 
one includes the vast spectrum of goods and services that will be bought by households 
and individuals for private use. This list includes books, haircuts, clothing, health services 
etc. This part of output is what we understand as consumption, while the various goods 
and services included are consumer goods (Heilbroner and Thurow 1998). However, 
there are also certain goods and services that do not end up in the possession of 
consumers. This category includes roads, machinery, airports, ports, bridges, but also 
smaller objects such as office furniture and typewriters (Heilbroner and Thurow 1998). 
These goods are investment or capital goods.    
                                                
26 Statisticians only count final products in GDP calculations, not intermediate ones. Counting intermediate 
products would lead the GDP statistics to account for the “same” output more than once, which would not 
capture the true production taking place in the economy.  
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However, the breakdown of GDP is not only limited to consumption and investment. It 
also includes government spending and the trade balance. Depending on whether 
consumption is private or public, that is depending on whether the final good is 
consumed by private households or the government, a certain purchase is accounted as 
Consumption or Government spending. The same holds true for investment. While the 
GDP equation does not distinguish between government consumption and government 
investment, and counts everything under government expenditure, GDP statistics in some 
countries actually do use that classification (Heilbroner and Thurow 1998). It is 
interesting to note here that not all government spending in included in the GDP 
calculation. Specifically, transfer payments (such as social security payments, health care, 
unemployment protection, various subsidies and measures of social protection), while 
they account for a significant portion of government spending, are not considered an 
“output-producing” activity, since “no direct production takes place in exchange for a 
transfer payment” (Heilbroner and Thurow 1998)27.  
 
Finally, the GDP metric includes the trade balance. By that, the GDP accounts for all 
domestic production that is sold abroad minus all foreign production purchased 
domestically. A negative trade balance, for instance, signifies a “net stream of purchasing 
power that wends it way abroad” and which should be subtracted from the GDP analytics 
(Heilbroner and Thurow 1998).  
 
Furthermore, GDP is a useful tool in the realm of international politics, as, apart from 
being an economic measure, it also constitutes a useful measure of state power.  
 
Overall, GDP displays a series of limitations as a measure of economic success: 
 
• It does not effectively capture the distribution of wealth in an economy. GDP per 
capita simply divides GDP by the population of the country. The information that 
this metric conveys, however, for a country with significant income disparities, 
however, is rather limited. Saudi Arabia and South Korea, for instance, have 
similar GDPs per capita. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is a particularly unequal 
country, whose growth has been fueled by its vast oil reserves, while South 
Korea’s growth model is primarily based on technological innovation and income 
dispersion is significantly lower.  
• Environmental quality is not included in the GDP metric. Environmental issues, 
however, are central to any measure of quality of life. Broadly, economists 
classify such issues as “externalities”, which are altogether neglected in GDP 
calculations. 
• GDP does not take into account the “black” sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, 
“underground” economic transactions can significantly affect the quality of life of 
the citizens of a country, both positively and negatively.  
                                                
27 This exclusion perhaps creates the first criticism of GDP, since transfer payments increasingly augment 
the quality of life of the citizenry.  
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• GDP does not capture non-monetary activities, such as unpaid or volunteer work. 
However, as Putnam et al. (1993) have prominently described, social capital is 
central to development and economic success. 
• Many economic activities included in GDP calculations do not advance “real” 
economic development. For instance increasing costs associated with healthcare, 
or costs of dealing with a natural disaster or war can significantly boost GDP.  
• GDP fails to capture any measure of the quality of goods sold. A higher volume 
of low quality products sold can perhaps boost GDP, however low quality 
products are typically less durable, and can thus create more waste and 
inefficiency. 
• GDP growth also fails to capture whether a country’s growth path can be 
sustained in the long-run. For instance, according to a series of studies, Russia 
required a $70 per barrel price for oil in order to balance its budget. Russia is one 
of the key examples of an “imbalanced” growth model, which can be easily 
disrupted by fluctuations in energy prices.  
• GDP includes no measure of societal opportunity costs. For instance, costs 
associated with the improvement of harm (such as natural disasters) divert 
funding from wealth-generating activities and investments. 
• GDP does not directly capture the essence of product innovation. It only does so 
indirectly, through the monetary value of products sold. However, pharmaceutical 
and technological innovations have increased quality of goods – and perhaps life -
- drastically. For instance, a person can be reached at almost any part of the globe 
at minimal cost, and many diseases considered incurable 30 or 40 years ago are 
now treatable. GDP does not convey any information for such advancements, 
even though they constitute main pillars of development. 
• It is also possible that GDP may similarly not reflect improvements in processes, 
for example by ICT increasing the overall quality in services. 
 
It is useful to note how these limitations are met in practice. Ponting (2007) notes that in 
the 1990s, the GDP per capita of the United States was 40% higher than that of Italy. 
However, life expectancy was lower by almost two years, possibly due to the poor US 
health system. Moreover, as noted above, averages tend to hide distributional realities. 
The life expectancy for African-Americans is lower than the Chinese average, infant 
mortality in cities such as Washington DC and Baltimore is higher than Bangkok and 
Cairo (Ponting 2007). Furthermore, Ponting (2007) underlines that while Sri Lanka had a 
GDP per capita equal to 20% of that of Malaysia, it had a comparable mortality rate, food 
intake and number of doctors per capita, while its literacy rate appeared to be 
significantly better.  
 
 
Additionally, there is evidence that economic growth beyond a certain point does not 
improve well-being for developed country, due to the external costs of that growth 
including climate impacts (Costanza 2009). For instance, an oil spill increases GDP, 
since the cost of cleaning it up is accounted for in the GDP metrics. However, such an 
activity diminishes well-being. As Costanza (2009) points out, increased crime, sickness, 
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war, pollution, fires, storms and pestilence are all positive for GDP because they boost 
economic activity.  
 
Ashford and Hall (2010) provide a systematic critique to the GDP growth paradigm, and 
try to examine a series of alternative measures of economic development. Specifically, 
they began by examining the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), the 
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), the System of Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounting (SEEA), and Genuine Savings (GS). In general, these measures attempt to 
adjust (or ‘green’) the calculations of GNP/GDP (such as ISEW, GPI, and SEEA) or 
present an alternative way of measuring the stock of ‘national wealth’ (GS).  
 
None of these measures has managed to become a viable alternative to GDP. The 
usefulness of GDP is obviously significant, and this is after all why it is the most widely 
employed economic indicator, used for the last decades and advanced by some of the 
brightest economic minds the world has produced. The rationale for this critique, 
however, is to make the point that while GDP is useful and perhaps the least incomplete 
economic indicator, policy-makers should not consider GDP growth a panacea. GDP was 
never designed as a measure of well-being. Nonetheless, its prevalence entails that a 
global consensus will be necessary for alternative indicators to move forward.  
 
In general, it is obvious that ideally a different sustainable economic indicator should be 
created, that will have the measurement advantages of GDP while incorporating its main 
criticisms, especially in what concerns its lack of any discussion on environmental 
externalities and the quality and nature of what is considered as “growth”. 
4.2 The End of Sustainable Growth? 
Perpetual economic growth does not constitute a law of nature, but rather an 
extrapolation of past trends. However, Robert Ayres (2006) notes that while “the 
economy has a lot of inertia, whence the future is more likely to be a continuation of past 
trends than otherwise,” a continuation of exponential growth until 2100 is not to be taken 
for granted.  
 
This point of view is vastly different than that of the economic “optimists” who make the 
case that the pace of technological growth in a series of industries, especially those 
relevant to converging technologies. Converging technologies represent a movement 
focused on the unification of science and technology, and can be defined by interactions 
between nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and pharmaceutical 
technologies. In general, converging technologies hold tremendous potential for 
improvements in health care, the production of clean water and energy and increasing 
advances in information technology and telecommunications. The convergence of these 
profoundly transformative technologies and technology-enabling scientific fields can 
potentially constitute one of the central research initiatives of the 21st century. 
 
According to Ayres, a series of drivers of past growth in industrialized countries are now 
indicating signals of saturation or exhaustion. These drivers are (Ayres 2006): 
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1. Division of labor (job specialization); 
2. International trade (globalization); 
3. Monetization of formerly unpaid domestic and agricultural labor, as a 
consequence of urbanization; 
4. Saving and investing; 
5. Borrowing from the future also tends to increase consumption in the present 
without added value; 
6. Extraction of high quality and irreplaceable natural resources and destruction of 
the waste assimilation capacity of nature; and 
7. Increasing technological efficiency of converting resource (especially fossil fuel) 
inputs to useful work and power.  
 
Ayres deems the first four trends to have largely completed their full effect in the 
industrial world, even though they have just started making their impact in the developing 
world. According to Ayres, the benefits of scale from division of labor and international 
trade have already probably peaked, while the monetization of formerly unpaid domestic 
labor is now fulfilled in the OECD countries (Ayres 2006). Perhaps the most interesting 
case in point lies in the question of saving and investing. According to Ayres, the US 
essentially stopped saving in the 1990s and actually started living on capital and on 
money borrowed from others, or even by borrowing from the future. In the same manner, 
exploiting non-renewable natural resources resembles borrowing from nature. This form 
of converting long-term assets into current income is also meeting its limits (Ayres 2006).  
 
Hence, this leaves only technological efficiency of converting resource inputs to useful 
work and power, along with unrealized technological progress from newer technologies 
as the sole determinants of economic growth. Technological efficiency emanating from 
the conversion of raw materials into useful work boomed during the end of the 19th 
century and the first half of the 20th century, resulting to the substitution of labor by 
machines powered by fossil fuels. This led to significant increases in efficiency. In the 
past, increases in efficiency led to lower costs, which in their turn led to lower prices and 
higher demand. The increase in demand was a driver for increases in investment and, 
ultimately, increases in supply and even lower costs. This “positive feedback cycle” is 
none other than the engine of economic growth, and has been the primary driver of 
productivity gains in the last two centuries (Ayres 2006). Nevertheless, sources of 
primary energy are getting more expensive instead of getting cheaper, and the rate of 
increase in the efficiency in energy conversion in industrial societies has decreased.  
 
In the words of Robert Ayres (2006), “all of these (seven) phenomena taken together (…) 
suggest that US economic growth is almost certainly decelerating and could soon cease 
altogether,” a pattern already visible for a series of other countries in the developed 
world.  
 
Others are not so pessimistic and argue that (1) technological advance has not reached 
any kind of natural limit and (2) a future shift to ecologically-sustainable technologies 
will loosen nascent creativity and that the basis of (post)industrial activity will change. 
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Still others have challenged how growth and development are measured and argue that 
the metrics we use are not measuring the development which is occurring. 
 
4.3 Growth in Developing Economies and the Washington Consensus 
Challenging economic orthodoxy, Seers (1997) questions some of its fundamental 
precepts in single-mindedly promoting economic growth in developing countries: 
 
“We can, after all, fall back on the supposition that increases in national income, if they 
are faster than population growth, sooner or later lead to the solution of social and 
political problems … [E]conomic growth may not merely fail to solve social and political 
difficulties; certain types of growth can actually cause them” (Seers 1997)  . [Sears argues that 
increases in per capita income may occur with adverse distributional inequities.] 
 
“Inequality can not really be reduced so long as property ownership is concentrated” (Seers 1997). 
 
“[I]n a highly unequal society, personal savings often flow abroad or go into luxury housing and 
other investment projects of low or zero priority for development” (Seers 1997). 
 
Further, he notes that “[n]ational income measures published for most developing 
countries have very little meaning” (Seers 1997). 
    
According to Seers (1997) the purpose of economic development lies in the reduction of 
poverty, inequality, and unemployment. According to Nafziger (2006), Amartya Sen 
(1999) adopts a different definition, stating that freedom of choice to determine one’s 
future and pathways to that future, instead of development, is the ultimate goal of 
economic life and the most efficient means of realizing general welfare.  
 
Actually, Seers (1997) is close to Sen when he states: 
 
“[What are the necessary conditions for a universally acceptable aim [of development?] – the 
realization of the human personality” (Seers 1997). 
 
Sen’s definition of freedom is far different than that of neoclassical economics. For Sen, 
“unfreedoms” include hunger, famine, ignorance, unsustainable economic life, 
unemployment and underemployment, barriers to economic fulfillment by women of 
minority communities, premature death, violation of political freedom and basic liberty, 
threats to the environment, little access to health, sanitation or clean water, etc. (Nafziger 
2006). According to this analysis, freedom of exchange, labor contract, social 
opportunities, and protective security are not just ends of development but also the means 
to it. In general, economic development constitutes the most powerful instrument for 
reducing poverty. This issue, while highly important for every society, is of course more 
relevant for the developing world.  
 
The characteristics of development policy have changed drastically in the last decades. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, it was “big-push, planning and import-substitution” policies 
that dominated the development agenda of reformers in poor nations (Rodrik 2007). 
These ideas started losing prominence in the 1970s, when more market oriented 
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approaches started being adopted. By the late 1980s views had converged around a vector 
of policies that John Williamson dubbed “The Washington Consensus.” As Rodrik notes, 
these policies (a list of which can be found in Table 4.1) remain at the heart of 
conventional understanding of a desirable policy framework, even though they have been 
augmented and expanded in the last years.  
Table 6.1: Rules of Good Behavior for Promoting Economic Growth 
Table 4.1: Rules of Good Behavior for Promoting Economic Growth 
Original Washington Consensus Augmented Washington Consensus 
1. Fiscal Discipline 11. Corporate Governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditures 12. Anticorruption 
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Interest rate liberalization 14. Adherence to WTO disciplines 
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates 15. Adherence to international financial 
codes and standards 
6. Trade Liberalization 16. “Prudent” capital account opening 
7. Openness to Foreign Direct Investment 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate 
regimes 
8. Privatization 18. Independent central banks/inflation 
targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets 
10. Secure property rights 20. Targeted poverty reduction 
Source: Rodrik (2007). 
 
The original list of Williamson was augmented by a series of second-generation reform 
policies of a more institutional nature that those targeted on good governance. As Rodrik 
notes, these second-generation reforms arose from the growing recognition that market-
oriented policies might be inadequate without a more fundamental institutional 
transformation.  
 
Nevertheless, contemporary growth experiences do not justify a widespread adoption of 
the Washington Consensus as the orthodox growth paradigm. The region that made the 
most determined attempt at remaking itself through the adoption of the Washington 
Consensus was none other than Latin America, which reaped minimal growth benefits 
out of these policy choices. In fact, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, etc. did 
more liberalization, deregulation, and privatization in a few years than what the East 
Asian countries did in four decades (Rodrik 2007). A similar case could be made for 
Africa, where even though “Washington Consensus” policies have been adopted in 
different states, decline persists. South Korea’s and Taiwan’s growth policies were 
significantly different from the Washington paradigm. Instead of privatizations, both 
countries invested on public enterprises. It is interesting to note that South Korea did not 
permit FDI inflows as well (Rodrik 2007).  
 
China and India, the two locomotives of Asian growth, also constitute interesting cases in 
that respect. It is true, of course, that both countries during their growth path departed 
from previous policy choices and decided to adopt policy frameworks based on markets 
and private enterprise. However, China never adopted a private property rights regime 
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and “merely appended a market system to the scaffolding of a planned economy” (Rodrik 
2007). At the same time, India deregulated with a particularly slow pace, had significant 
trade restrictions until recently and undertook minimal privatization (Rodrik 2007).  
 
The picture that emerges from this analysis is rather clear. While some key elements of 
success are the same in all growth strategies (sustainable government finances and sound 
money, healthy institutional environment, some degree of market orientation), different 
regions require a different set of policies. Key to this claim is the central message of 
Hernando de Soto’s “The mystery of Capital” (2000) that most of the worlds potential 
capital assets outside the western world and Japan are unusable under the legal property 
system and inaccessible as collateral for loans or to secure bonds. For Seers (1997) the 
greatest error of neoclassical economics was the universalization of the West’s 
development experience. The Washington Consensus, in particular has been catastrophic 
for the developing world. It is not accidental than only those that decided to embark on 
different growth strategies were the ones that showed the highest growth rates and the 
most significant poverty reduction.  
 
As Ashford and Hall (2010) note, we are in the aftermath of the 2008 stock market crash 
and the unraveling of the global financial system. In a provocative essay in The Guardian 
entitled: “The Death of the Washington Consensus? Paul Krugman’s Nobel Prize for 
Economics Signals the Intellectual Tide is Turning Against Unrestricted Free Trade,” 
Kevin Gallagher (2008) recites Krugman’s and others’ argument that “tariffs and 
subsidies to domestic industries can divert profits away from foreign firms and increase a 
nation’s income,” challenging the orthodoxy of market fundamentalism in the context of 
the benefits of trade to developing countries. While this is certainly not the last word on 
the debate, the 2008 financial crisis compels a re-examination of neoliberal doctrine. 
  
4.4 Growth in the Developed World and its Impact on Employment 
While there has been much discussion about the link between increases in productivity 
and economic growth, far less has been discussed about the effects of innovation and 
economic growth on employment. In fact, perhaps the most central question behind the 
consequences of economic growth from a societal perspective lies in the issue of 
increasing unemployment and underemployment. 
 
Rifkin (2004) states that the old logic that technology gains and advances in productivity 
destroy old jobs but create new ones does not appear to be true anymore. Productivity has 
traditionally been considered as an engine of job creation and economic prosperity. The 
economic intuition behind that is that productivity allows firms to produce goods at 
declining costs, which lead to cheaper goods. These cheaper goods increase demand in 
the market, which leads to even more production and productivity, which further 
simulates demand, etc. According to Schumpeter’s specification, innovation and 
specifically the process of creative destruction constitute the locomotive of capitalist 
economic growth, through the introduction of new technologies, processes, and ideas that 
displace old ones. Thus, it is argued that even if creative destruction displaces labor in the 
short-run, the increase in demand for cheaper products along with the new industries 
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created through technological innovation will ensure that additional people will be hired 
in the medium- to long-run. However, this is only theory. In reality, productivity 
increases, at least in the U.S., have been associated with increasing numbers of 
unemployed workers and/or lower wages, especially in the manufacturing industries.  
 
A case in point in the positive feedback cycle of economic growth lies in information and 
communication technologies (ICT). In fact, the acceleration of productivity growth in the 
U.S. during the 1990s has been widely attributed to the rapid increases in investment in 
the ICT industry. Advances in information and communication technologies allegedly 
have led to decreasing costs, falling prices and increasing demand.28 However, according 
to Robert Ayres (2006) the applications of information technology outside its own sector 
seem to have led to the elimination of more jobs than the ones created, without 
corresponding impacts on consumer demand on products and service that would end up 
creating more jobs.  
 
In their study of the employment effects of the new economy, van Ark et al. (2003) found 
that this inverse relationship between productivity and employment growth was much 
stronger in manufacturing than in services. This result is intuitive, and it largely depends 
on the whether the labor force of a specific industry has skills transferrable to other 
industries. However, this analysis does not mean to say that productivity is something 
“bad” that should be avoided. To a large degree, the process of creative destruction is 
actually inevitable. The point is to first acknowledge the effects of increases in 
productivity on the average worker of the economy, and implement such policies which 
will alleviate those effects, either by social safety nets or labor re-training policies etc.  
 
Commenting on the “digital divide” Liagouras (2005) notes: 
 
“[I]f the vicious cycle of social exclusion is not stopped in the near future, social 
polarization risks becoming a structural feature of post-industrial economy and society… 
 
[I]nequality depends above all on what organizational and institutional innovations are 
linked to digital technologies. On the one hand, the capacities required in order to cope 
with ICTs at a basic level are rather overestimated. As the objective of producers is to sell 
more and more, most of the new software hardware combinations have become so user-
friendly that what is primarily required for basic applications is non-computer-specific 
skills like reading, writing, counting, communicating and, first of all, motivation. The 
above skills, on the other hand, are clearly underestimated by digital divide analysts. 
Indeed, the 21st century risks being characterized by the expansion of illiteracy in the 
middle of knowledge abundance. Of course this is a complex social phenomenon, which 
defeats monocausal approaches. From an economic point of view, the main responsible 
agent for social exclusion has been national and international neoliberal economic 
policies. That is why the digital divide discourse proposed by prestigious international 
organizations sounds like a nice excuse for the economic policies they have applied for 
two decades. If it is an inherent characteristic of digital technologies to divide societies, 
neoliberal policies are then beyond doubt, and the only solution for governments is to 
spend a bit more on education and training.” 
                                                
28 Much has been written on the ‘ICT Productivity Paradox’ in which little productivity growth has actually 
occurred from the adoption of the computer, see Griffith in The Financial Times, 13 August 1997.  
 59 
4.5 Ecology and Collapse 
Diamond (2005) in his work “Collapse” examined a series of old civilizations and 
societies, and attempted to identify why the collapsed or survived in a significantly 
reduced form. This work came after the publication of his previous work, where he 
attributed historical differences in economic and social development to environmental 
and ecological variations (Diamond 1997). While considering the collapse of a society, 
Diamond (2005) employs a framework that consists of five sets of factors that may affect 
what happens to a society: 
 
• Environmental damage. 
• Climactic change. 
• Hostile neighbors 
• Loss of trading partners. 
• Society’s responses to environmental problems. 
 
Under this prism, Diamond (2005) manages to explain the collapse of societies as diverse 
as the Maya of Central America (environmental damage, climate change and hostile 
neighbors), the Rapa Nui of Polynesia (Environmental damage) and the Greenland Norse 
(climate change, environmental damage, loss of trading partners, hostile neighbors and 
unwillingness to adapt). Scholars have also cited the case of Easter Island, which he 
singles-out as the best historical example of societal collapse in isolation (Ponting 2007, 
Diamond 2005). 
 
Expanding on the above list, Diamond lists eight specific factors that have historically 
contributed to the collapse of past social structures (Diamond 2005):  
 
• Deforestation and habitat destruction. 
• Soil erosion/salinization/fertility losses.  
• Water management problems. 
• Overhunting. 
• Overfishing. 
• Effects of introduced species on native species. 
• Population Growth. 
• Increased per-capita impact of people. 
 
However, apart from these “historical factors”, Diamond (2005) also identifies a series of 
new factors, which are highly probable to contribute to the reduction or collapse of 
contemporary or future societies:  
 
• Global climate change. 
• Buildup of toxins in the environment. 
• Energy shortages. 
• Full human utilization of the Earth’s photosynthetic capacity.  
 
Most, if not all of these factors, however, constitute main consequences of contemporary 
economic growth and the northern growth model. Furthermore, there is an additional 
 60 
elements that makes Diamond’s (2005) analysis all the more worrisome. In the distant 
past, societies were significantly isolated, and societal collapses appeared to be rather 
isolated, without systemic spillover effects to other societies. Today’s societies, however, 
are significantly interconnected and the international economy reaches even the most 
distant regions of the world. As the economic crises of the last decades have shown, a 
simple economic crisis that occurs in some regional financial markets can spillover to 
other nations with unimaginable speed. And while this is a consequence that could 
potentially be mitigated by returning to a more highly regulated international financial 
regime, ecological collapse will need far more effort than a new “Bretton Woods” – it 
would require unprecedented international cooperation despite a significant rift between 
the interests of developed and developing nations.   
 
Unfortunately global ecological collapse is not an unimaginable scenario. As Ponting 
(2007) notes: 
 
“The increase in the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in the last 250 years reflects the 
second great transition in human history – the exploitation of fossil fuels and the development of 
societies dependent on high energy use. Coal production is now 350 times higher than in 1800 and 
oil production is 350 times higher than in 1900. The number of vehicles in the world rose from 
almost nil in 1900 to 775 million in 2000. In parallel, forests – particularly tropical forests – have 
been destroyed on an unprecedented scale in the last two hundred years. All these forces have had 
an impact on the earth’s atmosphere. Since 1750 about 300 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide has 
been added to the atmosphere through human actions – but half of that total has been added since 
1975. The result has been a rise in the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
Concentrations are measured in parts per million (ppm) and in 1750, before the widespread use of 
fossil fuels, there were about 270 ppm of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This is the baseline 
against which additions are measured. The slow pace of industrialization in the nineteenth century 
can be judged from the fact that concentrations had only risen to 280 ppm by 1850 and 295 ppm 
by 1900. By 1950 this had still only risen to 310 ppm – a roughly 15 per cent rise in 200 years. 
[Furthermore,] in 1959 the figure was 316 ppm, by 1985 it was 345 ppm and by 2005 it was 381 
ppm – a 20 per cent rise in forty-five years, reflecting the huge increase in carbon dioxide output 
in the second half of the twentieth century. […] the rate of increase is also rising – it was about 1.5 
ppm a year in the mid-twentieth century but reached a record 2.6 ppm in 2005.” 
 
In general, carbon dioxide is not the most powerful of greenhouse gases, however due to 
the huge volumes that have been released, it accounts for about two thirds of the total 
effect of greenhouse gas emissions (Ponting 2007). However, other gases such as 
methane and nitrous oxide have also been released in the atmosphere in significant 
volumes, thus exacerbating the ecological disequilibrium. Finally, the air pollutants black 
carbon and ozone constitute 30% of the sources of global warming, linking concerns of 
public health with global climate change (Moore 2009).  
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Table 4.2 captures the part of the picture of our ecological situation.  
Table 7.2: Sustainability and the World in the 20th Century 
Table 4.2: Sustainability and the World in the 20th Century 
  Increase 1900-2000 
World Population x 3.8 
World Urban Population x 12.8 
World Industrial Output x 35 
World Energy Use x 12.5 
World Oil Production x 300 
World Water Use x 9 
World Irrigated Area x 6.8 
World Fertilizer Use x 342 
World Fish Catch x 65 
World Organic Chemical Production x 1000 
World Car Ownership x 7750 
Carbon Dioxide in Atmosphere 30% up 
Source: Ponting (2007). 
 
 
Finally, the fact that a collapse or “breakdown” has not occurred so far does not signify 
that it will not happen in the years to come. Many of the societies that collapsed in the 
past also believed that they were in a sustainable societal equilibrium, only to discover 
later that they were mistaken. As Ponting (2007) notes:  
 
“by the time they had to face the crisis, they were unable to make the social, economic and 
political changes necessary for survival. The problem for all human societies has been to find a 
way of extracting from the environment their food, clothing, shelter and other goods in a way that 
does not render it incapable of supporting them”. 
 
In their highly influential and much discussed work, Limits to Growth, Meadows et al. 
(1972) listed out three conclusions: 
 
• If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on 
this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The most 
probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both 
population and industrial capacity. 
• It is possible to alter these trends and to establish a condition of ecological and 
economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. 
• The sooner the world’s people decide to strive for this stability, the greater will be 
their chance for success.  
 
In a 2007 article, Meadows underlined an important change that had occurred since the 
publication of Limits to Growth (Meadows 2007): 
 
“In 1972 we concluded that global population and industrial activity were still below the levels 
that could be supported indefinitely on earth. By 2004, it was clear to us that they had grown 
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above sustainable levels. So in 1972 the main objective seemed to us to be finding ways of 
slowing down physical expansion on the planet. In 2004 the main objective had become getting 
physical flows that are propelled by population and industry back down below the carrying 
capacity of the planet.”  
 
This point is corroborated by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report 
(MEA 2005), which summarized the work of approximately 1,360 experts from 95 
countries, who tried to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-
being and to establish the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation 
and sustainable use of ecosystems (Meadows 2007). 
 
As Meadows (2007) notes, in the MEA, among the five drivers of change in ecosystems 
and their services, population change and change in economic activity were the first two 
to be mentioned. Furthermore, the notion of collapse was also put forward as a possible, 
or even likely scenario (Meadows 2007, MEA 2005): 
 
“Approximately 60% (15 out of 24) of the ecosystem services examined during the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment are being degraded or used unsustainably, including fresh water, capture 
fisheries, air and water purification, and the regulation of regional and local climate, natural 
hazards, and pests…The challenge of reversing the degradation of ecosystems while meeting 
increasing demands for their services can be partially met under some scenarios that the MA has 
considered but these involve significant changes in policies, institutions and practices that are not 
currently under way.” 
 
The goal, thus, of modern societies should be none other than to anticipate the point at 
which the environment is being harmed by contemporary societal demands and to find 
the optimal systemic (economic, social, political) measures to respond accordingly 
(Ponting 2007).  
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5. Trade and Economic Development 
5.1 Free Trade: Winners and Losers 
Trade consists of the flow of goods and services between nations. These flows are 
heavily mediated by the international division of labor (i.e., the location of production 
versus consumption) and by the institutional organization of that labor (e.g., MNEs, 
which conduct significant inter-firm transfers of goods and services.) But the 
international trading system is also founded on theoretical beliefs about the gains from 
trade, and the international agreements which codify and regulate the conduct of trade 
reflect both this belief or ideology and a process of historical evolution. This chapter is 
therefore designed to provide an introduction to trade theory and its relationship to 
development/economic prosperity, and to the practice of trade as embodied in trade 
agreements.  
 
Although modern development theory emphasizes technological innovation as the 
‘engine of economic growth,’ trade also contributed to advancing industrializing nations 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Now, trade is increasingly described as a 
major engine of economic growth, both for advanced economies with ‘excess productive 
capacity’ and saturated domestic markets, and for less-industrialized countries with 
unutilized natural resources increasingly needed by the industrialized economies. For 
both, outward-looking strategies are being fashioned for more participation in world 
markets.29 The purpose of this section is to articulate why trade is seen as an important 
driver of development. 
 
Since the time of Adam Smith, most economists have considered free trade to be a 
beneficial activity towards which societies should strive. The most fundamental argument 
for free trade lies in the existence of efficiency losses associated with the enforcement of 
protectionist policies, such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies, which do not take advantage 
of lower factor costs elsewhere and which could be avoided through the imposition of a 
free trade policy regime.  
 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that developed nations (the U.S. in particular) 
believe that trade is critical to achieving sustainable development. It is seen as the 
mechanism through which poverty will be reduced, human well-being will increase, and 
environmental problems will be addressed. However, focusing on trade as a driver of 
sustainable development has its supporters and critics. 
 
                                                
29 See Schmidheiny (1992, pp. 69-81) for an insightful discussion on ‘trade and sustainable development.’ 
Schmidheiny (1992, p. 79) makes the observation that “[t]raditionally, the industrial nations of North 
America and Europe have championed free trade, against the resistance of most developing nations and 
centrally planned economies. Today, it is the former that tend to question the benefits of liberalized trade, 
while developing nations and the newly emerged democracies of Eastern Europe see it as their main hope 
for economic development.” To address the inherent conflicts associated with the expansion of trade and 
environmental protection, Schmidheiny (1992) calls for the harmonization of environmental regulations 
throughout the world.  
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Economists have identified a series of additional gains associated with free trade. One 
such gain involves the emergence of so-called spillover effects. By providing 
entrepreneurs with an incentive to devise new ways to export or to compete with imports, 
free trade results in innovation and increased learning opportunities. An additional gain 
involves the surfacing of economies of scale in production (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). 
An obvious consequence of protected markets is that they decrease production 
internationally; however, they also lead to a reduction in competition and an increase in 
profits for industry in the protected economy. On the other hand, low barriers to entry can 
lead too many firms to enter the protected industry, making the scale of production of 
each firm become inefficient. A good case-in-point is that of the Argentine automobile 
industry, which owes it emergence to import restrictions. While an efficient assembly 
plant should be making 80,000 to 200,000 automobiles per year, in 1964 the Argentine 
industry was producing only 166,000 cars per year, in a market of 13 firms (Krugman 
and Obstfeld 2003).  
 
The proponents of trade generally ground their arguments in the notion that free trade 
will enhance the welfare of humans by increasing prosperity. The justification for this 
from basic economic theory is that international trade that is free from protectionist 
barriers will reduce prices and increase the amount of goods and services available 
(Driesen 2001). Since free trade enables corporations (predominately based in developed 
nations) to become global in their operations, proponents argue that less developed 
nations will benefit from job creation and the spread of advanced technology, health, 
safety, and environmental standards, and environmental management techniques (OECD 
1997). In addition, as individual prosperity increases, so too does the tax base for 
environmental and social programs that governments can implement in response to 
increasing demands for a healthier environment (Bhagwati 1993; Speth 2003).30 In effect, 
proponents argue that international trade is opening up new opportunities to protect and 
enhance the environment through the reorientation of economic policies (OECD 1997). 
Further, as governments’ ability to manage their economic affairs is enhanced, there are 
likely to be spillover effects that will enable them to address environmental concerns 
(Speth 2003). 
 
Free trade, while a preferred policy measure in theory, does not uniformly advance all 
social interests. It is important to ask who wins from free trade and who loses.  
 
David Ricardo’s theory of competitive advantage remains the most central formulation of 
the theory of the benefits of international trade. The idea of comparative advantage states 
that countries can better their financial position by specializing in what they do best.31 In 
                                                
30 This type of argument is often put forward by those who believe in the inverted U-shape or Kuznets 
relationships – i.e., environmental quality falls during the initial stages of economic growth/industrial 
expansion, but later improves with increasing GDP.  
31 A very elucidating example of this is included in Ashford & Hall (2010). In a self-contained economy, an 
example of this theory is exemplified by bartering between a dentist and a carpenter. The carpenter needs 
his teeth fixed and the dentist needs shelves in his study. They agree freely on an exchange of services and 
it sounds like a marriage made in heaven. Both are made better off by the exchange. The dentist fixes 2 
teeth and the carpenter builds 3 shelves. Five years later, the carpenter needs 4 teeth fixed, but the dentist 
has enough shelves and wants a tool shed built in his garden. At that particular moment in time, the 
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the 1920s, the Swedes Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, showed that even when 
technologies could be copied, as in manufacturing, countries’ differing endowments of 
factors of production could explain different countries’ gains from trade. Capital-rich 
countries would specialize in goods whose production required an abundance of capital, 
while labor-rich countries would specialize in labor-intensive goods and land-rich 
countries in land-intensive (i.e., agricultural) goods. Instead of making goods that would 
primarily require the factors they possessed the least, countries could trade for them and 
acquire more goods overall. The Hecksher-Olin theory recognizes that trade would not 
benefit everyone uniformly. For instance, capital in labor-rich countries would lose from 
imports of capital-intensive goods. This helps explain why capitalists in low-wage 
countries, such as Brazil, opposed trade with capital-rich countries for capital-intensive 
goods, since this threatened their scarce premium. On the other hand, capitalists in the 
capital-intensive Britain were amongst the primary proponents of free trade. 
Symmetrically, labor in capital-rich countries would lose from imports of labor-intensive 
goods, which explains why labor unions in rich countries are usually anti-trade and also 
why the U.S. and Europe have been reluctant to reduce subsidies in agricultural 
production. 
 
Furthermore, by understanding which productive factors are required to manufacture 
commodities and relating this information to the relative endowments and factors of 
production of each country, factor endowment trade theory encourages countries to 
specialize in commodities in which they have a comparative advantage. Hence, the most 
efficient (worldwide) allocation of resources will be achieved if all countries specialize in 
their relative strengths and trade their surplus for needed commodities that are more 
easily produced by others. This view on trade ultimately leads to the integration of 
regional and national markets, increasing the importance of transnational corporations 
and the need to transport resources and commodities between nations (Korten 2001).  
 
In an article published in 1941, twenty years after the Heckscher-Ohlin contribution, the 
Harvard classmates Wolfgang Stopler and Paul Samuelson explored who benefits and 
who loses from trade. The authors began with the assumption that trade is beneficial for 
producers of exports and harmful for producers that compete with imports, with 
Heckscher-Ohlin predicting that export producers have the factor that is abundant in their 
country (Frieden 2006). In accordance with this analysis, an increase in exports will lead 
to an increase in demand for the factors employed in their production. For instance, as a 
labor-rich country exports labor-intensive products, the demand for labor increases, 
which leads to a corresponding increase in wages – at least in theory. At the same time, 
the demand for the products of import-competing producers will decrease, thus pushing 
them out of the market. In summary, the Stopler-Samuelson scheme constitutes a central 
theory of the politics of trade, making the case that trade makes the national owners of an 
                                                                                                                     
exchange still looks like a marriage made in heaven. Both are benefiting from the exchange. Ten years 
later, the exchange is 6 teeth fixed in exchange for a garage. It is still a mutually advantageous exchange, 
but note that one party to the bargain (the carpenter) is increasingly impoverished relative to the other (the 
dentist). The dentist is further advantaged by the greater technological advances in dentistry compared to 
carpentry. While at any point in time welfare is maximized, examination over time reveals a problem. The 
analogy to first world economies (providing advanced goods) trading with third world countries (providing 
basic commodities) is obvious.  
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abundant factor of production better off and the owners of a scarce factor of production 
worse off.  
 
Indeed, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, farmers in land-rich countries were free 
traders in almost all cases, no matter if they were cattle ranchers in Australia or wheat 
farmers in Canada (Frieden 2006). The same held true for owners of capital in capital-
rich countries, such as Britain and other countries of northwestern Europe. Stopler-
Samuelson also appeared to hold for the enemies of free trade as well. In labor-poor 
Australia, Canada and the U.S., labor was protectionist, while in capital-poor Russia and 
Brazil it was the owners of capital that primarily opposed free trade (Frieden 2006). 
Finally, farmers in land-poor Europe are still protectionist today, with countries such as 
France and Greece known for the subsidization of their respective national agricultural 
activities.  
 
Nevertheless, while international differences in factor costs and endowments have been 
important in the determination of the international division of labor and the patterns of 
international trade, Ricardo’s comparative advantage does not suffice in terms of its 
explanatory power (Coffey 1996). In fact, most of world trade seemed to be taking place 
between countries with similar factor endowments and costs. According to Porter (1990), 
the notion of competitive advantage constitutes a much more elaborate scheme for 
understanding international trade. Competitive advantage is a much broader concept than 
comparative advantage. Four attributes or interacting factors comprise Porter’s Diamond 
of Competitive Advantage (Porter 1990): 
 
• Factor conditions (such as resources, labor, infrastructure, etc.);32 
• Demand conditions (characteristics of consumers in domestic markets); 
• Related and supporting industries (suppliers, collaborators, competitors); and 
• Firm strategy, structure and rivalry (market conditions, competitive structure, 
company organization, i.e., the factors that influence an industry’s/firm’s attitude 
towards competition and innovation). 
 
These factors can combine to generate new advanced factor endowments (such as a high-
technology sector or a large pool of skilled labor) that determine a nation’s comparative 
advantage. A clear omission from Porter’s (1990) theory, however, is the failure to 
include government as a factor (Dicken 1994). Instead, government is described as 
having a proactive ‘influence’ on the four core endowment factors33.  
 
Daly (1993), in a comprehensive critique of free trade, underlines that even the term “free 
trade” is fallacious, because it creates the wrong impression that people who are for some 
set of trade restrictions are against “freedom.” In that context, the real debate is not over 
being for and against “free trade” (since there is no such thing as purely free trade), but 
                                                
32 Even though this may sound similar to Ricardo’s notion of comparative advantage, Porter does not limit 
his analysis to factor endowments. Porter believes that the key factors of production are actually created 
(i.e. skilled labor, capital, and infrastructure). 
33 Ashford and Hall (2010) suggest a much longer list of relevant factor endowments, addressed in Section 
2.1 
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over what sets of regulations and restrictions should be put in place and what goals are 
legitimate. Hence, according to Daly, a more accurate name instead of “free trade” would 
be that of “deregulated international trade.”34  
 
Greider (1997) agrees with that analysis. A passage from his 1997 book “One World, 
Ready or Not” is particularly elucidating: 
 
Lawrence B. Krause, international relations professor at the University of California at 
San Diego, aggregated all of the different ways in which trade was managed – openly and 
covertly – and concluded that only about 15 per cent of global trade was genuinely 
conducted in free-market circumstances. Other scholars have calculated that governments 
directly managed 25 to 30 per cent of trade through their various non-tariff [trade] 
barriers. Multinational corporations themselves managed about 40 percent of global trade 
through the intrafirm trade among their own subsidiaries. Further, Krause noted that the 
top ten trade sectors, from aircraft to petroleum, were managed by governments or 
concentrated firms, with the single exception of paper. These accounted for 22 percent of 
world trade.  
 
More than 10 years have passed since the publication of Greider’s book, however, these 
observations remain relevant today. 
 
Expanding Daly’s and Greider’s analysis, a key intuition of Porter’s model of 
competitive advantage is that government has an important regulatory role to play. 
Governments can affect all four elements of Porter’s diamond through subsidies, the 
creation of infrastructure, tax policy, education policy, standardization, regulations, etc.  
 
Daly (1993) however, makes an additional observation, often disregarded by some 
economic theorists. According to Ricardo’s specification, following trade liberalization, 
countries can specialize on the basis of comparative advantage, with the possibility of 
investing all of a country’s capital on a singular product. However, the hidden 
assumption of the theory of comparative advantage, according to Daly, is that capital 
earned from trade cannot cross borders, as was the case in the pre-1970 Bretton Woods 
world, and would be invested in the country in which the product was produced. If capital 
is mobile as well, then it can follow absolute advantage rather than comparative 
advantage, and one country could conceptually end up producing everything, since it 
could have lower costs, better infrastructure, larger or better markets, etc., and attract 
foreign capital.  
 
Morris (1996) extends Daly’s critique, by offering a reassessment of some of free trade’s 
assumptions. In his view, prices do not provide accurate measures of real efficiency, 
                                                
34A term that has been frequently used in juxtaposition to free trade is that of fair trade. According to its 
most accepted definition Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, 
that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better 
trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers – especially in the 
South. Fair Trade Organizations, backed by consumers, are engaged actively in supporting producers, 
awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international 
trade. Fair Trade products are produced and traded in accordance with these principles — wherever 
possible verified by credible, independent assurance systems.”  (EFTA 2006) 
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since they are the outcome of a series of variables, such as market structure and 
subsidization. Furthermore, Morris (1996) cites Howard Wachtel, who notes that 
“differences in product cost that are due to totalitarian political institutions or restrictions 
on economic rights reflect no natural or entrepreneurial advantage. Free trade has nothing 
to do with incomparable political economic institutions that protect individual rights in 
one country and deny them in another.”  
 
Furthermore, there is a significant set of additional arguments against free trade that need 
to be examined. For instance, labor used in a sector that would be harmed by import 
competition might otherwise be unemployed or underemployed. Also, the assertion that 
labor and capital markets perfectly clear is not corroborated by the evidence in most 
cases. In fact, defects often exist in the capital and labor markets that prevent resources 
from being transferred as rapidly as they should be to sectors that yield high returns. 
There is also a significant argument to be made about the protection of nascent domestic 
industries that can be particularly innovative and produce technological spillover 
effects.35  
 
In general, the proponents of free trade claim that it lowers import prices, a case which 
becomes all the more clear when thinking of cheap Wal-Mart products. However, this is 
not what theory claims to be the case. In fact, comparative advantage theory states that 
free trade affects relative rather than absolute prices. Absolute prices are actually 
determined by monetary and macroeconomic policies. The effect of a country liberalizing 
its trade regime is that the relative price of imports decreases relative to exports, or, 
conversly, that the relative price of exports increases relative to imports. The determinant 
of whether consumers will be better or worse off will be the extent to which their 
consumption basket is dominated by imports, after accounting for the net change in the 
amount of jobs. However, one cannot argue from first principles that this relationship will 
always be positive, especially in countries that seem to be running significant trade 
surpluses.  
 
Nevertheless, in many occasions, trade restrictions, such as tariffs and import quotas, are 
undertaken not in the context of an elaborate and well-planned industrial policy, but in 
order to protect the income of particular interest groups. Given the fact that trade 
restrictions are associated with efficiency losses, one would automatically make the case 
that such trade restrictions would reduce national welfare. However, there are theoretical 
grounds to believe that activist trade policies can, in some occasions, apart from 
protecting the income of certain segments of the society, increase the welfare of a nation 
as a whole. 
 
A particularly interesting observation pertaining to the above involves the “Olsonian” 
nature of the debate of free trade. The term “Olsonian” connotes the presence of 
concentrated losses from trade in specific societal segments and diffused benefits from 
lower consumer prices from import competition. Olson’s (1982) “logic of collective 
action” has long been invoked by economists, in order to explain seemingly irrational 
                                                
35 See Amsden (1994) for an explanation of the success of the so-called Asian Tigers as being the result of 
promoting national champions under a cloak of protectionism. 
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trade policies as a result of small concentrated groups capturing the political process. This 
is highly relevant for countries where the harmed interests groups can closely influence 
the policy-making process through their linkages to specific party interests. Organized 
labor was the natural base of British Labor party in the 1970s and 1980s, while the 
policies of the Tories in the late 1970s and early 1980s reflected their proximity to 
capital-owners and City financiers.  
 
5.2 The Effects of Trade in the Developed World  
In general, the established consensus among most members of the economic profession 
appears to be that trade constitutes “an important stimulator of economic growth” 
(Todaro and Smith 2009). Trade increases a country’s consumption capacities, expands 
world output and provides access to scarce resources and global markets for products, 
without which poor countries would not have been able to develop (Todaro and Smith 
2009).  
 
However, while agreements such as NAFTA are generally considered by economists to 
have been beneficial for the United States, the population of the U.S. appears to be 
particularly divided on the issue Warf and Kull (2002). How can Americans be that 
divided when NAFTA has purportedly been beneficial for the majority of the population 
through lower consumer prices? One answer attractive to the proponents of the 
mainstream view has to do with the relative visibility of NAFTA’s effects. In general, job 
losses are more obvious and concentrated than lower prices, and more easily attributable 
to trade. Hence, even though one might have personally gained from free trade, the 
adverse effects of trade liberalization, through the associated job losses in sectors like 
manufacturing, can increase insecurity in the working population and create hostility 
towards free trade.  
 
Nevertheless, other commentators seem to disagree with this “established” view. Scott 
(2002) states that NAFTA was eventually harmful for the U.S. economy, costing 766,030 
jobs and job opportunities in the period 1993-2002, while the total U.S. trade deficit cost 
approximately 3 million jobs in the period 1994-2002. Furthermore, according to Berger 
(2005) “more than two million jobs disappeared from the U.S. workforce between 2001 
and 2004. By one calculation, a half-million of them were in high-tech industries like 
electronics, components, and telecoms. The layoff rate has risen, and while many of those 
who lose jobs get hired again fairly soon, two-thirds of the jobs they get pay less than the 
jobs lost.”  
 
Hence, apart from the impact of trade on the employment statistics, trade has also 
significantly impacted wages. According to Scott (2002), trade’s indirect effects on 
wages, through the elimination of good job opportunities and the possibility of relocation 
as a threat in wage negotiations has led to a series of effects on wages: 
 
• Real production worker wages have decreased by 5.4% between 1978 and 2000; 
• Growing wage inequality since late 1970s; 
• Increasing income inequality since 1979; and 
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• Flat incomes for the bottom 60% despite 7.6% increase in working hours. 
 
Scott (2002) notes that trade explains at least 15%-25% of the increase in income 
inequality with other factors including deregulation, liberalization and weak 
macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, Charles and Lehner (1998) argue that trade might 
actually facilitate rigidity and lack of innovation and actually contribute to long-term 
decline. 
 
Faux’s (2007) analysis moves along similar lines, even though the picture that he paints 
is even more bleak. While he deems globalization to be a force that can potentially be 
beneficial and enhance living standards for workers around the world, he considers it to 
have been “tragically mismanaged,” entailing an accumulation of international trade and 
investment agreements which are “increasingly unaccountable to any country’s citizens.” 
Faux’s calculations are dire, and according to his analysis, in the period between 1979-
2007, 7 million jobs have been displaced in the U.S. due to the expansion of trade. 
According to his analysis, real wages have not declined – in fact the wages of 
nonsupervisory employees (accounting for 80% of U.S. workers) increased by a marginal 
4%; however, this increase did not remotely match the corresponding 71% increase in the 
productivity of the U.S. economy, as traditional economic theory would have us believe. 
In order to make the picture clearer, the 4% increase also includes the increasing 
participation of female workers in the workspace. In fact, among working males, real 
hourly wages have remained at the 1973 level (Faux 2007). 
 
The proponents of free trade underline that these costs are inflated. However, they also 
note that even if inflated, such costs should be up to some degree expected, given the lack 
of skills of the unskilled workers of the manufacturing sector. According to mainstream 
economic thinking, these workers, as they obtain portable skills and become better 
trained, will be channeled to other productive activities. Scott (2002) seems to agree that 
college-educated workers, who account for 20-40% of U.S. households, constitute the 
second category of winners from globalization in the U.S., apart from MNEs. 
Nevertheless, Faux (2007) does not come to the same conclusion. Americans are working 
longer hours, and are increasingly educated. The percentage of workers with college 
degrees has doubled from 15% in 1973 to 30% today, while the share of high school 
dropouts has fallen from 29% to 10%. Nevertheless, the U.S. economy, in this process of 
Schumpeterian Creative Destruction, does not seem to be fulfilling the “creative” part. 
Faux (2007) cites projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, that concludes that by 
2014, the number of occupations filled by people with college degrees will rise by only 
1% – from 28% to 29% – while the share of jobs for which a college degree is required is 
projected to be only 21%.  
 
However, acknowledging that some level of costs does emanate from increasing trade 
openness is to be expected even from the most pro-trade advocate. The point is whether 
these costs, as accounted from the above analysis, are less than the projected benefits. In 
theory, free trade creates losers in the domestic economy in those industries that are not 
able to compete in the international spectrum; however, it also entails cheaper imports 
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and products, which can drastically increase the standard of living of the domestic 
population. 
 
But is this the case? Are lower prices that prevalent? Faux (2007) again offers compelling 
evidence to the contrary. As he notes: “Comparing the price change of domestic and 
imported goods … yields a savings from imports to the average American of about $36 a 
year. A gain, but hardly substantial enough to justify any costs.” In fact, Faux does note 
that other authors are led to conclude there are higher benefits, however, most of these 
studies seem to be based on unrealistic assumptions and simulation, rather than being 
grounded on facts. The reality of the benefits of free trade for the U.S., thus, seems 
unclear. 
 
5.3 The Effects of Trade in the Developing World  
While there appears to be a consensus among many economists that free trade produces 
net gains for developing societies, and that countries should unambiguously adopt trade 
liberalization policies, reality paints a more complex picture. Rodrik (2007) cites the 
particularly elucidating case of two different countries, Vietnam and Haiti. Vietnam still 
engages in state trading maintains import monopolies, retains quotas and tariffs (in the 
range of 30%-50%) in imports of agricultural and industrial products and is not a member 
of the WTO. On the other hand, Haiti undertook significant trade liberalization in 1994-
1995, joined the WTO, diminished import tariffs to a maximum of 15% and removed all 
quotas. The result? Vietnam experienced annual GDP growth rates in the area of 8%, 
reduced poverty, expanded trade significantly and attracted significant foreign direct 
investment. On the other hand, Haiti has stagnated and suffered from significant poverty 
and unemployment rates, having made little progress in integrating with the world 
economy.  
 
Rodrik (2007) is right to note that trade should not be viewed as a goal in itself but rather 
as a means towards the goal of increasing economic welfare. As he notes “a leadership 
committed to development and standing behind a coherent growth strategy counts for a 
lot more than trade liberalization, even when the strategy departs sharply from the 
enlightened view of reform.” His view is corroborated by the facts. The cross-national 
evidence on the relationship between open trade policies and higher economic growth 
and poverty reduction has shown no systematic relationship between a country’s average 
level of tariff and nontariff restrictions and its subsequent economic growth rate. In fact, 
if anything, the evidence from the 1990s suggests a positive (but statistically 
insignificant) relationship between tariffs and economic growth, with the only systematic 
relationship being that as countries get richer they tend to liberalize trade.  
 
Hence, integration to the world economy through trade liberalization should be viewed as 
an outcome, rather than a prerequisite of a successful growth strategy. As Stiglitz (2002) 
and Rodrik (2007) note, the fact that all of today’s advanced countries embarked on their 
growth with trade restrictions and gradually reduced protection, should be viewed as a 
lesson. Finally, almost all of the outstanding developing country success stories, such as 
China, India, the East Asian countries, involved partial and gradual trade and capital 
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liberalization. A country’s trade policy should be eclectic, and take into account a series 
of national and external variables, such as the industries that will be harmed from trade 
openness and the capacity of the domestic market to reallocate workers.    
 
While international trade has some positive effects on developing regions and can 
potentially help protect/enhance the environment, it is also seen to have negative 
environmental (OECD 1994) and social (welfare) impacts (Rees and Westra 2003). 
Among the main arguments against the international integration of economies are that 
free trade: 
 
 is accompanied by environmental degradation and growing economic inequality 
(Borghesi and Vercelli 2003; Held and McGrew 2002); 
 weakens the democratic accountability of governments through the transfer of power 
from people (and society in general) to global financial institutions and corporations 
(Korten 2001). Such a transfer of power is mirrored by “a corresponding shift in 
economic priorities from the production of goods and services to meet human needs 
to a wholly different agenda centered on extracting wealth from the larger society to 
increase the financial assets and power of the wealthiest among us;”36 
 is not proceeding in a fair and equitable manner. A main contention is that 
industrialized nations have pressured developing nations to eliminate their trade 
barriers while keeping their own intact. This has the effect of opening up the markets 
of developing nations to capital-intensive products from developed nations, but has 
prevented them from exporting their labor-intensive products, depriving them of vital 
export income (Stiglitz 2002);  
 encourages economically rational corporations to invest capital in countries with the 
lowest environmental and health and safety standards. Such action reduces the cost of 
producing commodities and might also lead countries to specialize in those sectors 
where regulations are weakest (Cole 2000). Alternatively, the pressure to produce 
commodities at or below the price dictated by the international market creates a 
perverse incentive to lower health and safety and environmental standards to improve 
the competitiveness of national sectors (Daly 1993); 
 creates a situation in which capital from developed nations is only invested in nations 
that offer the potential for a high rate of return. This means it is more profitable to 
invest in the inefficient and polluting industries of Eastern Europe, for example, than 
to invest in the less attractive markets of developing nations (Reid 1995). Hence, 
economic ‘logic’ is reducing the already limited financial flows reaching developing 
nations; and 
 leads to the “spatial and temporal separation of action and impact from 
responsibility” (Speth 2003). As commodity chains grow in length, become more 
complex and more international, the spatial and social distance between production 
and consumption is widened (Conca 2002; Princen 2002). The result of this 
distancing effect is that consumers lack the information and incentives to behave in a 
more sustainable manner even if they wished to do so. To put it another way, as trade 
increases and countries continue to specialize, the transaction costs (linked to 
                                                
36 Source: People-Centered Development Forum, History, http://www.pcdf.org/About_PCDF/history.htm 
(accessed on 04/09/06).  
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externalities) become hidden by the distancing effect. Therefore, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for communities in different nations to communicate and agree 
on collective solutions to externality problems (Costanza et al. 1997). Further, the 
growing movement of resources between nations in response to market demands is 
reducing the effectiveness of traditional local controls over resource use (Speth 2003). 
This loss of indigenous control can lead to the exploitation of resources as a result of 
unsustainable rates of extraction.  
 
The above concerns have led a series of scholars to move their point of reference, asking 
for trade to become part of a larger development scheme. Najam and Robins (2001) note 
that it is in the interest of the developing world (“the South”) to shift the terms of the 
debate from “trade and environment” to “trade and sustainable development.” 
Furthermore, in their view, “if sustainable development is to become the organizing focus 
of the international trade regime, then at some point, “sustainable trade” will have to 
replace “free trade” as the grand rationale for our efforts. For the early advocates of 
GATT, the ultimate and non-negotiable goal – to be reached through small steps – was to 
create a world in which all trade was “free”. The new goal, equally non-negotiable at its 
core, must be the creation of a world where all trade is seen as a part of the larger 
sustainable development enterprise” (Najam and Robins 2001). 
 
5.4 The Effects of Trade on the Environment37 
 
As elaborated in section 5.1-5.3, free trade is far from being a panacea. According to 
Ashford and Hall (2010), this view if enhanced by the perceived negative impacts of free 
trade on the environment, effects which are strongly contested by free trade advocates. 
What, however, are the potential environmental impacts of free trade? 
 
A series of authors argue that trade by itself does not have a negative impact38 on the 
environment. Environmental harm is caused by (Cole 2000): 
 
- Market failures: the market fails to internalize externalities or “to properly value 
and allocate environmental goods, with the result that prices do not cover the full 
social costs of production” (Cole 2000). Cole recalls the three reasons for market 
failure that were first outlined by the OECD (1994). These are: [1] the costs of 
environmental harm are not being included in the price of goods and services; [2] 
the market fails to take into account the full value that society places on an 
environmental asset; and [3] there is a lack of property rights for certain 
environmental assets (the resource is considered as ‘free of charge’). 
- Intervention failures and distortions: these “occur when government policy 
creates, exacerbates or fails to remove market failures” (Cole 2000). 
                                                
37 Drawn heavily from Ashford and Hall (2010). 
38 Ashford and Hall (2010) note that this perspective reflects the view that some environmental harm is 
acceptable so long as the marginal benefits of an economic activity are equal or greater than its 
environmental costs. 
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Free trade advocates generally argue that the net effects of liberalized international 
exchange on the environment are globally positive (Ashford and Hall 2010). Their 
arguments are: 
 
- Free trade favors economic growth and the growth of income has positive effects 
on the environment due to the increased demands for a clean environment and the 
ability to pay for them; 
- Free trade favors the international exchange of technology and environmentally-
sound products and services; and 
- Free trade induces the removal of trade-distorting and environmentally-harming 
policies. 
 
In general, free trade advocates reject the claim that economic growth, as accelerated by 
free trade, harms the environment. Bhagwati (1993) argues that economic growth enables 
governments to raise taxes to protect the environment and increases the demand for 
higher environmental quality. Similarly, according to Cole (2000), the expansion of the 
scale of economic activity, through liberalized trade, increases the financial resources 
available to improve environmental quality. In developing countries, he states that growth 
in income is essential if developing countries are to improve the quality of their 
environment. He recalls the example of Mexico, given by Voigt (1993), whereby the lack 
of financial resources has limited the ability of the government to control the 
environmental affects of development.  
 
A second argument employed by free trade advocates emphasizes the benefits of the free 
trade of environmentally cleaner technologies, products, and services (Ashford and Hall 
2010). For Bhagwati (1993), freer trade and rising income enhance the exchange of 
pollution-fighting and resource-efficient technologies: trade liberalization plays a role in 
expanding the potential market for environmentally cleaner products, services, and 
technologies and, in turn, this market expansion boosts technological innovation and 
trade (OECD 1994). Cole (2000) agrees that free trade can be beneficial to the 
environment through the technique effect: by allowing the expansion of markets, free 
trade increases access of countries to cleaner technologies, products, and services, but 
also to more efficient production methods. Therefore, output might be produced in a 
much cleaner and more efficient way following trade liberalization (Ashford and Hall 
2010).  
 
Finally, Ashford and Hall (2010) conclude that:  
 
“it appears that proponents of free trade consider a kind of natural vicious circle between trade 
liberalization – market expansion – and technological innovation, so that environmental quality 
eventually benefits from increased international exchanges.”  
 
Rather than restricting liberalized international exchanges, free trade advocates believe 
that externalities should be tackled directly (Ashford and Hall 2010). They also urge 
environmentalists to use methods such as lobbying countries with poor standards, and 
boycotting certain commodities, rather than attacking free trade (Bhagwati 1993). 
 75 
Finally, they believe in the potential of voluntary approaches to promote both free trade 
and the quality of the environment. 
 
However, this picture is considered to be rather optimistic by a series of scholars and 
policy-makers who view free trade as significantly harmful for the environment, and 
consider opinions such as Bhagwati’s (1993) as highly theoretical, without any practical 
application. In the absence of internalization of externalities, it appears that trade is rather 
conducted on the ‘back of the environment’ (Ashford and Hall 2010). By encouraging 
trade with nations which do not internalize their externalities, free trade leads to 
inefficient allocation of resources and harms the environment (Daly 1993). Similarly, 
Daly (1993) argues that the environmental costs of growth increase faster than its 
potential benefits, thus refuting the argument that growth generates wealth that can be 
used to protect the environment. 
 
A second reason for questioning the supposedly more efficient allocation of resources 
and better environmental quality brought by free trade relates to the different 
environmental standards and regulations among nations (Ashford and Hall 2010). First, if 
comparative advantage occurs due to differences in environmental standards, countries 
are likely to specialize in those sectors where their country has the weakest 
environmental regulation, and, as a result, the composition effect of trade liberalization 
will lead to a decrease of environmental quality (Cole 2000). Secondly, international 
competition arising from free trade can lower costs by keeping environmental standards 
low in developing countries and providing pressure to lower, or at least not to raise, those 
standards in the industrialized nations, rather than through increasing efficiency (Daly 
1993). The idea that free trade and increased competition among nations will lead to a 
lowering of environmental standards is usually referred to as the ‘Race to The Bottom’ 
(Ashford and Hall 2010).  
 
Moreover, the question of free trade and transportation is also particularly significant. 
Daly (1993) notes that the gains from free trade would be highly reduced if the subsidies 
for the energy-intensive transportation costs associated with increased global trade were 
to be deducted. Furthermore, Cole (2000) argues that trade liberalization – and the 
subsequent expansion in the total volume of trade – directly affects the environment by 
favoring increased transportation, because fuel prices do not fully internalize 
environmental costs associated with transportation. Thus, an unsustainable transportation 
system is linked to unsustainable consumption (Hall 2006, Ashford and Hall 2010). 
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6. The Evolution of International Financial Institutions 
6.1 International Financial Institutions: Bretton Woods and Its Aftermath 
In the aftermath of World War Two, a new system of financial architecture was created. 
The pillars of this system were initially put in place in 1944 during a conference  in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The then head of the State Department’s delegation at 
Bretton Woods, and subsequent Secretary of State, Dean Acheson described his 
participation at the 1944 conference as none other than “being present at the creation.” It 
was in Bretton Woods that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
were created in the context of a new international financial system, where “never again” 
would a Great Depression occur. 
 
Relevant to this discussion is the notion of Mundell’s “unholy” trinity (Obstfeld and 
Taylor 2002). Of the “unholy” trinity – fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, and 
monetary independence – a country can choose to have any two of these attributes, but 
cannot choose all three. The financial architecture of Bretton Woods constructed a world 
of fixed exchange rates and low capital mobility. In that era, the IMF sanctioned capital 
controls as a means to prevent currency crises and bank runs, which lent some level of 
autonomy to governments by providing more power to monetary policy (Obstfeld and 
Taylor 2002). Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, global capital was difficult to contain in the 
confines of the nation-state.  
 
Key countries in the Bretton Woods system, such as the US and Germany, fearful of 
sluggish growth and increased inflation respectively, proved unwilling to accept the 
domestic policy implications of maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. Even in the 
pre-1970s world of low capital mobility, furious speculative attacks on the major 
currencies led to the collapse of fixed exchange rates. The “adjustable peg” system of 
fixed exchange rates was, to a large extent, unstable in itself. If a specific country faced 
economic difficulties and it started to look as if the country would consider a devaluation 
of its currency, speculators would start selling its currency in anticipation. This would 
force the hand of the central bank of the country to raise interest rates – which would 
worsen the slump – to devalue the currency, or to impose capital controls (Krugman 
2009). After the system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in March 1973, several 
major countries no longer needed the capital controls that had been put in place in order 
to protect their monetary policy independence. That, along with the emergence of 
enhanced communication technologies, made the removal of capital controls imminent.  
 
In general, we can distinguish between two broad types of capital controls. One category 
aims to control capital inflows, while the other aims to control capital outflows. In West 
Germany, the controls in place by the early 1970s were designed to discourage the 
acquisition of assets by foreign residents. The German government prohibited the 
payment of interest from large bank deposits to nonresidents, taxed new credits by 
nonresidents to German banks, and prohibited nonresidents from buying German bonds 
(Caves et al. 2006). The German government was essentially trying to limit the flow of 
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capital from the United States to Germany, which was putting upward pressure on the 
mark as it put downward pressure on the dollar. The other reason behind the imposition 
of such controls was that in the fixed exchange rate world of Bretton Woods, foreign 
capital inflow could result in the possible loss of control of the money supply, since if a 
large volume of foreign reserves flowed in, the Central bank of the capital-receiving 
country might not be able to counter the effects on the money supply, leading to inflation.  
 
6.2 The Benefits and Perils of Increased Capital Mobility  
In general, for a rapidly growing economy with a high return to domestic capital, 
investment can be financed more cheaply by borrowing from abroad than from domestic 
savings alone. This is, perhaps, the most significant argument for financial integration 
and increased capital mobility. Symmetrically, investors in wealthier countries can 
sometimes earn higher rates of return (for a variety of reasons) by investing in emerging 
markets rather than investing domestically. Arguably, this process of openness can 
further lead to everyone benefiting from the opportunity to diversify risks and dampen 
volatility. 
 
An additional argument in favor of capital inflows is that letting foreign financial 
institutions into a country with an underdeveloped financial system improves the 
efficiency of domestic financial markets. Internationalized financial markets foster a 
competitive environment, making it more difficult for overregulated and potentially 
inefficient domestic institutions to operate as they did previously. Finally, governments 
face the discipline of international capital markets in the event they make substantial 
policy missteps, i.e. in their domestic regulatory duties. 
 
Nevertheless, the occurrences of recent crises underline that financial markets do not 
work as perfectly as economic theorists seem to believe. Practice does not corroborate the 
argument that investors have punished countries only when governments are following 
mistaken macroeconomic policies. In many cases, large capital inflows are succeeded by 
large capital outflows, with no significant reasons appearing in the interim that could 
justify such a shift (Caves et al. 2006). In addition, if international capital controls are 
removed prematurely, massive capital inflows might occur internally. For instance, 
liberalization in Chile resulted in a large trade deficit financed by a large increase in 
domestic borrowing, thus leaving the country with an excessive level of debt throughout 
the 1980s. 
 
As with free trade, capital mobility has clear winners and losers. Investors are generally 
better off since they are faced with an expanded portfolio of investment options. On the 
other hand, increasing options for capital reduce those of labor, making it less costly for 
capital to move than to comply with labor demands (Frieden 1991). Furthermore, 
according to Heckscher-Ohlin, increased capital mobility will benefit capital where it is 
abundant, and hurt capital where it is scarce. As a rule, capital flows out of capital-rich 
countries, raising the return to (now scarcer) local capital, and flows toward capital-poor 
countries, lowering the return to local capital there. Hence, capitalists in capital-rich 
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countries in the developed world have arguably gained from increased capital mobility, 
while the opposite probably holds true for capitalists in capital-poor countries.  
 
However, despite the theoretical prediction of capital moving from the more to the least 
developed counterpart, empirical observation suggests the opposite. According to Raja 
(2008): 
 
The capital-poor developing world is lately exporting more capital to developed countries 
than it receives. … In its Trade and Development Report 2008, UNCTAD said that the 
puzzle is all the more intriguing because many of these capital-exporting countries have 
been achieving higher rates of investment and growth than those that rely on the standard 
economic model of net capital imports. … The beginning of the Millennium saw the shift 
of developing countries as a group from net capital importers to net capital exporters. 
Indeed, since the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, capital has increasingly been 
flowing “uphill” – from poor to rich countries. The magnitude of this new phenomenon 
has caused some observers to conclude that some developing countries have been 
creating a global savings glut. The emergence of developing countries as net capital 
exporters contrasts with expectations derived from standard growth theories. These 
theories postulate that with open capital markets, capital will flow from rich to poor 
countries in order to exploit the higher expected rates of return on capital and bridge the 
“savings gap” in capital-scarce countries. The theories also predict that capital inflows 
will spur economic growth. However …, these predictions are not supported by 
developments over the past few years. Not only is capital flowing “uphill”, but net 
capital-exporting developing countries also tend to grow faster and invest more than 
those developing countries that receive net capital inflows. Thus, higher rates of 
investment for diversification and structural change do not always require current-
account deficits or net capital inflows, as suggested by standard economic models. 
Indeed, many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, failed to achieve 
higher productive investment under the mainstream approach because the monetary and 
financial policies that attracted waves of capital inflows also led to high domestic 
financing costs and to currency appreciation. [Finally], these developments also call into 
question another hypothesis of standard economic theory, namely that there is a close and 
positive relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth. 
 
A similar theoretical assertion as the one made about capital in capital-rich countries 
could be made for labor in capital-poor countries – that in fact capital mobility empowers 
them by increasing investment in labor-intensive activities – but Frieden (1991) argues 
that this argument is not really clear-cut. While the Heckscher-Ohlin model might be 
useful with respect to identifying long-term economic trends, it might not be the best tool 
for analyzing the near-term distributional effects of international capital movements. 
Frieden (1991) identifies a different conceptual model for analyzing the winners and 
losers of financial integration. His model follows a sectoral approach to political 
economy rather than a class-based approach like that of Heckscher-Ohlin. The model 
predicts that in the developed world, winners (and thus supporters) of financial openness 
include the owners and managers of financial assets and multinational firms with 
internationally diversified investments. On the other hand, participants of “specific” 
industries, especially those tied to a particular national market, are amongst the losers of 
increased capital mobility. In broad terms the model indeed predicts the patterns of 
political activity on the issues in question. In the United States, for instance, the country’s 
 79 
financial centers and its internationally-oriented nonfinancial corporations were among 
the major proponents of financial deregulation. On the contrary, domestic manufacturing 
and farm interests have either been ambivalent or even hostile (Frieden 1991).  
 
6.3 Towards a New Bretton Woods? 
However, the situation appears to be different today. The 2008 Financial Crisis has led to 
an increasing number of voices demanding for a more “fair” and “stable” international 
financial system. We have reached a certain point where, as Wolf (2008a) notes, 
“ambitious leaders call for a new Bretton Woods.” However, is a new Bretton Woods 
attainable? Perhaps it is, but probably not under the “fierce urgency of now.” The original 
Bretton Woods agreement, despite having taken place during a period when the outcome 
of World War Two was far from certain, was a product of two years of extensive 
preparation. It is not clear that an agreement could actually be reached today with respect 
to the exact nature of a novel financial architecture. The Europeans, through the 
statements of their national governments, are pushing for the creation of new global 
regulators for the international financial system. The Americans and the Chinese, 
however, despite a change in administration in the first case, should still be expected to 
be cautious of such a development (Rachman 2008). In addition, it is very unclear if a 
country like China would accept changing its reserve accumulation policy to fit the needs 
of the US or the UK. 
 
Another point that should be made is that multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the UN were the product of America’s strength in 1944-45. Gideon 
Rachman (2008) suggests that “one of the reasons Bretton Woods worked was that the 
US was clearly the most powerful country at the table, and so ultimately was able to 
impose its will on others, including an often-dismayed Britain.” Contrary to Rachman’s 
view that unlike 1944, the US “lacks the power and the inclination to impose a new set of 
arrangements on the rest of the world,” the election of the incoming administration 
represents, perhaps, a defining moment, where the realm of possibility appears 
significantly expanded, and the “soft power” of the US seems augmented. If the Obama 
administration comes to the table with increased authority, it could perhaps forge a 
politically difficult agreement.  
 
What could a Bretton Woods II agreement consist of? First, one needs to approach the 
subject with a certain degree of humility. As the Economist magazine readily points out, 
“international finance cannot just be “fixed,” because the system is a tug-of-war between 
the global capital markets and national sovereignty.”39 In general, the most “globalized” 
component of the international economy, finance, appears to be its weakest link. Some 
have argued that the crisis we are facing is essentially the outcome of the mismatch of 
international financial markets and national regulation and control measures (Frieden 
2006). Hence, if a new comprehensive architecture were to be proposed, some version of 
a global financial regulator, or a global lender of last resort, would be vital.  
 
                                                
39 The Economist, (2008). Redesigning Global Finance, November 15 2008 
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Today, non-coordinated national supervisors, in some cases even state-based, oversee 
regulated financial firms, while the “shadow” financial system40 is largely unregulated. 
International differences in regulation led to what The Economist (2008) calls “regulatory 
arbitrage.” The big lesson of the 2008 Financial Crisis is that policy-makers did not 
understand the nature of the financial system when they were engaging in extensive 
deregulation. Hence, instead of just re-regulating domestically, the new administration 
should propose reforms of financial structure and regulation at both the domestic and the 
international level, with less speculation and more real investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 This is a term coined by/borrowed from Krugman (2009). 
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7.  Policy Options for a Transition to Sustainability  
The financial crisis of 2008 has increased the number of voices calling for a 
comprehensive transformation of the economic system. At the same time, however, there 
is lack of a clear vision of what such a transformation could entail.  
 
As elaborated earlier, the world’s population has, on average, achieved a higher standard 
of living that would have been inconceivable for earlier generations. However, this vast 
improvement has been achieved at a significant price: a huge increase in the consumption 
of energy and raw materials, elevated levels of pollution and a wide spectrum of social 
problems (Ponting 2007) as well as unjustified borrowing from the future. Furthermore, 
as Clark (2007) has explained, this increase in the average standard of living hides the 
fact that many nations and citizens, especially in the sub-Saharan Africa, actually saw a 
decrease in their standards of living (Clark, 2007).  
 
In broad terms, the opportunity before societies right now is to make a historic shift in 
their carbon dependence, that would characterize a transition away from a “low entropy” 
economy based on consumption, to a “high-entropy” economy based on sustainability. 
Further, consumption of both energy and material resources is not sustainable on a global 
scale.  
7.1 Crisis and Opportunity 
While this work is being written, the consensus is that the world is experiencing the worst 
economic crisis since the 1930s. In essence, what the world is facing today is what many 
would describe as a “Minsky” moment. The late-economist Hyman Minsky asserted in 
his 1986 work “Stabilizing an Unstable Economy” that an extended period of rapid 
growth, low inflation, low interest rates and macroeconomic stability did not constitute an 
equilibrium but bred complacency and an increased willingness to bear risks (Minsky 
1986). Instability, in his view, was a hidden element of stability – and an undue faith in 
unregulated markets, along with securitization, off-balance-sheet financing and other 
financial innovations would create a particularly dangerous and disruptive mix. 
 
Galbraith observed in “A Short History of Financial Euphoria” that “the more obvious 
features of the speculative episode are manifestly clear to anyone open to understanding 
(and) especially so after the fact” (Galbraith 1990). After all, it was only back on July 19 
2007, that the Dow Jones Industrial Average had risen above 14,000 points for the first 
time in its history (Krugman 2009). Less than a month later, however, the French bank 
BNP Paribas suspended withdrawals from three of its funds. According to Krugman, this 
was the moment “ the first great financial crisis of the twenty-first century had began” 
(Krugman 2009).  
 
The exact characteristics of the 2008 crisis can potentially tempt one to observe that this 
crisis is like nothing we’ve ever seen before. This is, after all, what expert figures such as 
George Soros seem to assert (Soros 2008). A perhaps more accurate observation, 
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however, would lead us to the conclusion that this crisis is exactly like everything we 
have seen before, only simultaneously: a real estate bubble, reminiscent of Japan at the 
end of the 1980s; a wave of bank runs similar to those of the Great Depression in the 
early 1930s (but which mainly involved the “shadow” banking system of derivatives 
hedge funds etc. rather than conventional banking organizations); a liquidity trap in the 
US, again similar to what happened in Japan; and finally a disruption of international 
capital flows and a wave of currency crises, comparable to what happened to East Asia in 
the late 1990s (Krugman 2009).  
 
It is important to underline however that more than anything else, the 2008 crisis is the 
outcome of a culmination of problems inherent to the unsustainable nature of the 
economic system. Some facts are particularly elucidating. As Walker (2009) notes, 
between 1951 and 1983, consumption remained within the range of 60-64 per cent as a 
proportion of GDP. However, since 1983, consumption grew to 66 per cent in 1990, 68 
per cent in 1998, 70 per cent in 2001 and 71 per cent by the end of 2007 (Walker 2009). 
It is particularly interesting to observe the evolution of the savings rate and the trade 
deficit as consumption was increasing. Walker (2009) cites an analysis by Wen and 
Shimek (2007) which states that the trade deficit was at a maximum of 1 percent of GDP 
until 1983, and then moved to 3 per cent in 1986, decreased again during the recession of 
1991-1992 and then rose up to 5 per cent in 2004 where it has remained. At the same 
time, savings fell from 10 percent of GDP in 1980 to 0.4 percent in 2006, household 
consumption’s chare of disposable income grew from 87.5 per cent to 95.8 percent and 
revolving credit (mainly credit cards) grew from about 2.7 percent of personal income to 
9.8 percent of personal income (Walker 2009, Wen and Shimek 2007). 
These numbers seem to match significantly. As Wen and Shimek note, the increase in the 
trade deficit ($762 billion), the increase in consumption’s share of personal income ($802 
billion) and the increase in revolving credit outstanding ($800 billion) are strikingly 
similar (Wen and Shimek 2007). The 2008 crisis has of course had its effect on these 
figures and consumption has declined by 3.7 percent in the third quarter of 2008, while 
savings have started moving upwards (Walker 2009)41. However, contrary to Walker’s 
(2009) interpretation, it’s not necessary for this short-term response to the crisis to 
constitute a significant cultural shift, which will be essential for a transition to a more 
sustainable economic model.  
 
Apart from the structural shift in consumption, savings and trade, the US economy has 
also experienced a growing imbalance in the relationship between business and 
government, especially during the last 30 years. In the 1950s, Galbraith (1952) coined up 
the term “countervailing power” to describe the idea that in market economies, both 
government and organized labor must be strong in order to balance the power of large 
corporations. Galbraith’s analysis dictated that economic life was not governed by small 
                                                
41 This element corroborates the fears of those commentators who have a structural preference for 
infrastructure spending instead of tax cuts. A central irony of the crisis is that the consumption vice 
becomes a virtue in the Keynesian space, since more spending is necessary to come out of the crisis. 
Increased savings, on the other hand, will be a sine-qua-non of sustainable development, but this is an 
“equilibrium” condition, under a different growth regime. 
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firms battling one another through price competition to serve consumers, but by large 
corporations in oligopolistic markets, that had the power to dictate the terms of their 
engagement with both buyers and suppliers (Auerswald and Acks 2009). Galbraith 
believed that the dominance of large corporations in the economy would lead to a 
countervailing response from workers and consumers that would decrease their influence. 
At the same time, government would be the force responsible for balancing interests in 
markets and moderating the adverse effects of business cycles (Auerswald and Acks 
2009).  
 
This balance was termed by many as the “Iron Triangle”, however it was not meant to 
last, as the organizational realities of mid-twentieth century were going to change in the 
coming decades. In the mid-1970s, rising inflation and unemployment, high energy 
prices, increasing international competition, and the fall in innovation and productivity 
were forces that undermined the profitability of large corporations and started changing 
the balance of the “Iron Triangle” (Auerswald and Acks 2009). The deregulatory 
measures of the Reagan administration were the beginning of the end for countervailing 
power. In the financial industry, deregulation along with the emergence information 
technologies drove new innovative business models. While these models had certain 
positive effects in the short-run, their complexity increased while government supervision 
eroded. The consequences of that have never been more pronounced than in today’s 
financial crisis42.  
7.2 An Alternative International Financial Architecture 
The financial crisis of 2008 has exemplified in the minds of even the most fervent 
defenders of the existing international financial order that changes in the international 
financial architecture are essential.  
 
In general, it is difficult to distinguish between the purely domestic and the purely 
international in terms of the policies that will need to be adopted on behalf nation states. 
In fact, in a world of free trade and low or nonexistent- capital controls, a domestic fiscal 
expansion can, among other things, increase demand for imports, which can significantly 
help the prospects of other economies. According to Frankel, it was the 1967-1972 US 
fiscal expansion that led to, or at least accelerated, the crash of the Bretton Woods system 
in 1973 (Frankel 2007). If monetary policy is essentially non-coordinated, then investors 
and speculators can move their capital to the countries with the highest interest rates, for 
a given level of risk. Hence, a certain level of coordination, especially during times of 
crisis, needs to characterize both fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
                                                
42 Of course the “Iron Triangle” was probably destined to collapse despite government policy. Galbraith’s 
observation was particularly valid in the 1950s, where large corporations were indeed dominant. However, 
despite the fact that some corporations are still large today, the economy of the 21st century is highly 
networked and distributed. In most cases, large corporations are not any more economically dominant to 
dictate the terms of engagement with buyers and suppliers (Auerswald and Acks 2009). As Auerswald and 
Acks (2009) point out, this is all the most obvious by the fact that government’s greatest challenge at the 
moment is not restraining the biggest firms, but keeping them afloat.  
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Pertaining to this discussion, one needs to shed some more light to specifics. The world, 
indeed, appears to have run out of creditworthy private borrowers. Governments, through 
increased fiscal deficits, can play this role in the short-run by replacing private sector 
borrowers. However, this does not constitute a sustainable policy prescription. As Martin 
Wolf (2008b) notes, “if (current account) surplus countries do not expand domestic 
demand relative to potential output, the open world economy may even break down.” 
 
The emergence of significant current account imbalances constitutes an important 
variable of the crisis, which needs to be taken into account in any policy prescription. In 
2008, according to forecasts from the IMF, the aggregate excess of savings over 
investment in surplus countries will be over $2,000 billion. The countries with the highest 
savings are China ($399 billion), Germany ($279 billion), and Japan ($194 billion), along 
with oil exporting countries (Wolf 2008c). At the same time, the big current account 
deficit countries are the US, Spain, the UK, France, Italy, and Australia, with the US 
being by far the biggest borrower among them (Wolf 2008b). In fact, these six countries 
represent almost 70 per cent of the world’s deficits (Wolf 2008a).  
 
The sum of net foreign lending (gross savings less domestic investment) and the 
government and private sector financial balances must be zero. In the case of the US, the 
counterparts of net foreign lending were mainly fiscal deficits, along with government 
and household deficits (Wolf 2008b). During recessions, the government deficit increases 
and the private sector deficit retracts, with the existence of a housing boom making huge 
household deficits possible in many of the deficit countries mentioned (US, UK, Spain, 
Australia, etc.). However, at this point of crisis, with households and businesses cutting 
back, government deficits are expected to explode. So, as Wolf underlines, “this is the 
endgame for the global imbalances” since deficits aimed at sustaining aggregate demand 
at time of crisis will be added on top of the fiscal costs of rescuing bankrupt banking 
systems (Wolf 2008a). 
 
Sooner or later, the willingness of surplus countries to absorb government paper and the 
liabilities of central banks will reach a plateau. The probability of facing a crisis will be 
particularly elevated. For crisis to be averted the private sector of the deficit countries 
will need to be able and willing to borrow, or the economy must be rebalanced with 
stronger external balances and smaller domestic deficits (Wolf 2008b). Given the 
characteristics of the current crisis at hand, an increase in private debt seems not only 
unrealistic but also lethal. Hence, a US expansion in net exports, which took place 
during recent years, must continue, a scenario that is not overly realistic given the recent 
dollar appreciation and the nature of the global financial downturn. 
 
The above analysis makes the case that the current financial crisis is, to some extent, a 
byproduct of increasing current account deficits on behalf of the US. Hence, this 
significant imbalance will need to be in some way alleviated in order to avert further 
global financial turmoil. Unfortunately, the probability that a country like the U.S. will 
significantly rebalance its current account does not seem particularly realistic. Hence, 
attention needs to shift on the other side of the equation. In normal times, current account 
surpluses of countries that follow mercantilist policies (China – which keeps its currency 
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artificially low through foreign currency intervention policies) or that are structurally 
mercantilist (Germany and Japan – which have a chronic excess of output over spending) 
can perhaps even be useful (Wolf 2008a). However, in times of recession and insufficient 
aggregate demand, these policies are perilous and contractionary.  
 
It becomes more obvious, therefore, that surplus countries must expand domestic 
demand relative to potential output, or – in other words – spend more at home in 
order to stabilize the global economy. Global imbalances are hurting the international 
financial system, and it is in the interest of the surplus countries to be accommodating in 
their policy approach. After all, if the surplus countries do not act, they should not be 
surprised if the deficit countries resort to protectionist measures in order to alleviate their 
troubles. The expansion program announced by the Chinese government in early 
November 2008 is exactly in that spirit (Wolf 2008c). Hence, the immediate way to deal 
with this challenge is to demand and coordinate a global fiscal stimulus in which the 
surplus countries will implement the biggest packages (Wolf 2008c).  
 
In addition to the aforementioned remedies, the fundamental reform of additional 
elements that made this crisis possible is essential. Krugman (2008) notes that “growing 
international capital flows set the stage for devastating currency crises in the 1990s and 
for a globalized financial crisis in 2008. The growth of the shadow banking system, 
without any corresponding extension of regulation, set the stage for latter-day bank runs 
on a massive scale. These runs involved frantic mouse clicks rather than frantic mobs 
outside locked bank doors, but they were no less devastating.”  
 
Therefore, a higher level of transparency in the financial sector, and specifically in 
the “shadow” banking sector, should be amongst the first steps. Transparency should be 
understood as the better provision of financial information, in a similar manner that 
corporations in the United States are required to provide accurate public reports of their 
financial positions. Increased transparency has the potential to reduce the tendency of 
very elevated levels of capital rushing into a country under favorable financial conditions 
and flowing out in times of stress.  
 
Stronger banking systems are also essential. The severity of the Asian financial crisis of 
the 1990s was due to the fact that the currency crisis was associated with bank runs 
(Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). Had the banking institutions been stronger, it is quite 
possible that the situation could have been milder. A stronger banking system denotes a 
more closely regulated banking system with increased capital requirements in order to 
alleviate moral hazard on behalf of the bank owners. As Gao Xiqing, President of the 
China Investment Corporation underlines, “Thirty years ago, the leverage of investment 
banks was like 4-to-1, 5-to-1. Today it’s 30-to-1. This is not just a change of numbers. 
It’s a change of fundamental thinking” (Fallows 2008). The same point has been made by 
Solow (2009), who argues that a shift from 10-to-1 to 30-to-1 has occurred, a level 
reached by Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers. Since the 1930s, commercial banks in the 
US have been required to possess adequate capital, hold reserves of liquid assets that can 
be quickly converted into cash, and limit the types of investments they make, all in return 
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for federal guarantees in the occasion of a crisis (Krugman 2008). Comparable regulation 
will need to be put in place for the “shadow” banking system as well. 
 
This point is also made by Soros (2008), who makes the case that variable margin 
requirements and minimal capital requirements that are meant to control the amount 
of leverage market participants can employ should also be instituted. As he notes, 
“Central banks even used to issue guidance to banks about how they should allocate loans 
to specific sectors of the economy. Such directives may be preferable to the blunt 
instruments of monetary policy in combating irrational exuberance in particular sectors, 
such as information technology or real estate” (Soros 2008). However, in order to employ 
such requirements, financial engineering43 should also be regulated, and new products 
should be registered and approved by the appropriate authorities before they can be used. 
 
Moving along the same lines of securing the stability of the financial system, what is 
fragile should break early, while it is still small. No corporation or economic entity 
should ever become too big to fail. As Taleb (2009) notes, evolution in economic life 
helps those with the maximum amount of hidden risks, and thus the most fragile, become 
the biggest. This of course a long-term goal for an international financial system, away 
from its present state of socialization of losses and privatization of gains. At this point, 
nationalization seems like the most prudent option for the entities that are too big to fail, 
while the entities that do not need a bail-out should be “free, small and risk-bearing” 
(Taleb 2009). 
 
Finally, enhanced credit lines that nations could draw from in the event of a credit crisis, 
adding to their foreign exchange reserves, would also help moderate the likelihood of 
having a credit crisis, along with diminishing its potential effects in case such a crisis 
becomes unavoidable.  
 
Returning to a world of low capital mobility neither constitutes a political reality, nor is a 
development that nations should seek. The most realistic and effective option would be 
the adoption of coordinated policies that would modify the composition of capital 
inflows, rather than completely discouraging them. In general, the higher the reliance on 
foreign-currency borrowing that is short-term or intermediated through banks, the higher 
the probability of having a crisis, since short-term flows are prone to moral hazard and 
asset mismatch (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). On the other hand, policies that would 
seek to shift the composition of capital inflows, instead of affecting their total level, 
would be significantly beneficial. These policies would include taxes or restrictions on 
short-term inflows, along with a set of measures that would place incentives for foreign 
direct investment and longer maturities.  
 
A success story, in this regard, is Chile. Chile imposed a tax on inflows in 1991. This tax 
took the form of a requirement that a percentage of any foreign borrowing be left in a 
non-interest-bearing deposit maintained at the central bank for up to one year. 
Additionally, a requirement was put in place that all FDI must remain in the country for 
at least one year. These controls were successful in changing the composition of the 
                                                
43 Financial engineering refers to the creation of new financial instruments, such as derivatives. 
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capital inflows to Chile in the 1990s in the direction of longer-term maturities while 
having a minimal effect on the total magnitude of capital inflows (Edwards 2000). Hence, 
countries should aim for increased foreign direct investment and long-term inflows 
relative to debt and portfolio capital inflows. Nevertheless, if such a policy is 
implemented on a country-by-country basis, then this will do little to avert a future crisis 
– it will only better protect the set of countries that adopt such measures and only up to a 
certain degree. Policy coordination again appears to be at the epicenter. 
 
Another possibility that should be explored is the adoption of a measure similar to what is 
now called the “Tobin Tax.” The Tobin Tax, which was proposed by the late Nobel-
laureate James Tobin, essentially entailed a very low tax imposed on each individual 
currency transaction. This measure would have two fundamental effects: first, it would 
reduce currency speculation by “throwing sand in the wheels” of the financial system, 
and perhaps make it easier for governments to pursue their own monetary and fiscal 
policies without excessive concern about the exchange rate; second, it would also raise 
significant amounts of revenue, which could be used for activities such as financing 
development assistance or alleviating the dept of the developing world (Wolf 2004). 
Whether such a measure would indeed be beneficial is still debatable. Economists such as 
Martin Wolf think that it would actually be a bad idea, since in his view, the tax would 
not prevent big jumps in the exchange rates, and by reducing hedging activity, might 
eventually increase volatility (Wolf 2004). Others, such as investor George Soros do not 
share this view and believe that some variation of tax would actually be significantly 
beneficial (Soros 2001). In any case, “throwing sand in the wheels” is exactly one of the 
things that the financial system seems to need right now, so any measure that proposes to 
do so should be thoroughly examined. 
7.3 Sustainability in Practice: The Cases of Kerala and Costa Rica 
The Indian state of Kerala, on the southern Indian coast, has been one of the most widely 
cited cases successfully practicing sustainable development (Parayil 1996). Kerala is one 
of the 25 constituent states of India, with a population of 32 million people, occupying 
about 1% of the total land area of the country. A series of statistics make Kerala one of 
the most interesting case studies in sustainable development and of alternative paths to 
social and economic development. Life expectancy for the average Keralite is 74 years, 
11 years more than the average Indian life expectancy of 63 years, and approaching the 
average US life expectancy of 77 years (Deparle 2007). Furthermore, Kerala has a 
literacy rate of 91% compared to an Indian average of 65% (Deparle 2007). This number 
is not too far from the US, where 99% of the population is literate. 
 
According to Parayil (1996) “[t]ough Kerala has a low throughput, the indicator of social 
progress have not suffered because of sustained efforts to limit population growth and 
social inequality, to conserve resources frugally and to use them on a shared basis.” 
 
A particularly interesting fact of Kerala’s development lies in the fact that it is completely 
hidden from the GDP per capita statistics. As Parayil (1996) notes, states with per capital 
income higher than that of Kerala fared much worse than Kerala in social indicators of 
development. In 1991-92, Punjab which had a GDP per capita twice that of Kerala, had 
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33 PQLI (Physical Quality of Life) points less than that of Kerala, underscoring the 
limitations of the GDP and the GDP per capita statistics with respect to economic and 
social development (Parayil 1996). 
  
None of these outcomes occurred by chance. On the contrary, these are the direct result 
of a set of policy choices by Kerala’s liberal administrations, which have a policy priority 
of investing in a welfare state. Kerala spends 46% more on health and 36% more on 
education than the average Indian state (Deparle 2007). Hence, if there is one first point 
to be made about the Kerala model, is that it constitutes a clear example of how the 
quality of life of the citizenry can be improved through government intervention in the 
economy, without a primary focus on encouraging economic growth. 
   
The model, however, appears to have limitations. Kerala has been suffering by elevated 
rates of sustained unemployment, with many Keralites preferring to work in jobs at the 
Persian Gulf, where salaries are understandably higher. Unemployment is presently 20%, 
with one our of six working abroad and who mostly work in the Arab emirates and 
augment the state’s economic output by 25%. With all its achievements with respect to 
the welfare state, Kerala has a per capita income of $675, while India’s nationwide per 
capita income is $730 (Deparle 2007). But more importantly, the dispersion of income 
(and wealth) is much less than in other Indian states. 
  
While Kerala appears to be poor from an Indian comparison, the average income 
statistics do not take into account the socially important non-monetizables: average life 
expectancy, education, healthcare, etc. Nor do the average figures reveal the dispersion of 
wages or wealth in other Indian states. A more complete set of criteria of success should 
include not only environmental stewardship, but also political, social and economic 
justice, along with the improvement in the quality of life of the most vulnerable section of 
the population and the improvement of women’s rights in the society (Parayil 1996). 
 
In light of Kerala’s huge successes in education and healthcare, one must be reserved in 
criticizing the model, and draw the appropriate lessons from Kerala for sustainable 
development. If there exists one conclusion which seems indisputable, it is that 
widespread poverty does not exist, giving one pause to think about whether concentrated 
wealth can exist without pockets of manifest poverty in a growth-oriented economy. 
Parayil (1996) observes “the ‘Kerala model’ is not based on any one of the existing 
theories or models of development and modernization” and that it “should be studied 
earnestly for improvements and possible replication.” The view that perhaps best 
encapsulates the success of Kerala is that of Samir Amin (1991), who notes that 
“Kerala’s achievements are the best way to prepare for the next stage, if only because 
they result in strong popular organization, and give reasons for hope, and something to 
guard.” While otherwise positive about Kerala, Parayil  (1996) is realistic in noting that 
“[t]he fact that industrial and agricultural growth has to be achieved to improve the 
material standards of living for all Keralans is undeniable; [b]ut the high indicators of 
social development and a high literate populace are conducive to rapid industrialization 
of the state which is essential for creating more jobs and material outputs to meet local 
needs.”  
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Costa Rica has been increasingly gaining publicity for the sustainable character of its 
policies. More than 25 per cent of the country’s landscape is a protected area, due to a set 
of policies meant to preserve and protect its cornucopia (Friedman 2009). Friedman 
(2009) notes the following with respect to the Costa Rican Model of Development:  
 
“[Costa Rica] has created a holistic strategy to think about growth, one that demands that 
everything gets counted. So if a chemical factory sells tons of fertilizer but pollutes a river — or a 
farm sells bananas but destroys a carbon-absorbing and species-preserving forest — this is not 
honest growth. You have to pay for using nature. It is called “payment for environmental services” 
— nobody gets to treat climate, water, coral, fish and forests as free anymore. 
The process began in the 1990s when Costa Rica, which sits at the intersection of two continents 
and two oceans, came to fully appreciate its incredible bounty of biodiversity — and that its 
economic future lay in protecting it. So it did something no country has ever done: It put energy, 
environment, mines and water all under one minister. 
“In Costa Rica, the minister of environment sets the policy for energy, mines, water and natural 
resources,” explained Carlos M. Rodríguez, who served in that post from 2002 to 2006. In most 
countries, he noted, “ministers of environment are marginalized.” They are viewed as people who 
try to lock things away, not as people who create value. Their job is to fight energy ministers who 
just want to drill for cheap oil. 
But when Costa Rica put one minister in charge of energy and environment, “it created a very 
different way of thinking about how to solve problems,” said Rodríguez, now a regional vice 
president for Conservation International. “The environment sector was able to influence the 
energy choices by saying: ‘Look, if you want cheap energy, the cheapest energy in the long-run is 
renewable energy. So let’s not think just about the next six months; let’s think out 25 years.” 
As a result, Costa Rica hugely invested in hydro-electric power, wind and geo-thermal, and today 
it gets more than 95 percent of its energy from these renewables. In 1985, it was 50 percent hydro, 
50 percent oil. More interesting, Costa Rica discovered its own oil five years ago but decided to 
ban drilling — so as not to pollute its politics or environment! What country bans oil drilling? 
Rodríguez also helped to pioneer the idea that in a country like Costa Rica, dependent on tourism 
and agriculture, the services provided by ecosystems were important drivers of growth and had to 
be paid for. Right now, most countries fail to account for the “externalities” of various economic 
activities. So when a factory, farmer or power plant pollutes the air or the river, destroys a 
wetland, depletes a fish stock or silts a river — making the water no longer usable — that cost is 
never added to your electric bill or to the price of your shoes. 
Costa Rica took the view that landowners who keep their forests intact and their rivers clean 
should be paid, because the forests maintained the watersheds and kept the rivers free of silt — 
and that benefited dam owners, fishermen, farmers and eco-tour companies downstream. The 
forests also absorbed carbon. 
To pay for these environmental services, in 1997 Costa Rica imposed a tax on carbon emissions 
— 3.5 percent of the market value of fossil fuels — which goes into a national forest fund to pay 
indigenous communities for protecting the forests around them. And the country imposed a water 
tax whereby major water users — hydro-electric dams, farmers and drinking water providers — 
had to pay villagers upstream to keep their rivers pristine. “We now have 7,000 beneficiaries of 
water and carbon taxes,” said Rodríguez. “It has become a major source of income for poor 
people. It has also enabled Costa Rica to actually reverse deforestation. We now have twice the 
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amount of forest as 20 years ago.” 
As we debate a new energy future, we need to remember that nature provides this incredible range 
of economic services — from carbon-fixation to water filtration to natural beauty for tourism. If 
government policies don’t recognize those services and pay the people who sustain nature’s ability 
to provide them, things go haywire. We end up impoverishing both nature and people. Worse, we 
start racking up a bill in the form of climate-changing greenhouse gases, petro-dictatorships and 
bio-diversity loss that gets charged on our kids’ Visa cards to be paid by them later. Well, later is 
over. Later is when it will be too late.” 
 
While the two models presented here have significant differences, both have important 
characteristics of sustainability in the policies that they have chosen to pursue. The 
Kerala model focuses on a series of parameters aside GDP growth, such as literacy rates , 
education, health. At the same time, the Costa Rican model places any growth 
considerations inside the context of environmental protection and preservation. In 
general, could a growth model that would combine the positive aspects of Kerala and 
Costa Rica, without the increased unemployment of Kerala, and which would be 
applicable for states with less biodiversity than Costa Rica, be realistic? Whatever the 
case might be, both Kerala and Costa Rica deserve to be closely studied and monitored.  
7.4 Reconceptualization of the Economy: An Ecological Paradigm 
In tandem with the significant economic and financial imbalances, the ecological 
situation, as elaborated in section 4.5 is also particularly problematic, and is a direct 
consequence of our industrial systems. Kallis et al. (2009) put forward an alternative 
framework for studying the financial crisis of 2008. According to their analysis the 
economy must be analyzed at three levels (from top to bottom): 
 
• The Financial Level 
• The Real Economy 
• The “Real-Real” Economy 
 
As Kallis et al. (2009) note: 
 
“At the top there is the financial level that can grow by loans made to the private sector or to the 
state, sometimes without any assurance of repayment as in the present crisis. The financial system 
borrows against the future, on the expectation that indefinite economic growth will give the means 
to repay the interests and the debts. Then there is what the economists describe as the real 
economy, the GDP at constant prices. When it grows, it indeed allows for paying back on some or 
all the debt, when it does not grow enough, debts are defaulted. Increasing the debts forces the 
economy to grow, up to some limits. Then, down below underneath the economists’ real economy, 
there is what the ecological economists call the “real-real” economy, the flows of energy and 
materials whose growth depends partly on economic factors (types of markets, prices) and in part 
from physical and biological limits. The “real-real” economy also includes land and capacity of 
humans to do work.” 
 
The ecological approach to the present crisis states that the level of finance grew too 
large and too fast for the real economy to adapt. The financial system also increased the 
debts too much, in the absence of coherent regulation, and this expansion of credit lines 
was mistaken for real wealth (Kallis et al. 2009). At the same time, , the economy is not a 
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closed system, but operates within certain ecological limits and biophysical constraints, 
which condition the rate at which real wealth can increase. This analysis reminds that of 
Polanyi (1944) who placed markets within social systems, rather than independent 
“value-neutral” entities.  
 
In general, energy resources appear to be having an increasingly pivotal importance 
around the world. As Klare (2001) notes, ever since the end of the Cold War, political 
analysts of different persuasions have attempted to identify the “defining principle of the 
new international environment”. While there have been many competing theories about 
this new defining paradigm, such as Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”, 
Robert Kaplan’s return of Malthusian dynamics and Tom Friedman’s “flat world”, Klare 
is correct to note that “the fervent pursuit of resource plenty in total disregard of any 
civilizational loyalties” appears to have a much more significant explanatory power with 
regards to contemporary international dynamics (Klare 2001). 
 
The dominant neoclassical economic paradigm, assumes the existence of utility 
functions, which constitute the foundation of production and consumption functions. 
These functions act as simplified abstractions of economic decisions. In the consumption-
production framework, every material product in the system is produced by other 
products made within the system, plus exogenous capital and labor (Ayres 2009). A 
particularly interesting observation, made by Ayres and Warr (2009) but also by 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) is that this model of the economy displays a characteristic 
neglect of energy and material flows.  
 
As Daly (1991) notes, standard economics does not ask the question of what the size of 
an economy relative to the ecosystem should be. In fact, standard economics is actually 
indifferent to the scale of aggregate resource use, focusing instead on the optimal 
allocation of resources among alternative uses (Daly 1991).  
 
One of the earliest, fundamentally intuitive approaches to understanding environmental 
problems came from the “I = PAT” formula (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971). 
 
Impact (environmental)  =  Population x Affluence (GDP per capita) x  
Technology (environmental impact per dollar of 
GDP) 
 
Ashford and Hall (2010) note that since the publication of the I = PAT formula, a number 
of revisions have been proposed. For example, Holdren et al. (1995) adjusted the formula 
to disaggregate affluence from resource use and to separate measures of the ‘stress’ that 
technology imposes on the environment from measures of actual damage, which depend 
upon stress and ‘susceptibility.’ The measurement of susceptibility is predominantly a 
function of cumulative damage from previous environmental stress. Thus, the revised 
formula is: 
 
 
 
 92 
Damage (environmental) =  Population x 
Economic activity per person (affluence) x 
Resource use per economic activity (resources) x 
Stress on the environment per resource use 
(technology) x Damage per stress (susceptibility) 
 
It is important to acknowledge that formulae such as these constitute simple 
representations of complex systems. They are informative and can help stimulate 
discussions about the causes of environmental degradation, but to argue whether or not 
they are ‘right’ is unwise (Holdren et al. 1995). What they indicate is that the magnitudes 
of all the factors need to be considered since these are multiplicative in their effects on 
environmental damage (Ashford and Hall 2010). However, we should also recognize the 
limitations of these formulae. They do not take into account the interdependencies or 
non-linearity that might exist between the factors, there is no explicit consideration of 
societal factors and how they can influence each variable, and they do not consider how 
each of the variables can change over time – which is especially critical for technological 
change (Holdren et al. 1995). 
 
Given the inherent political difficulty in developing measures to curtail population 
growth or limit/reduce affluence and the associated levels of consumption, it seems that 
the easiest way to achieve a less environmentally destructive society is to focus on 
technological innovation. Indeed, the ‘technological fix’ has become a major or integral 
aspect of many theories put forward on how society can live within its ecological means 
(Ashford and Hall 2010).  
 
Two interesting developments in economics that treat technology differently are the idea 
of substitutability (Solow 1993) and the steady-state economy (Czech and Daly 2004; 
Daly 1991; 1996), which is part of the much broader view of ecological/green/natural 
economics (Costanza 1991; Lawson 2006; Ruth 2006).44  
 
Solow’s (1993) approach to sustainability is rooted in the idea that technology can create 
high degrees of substitutability between one resource and another and, implicitly, that 
natural and man-made capital are in some sense ‘fungible.’ This is what Ayres (2006) 
                                                
44 As Ashford and Hall (2010) note, the emerging field of ecological economics, which combines both the 
economy and technology with ecology, provides a holistic perspective of sustainable development 
(Costanza 1991). It studies the relationships between ecosystems and economic systems, encompassing 
both biological and cultural change. The human economy is seen as being part of a larger whole. Its domain 
is the entire web of interactions between economic and ecological sectors. Ecological economics defines 
sustainability in terms of natural capital - the ability of natural systems to provide goods and services, 
including clean air and water and climatic stability. Ecological economists propose that the vital role of 
natural capital (e.g., mineral deposits, aquifers, stratospheric ozone, etc.) should be made explicit in 
commodity production (Ayres 1996; Daly 1994). Thus, consumption should not deplete natural capital at a 
faster rate than it can be replaced by human capital. Daly’s notion of the steady-state economy views 
natural ecosystems as being finite and, therefore, focuses on the scale of human activity (i.e., the economy) 
that can be supported. Living (and producing) within ecological limits is the major focus of ecological 
economics. Green economics (Lawson 2006) and natural economics (Ruth 2006) build upon ecological 
economics, but focus more explicitly on informing/shaping political views and policy for sustainable 
economic development.   
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describes as the “weak” sustainability position, which essentially argues that all kinds of 
natral capital can be substituted by man-made capital. If resources are fungible, this 
means that society has no obligation to save a resource for future generations as long as 
an alternative resource is made available. Solow (1993, p. 182) argues that “what we are 
obligated to leave behind is a generalized capacity to create well-being, not any 
particular thing or any particular resource.” It follows that resources should be assessed 
as if they were savings and investments (i.e., we have a choice between current 
consumption and providing for the future through the investment of non-renewable 
resource rents).45  
 
In contrast, Daly (1991) holds what Ayres (2006) calls a “strong” sustainability position, 
whilch enmtails that many of the most fundamental services provided by nature cannot be 
replaced by services produced by humans or man-made capital. Daly (1991) provides 
what is probably the most well-developed vision of an economy which functions within 
ecological limits. Arguing from the first principle of thermodynamics, Daly describes a 
steady-state economy (SSE) as one in which births replace deaths and production 
replaces depreciation. The objective of the SSE is to keep the throughput of raw materials 
(low entropy) and waste (high entropy) to levels within the regenerative and assimilative 
capacity of the ecosystem. Whereas neo-classical economics views the growth economy 
as a continual expansion of production and consumption (Figure 7.1), the SSE considers 
these cycles to be in equilibrium with the ecosystem (Figure 7.2).  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Classical Economics View of Growing Cycles of Production and 
Consumption 
Figure 5.1: Classical Economic View of Growing Cycles of Production and Consumption 
                                                
45 Asford and Hall (2010) note that Solow (1993) describes resource rents as the investment of the pure 
return on a non-renewable resource. For example, in using up a natural resource such as oil in the North 
Sea oil field, the revenues that are intrinsic to the oil itself should be invested into new technologies that 
will eventually replace oil. Hence, investing the ‘rent’ from the non-renewable resource is seen as being an 
effective way to continue the current levels of consumption while providing for future generations.  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
Production 
Production 
Consumption 
Consumption 
Source: Ashford and Hall (2010). 
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Figure 7.2: Steady-State Economics View of Production and Consumption Cycles in 
Equilibrium with the Ecosystem 
Figure 6.2: Steady State Economics View of Production and Consumption Cycles in Equilibrium 
with the Ecosystem 
Within the SSE, technology, knowledge, the distribution of income, and the allocation of 
resources are fluid.46 Since a fixed amount of resources will yield constant flows of goods 
and services (all else being equal), technological progress is one way in which more (or 
more highly valued) goods and services can be produced (Czech 2003; Czech and Daly 
2004). However, given the laws of thermodynamics there are limits to what is 
technological feasible. Thus, there is a theoretical maximum size (an ecological carrying 
capacity) at which a steady-state economy may exist. This constraint implies that high-
quality, long-lasting, and repairable goods are preferable to low-quality, short-lived, and 
disposal goods (Ashford and Hall 2010).47 
 
To help describe the SSE, Daly (1991) compares it to a steady-state library, where the 
addition of a new book would mean the removal of an old book. Thus, while the 
quantitative physical scale remains constant, the library would continue to improve in a 
qualitative sense. In this regard, Daly’s view of the necessary technological fixes to 
environmental degradation is more conservative than Solow’s (Ashford and Hall 2010). 
Rather than continuing business as usual and investing in future alternatives, Daly’s focus 
is to develop new science/technology that reduces the environmental burden to rates 
within ecosystem limits and also extends human lives. Both viewpoints are quite different 
and represent contrasting views of the role that technology plays in development.  
 
                                                
46 In general, ecological economists, especially those focusing on steady-state economics, are concerned 
with the size of the economy relative to the ecosystem. The efficient allocation of resources is a concern, 
but it is not the primary focus as in neoclassical economics.  
47 While one could argue that an effective recycling process reduces the need to extend the lifespan goods, 
such as argument is weakened by the fact that [1] recycling processes use energy that reduce the available 
stock of terrestrial resources (assuming that the recycling process is not powered by solar energy) and [2] 
most recycling involves the degradation of material, which means it is only suitable for poorer quality 
goods. The latter point is often referred to as ‘down-cycling.’ 
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Ayres (2006) offers a critique to both “strong” and “weak” sustainability proponents. In 
his view, while the mathematics of Solow’s argument are “impeccable”, the underlying 
assumptions, or what Ayres calls “the physics”, are not. Ayres (2006) believe that 
“strong” sustainability proponents are right to point out the relevance of entropy law, the 
second law of thermodynamics and the impossibility of perpetual motion machines, 
however they are wrong to assert that human civilization is totally dependent on a finite 
stock of high quality (low entropy) resources stored in the earth’s crust. As Ayres (2006) 
points out, “the fact that much of our industrial base currently utilizes fossil fuels and 
high quality metal ores is merely due to the ready availability of these resources at low 
cost. It does not follow from the entropy law that there are not substitutes.” Nonetheless, 
Ayres (2006) concludes by saying that: 
 
 “[…] I have to reiterate that, while there is plenty of room for substitution and some possibility of 
major breakthroughs (e.g., in manufacturing room temperature super-conductors or carbon 
nanotubes) the pessimists – those who espouse the notion of “strong sustainability” appear to be 
closet to the truth than the optimists who believe in more or less unlimited substitution 
possibilities. “ 
  
In general, in this time of growing ecological and economic crisis, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that questions of ecology cannot be separated from questions of 
economics, and that building a truly sustainable future will necessarily involve new 
theories, new paradigms, new policies.  Ecological and stead-state economics provide a 
first step in thinking about the economy and the environment in different terms. As old 
theories become obsolete in light of events with real consequences and a political 
economy both unsustainable and immoral, new paradigms will emerge.  
 
7.5 Sustainable Policies for a Sustainable Future 
Policy-making does not operate independently from a given economic and social context. 
As this work is being completed, the world is witnessing the biggest financial crisis since 
the great depression. However, each crisis encapsulates elements of opportunity, and a 
failed growth economy is perhaps the first step for a transition to a sustainable economy. 
Thus, Section 7.1 sets the context in which policy will have to operate in the near-term, 
by discussing the main elements of the Financial Crisis of 2008, along with the long-term 
trends that let to the crisis. Section 7.2 provided a set of options for an alternative 
international financial architecture. Focusing on responses to international finance and 
regulation, given the present situation is unavoidable. The international economy is 
highly globalized, and significant changes in the international financial system towards 
more stability and less speculation will be essential for a transition to sustainability. 
 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 shift the focus from the short to the long-term. Kerala and Costa 
Rica are two case studies of regional sustainability, which, while imperfect and 
incomplete, offer significant insights to how elements of sustainable development can 
work in practice. The point, however, is whether sustainability “can also work in theory”, 
-- to persuade economic development advisors. The different frameworks of ecological 
economics conceptualize the unsustainable nature of the international economy and 
provide the foundation for an alternative economic paradigm that does not just treat 
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environmental problems as externalities, but considers the physical limits of the 
ecosystem.  
 
The question now turns to the set of policies that could enhance a transition to a more 
sustainable economy.  
 
The transition to sustainability can either be evolutionary, or it can be revolutionary. 
Beddoe et al. (2008) advocate for an “evolutionary redesign of worldviews, institutions 
and technologies”. However, Kuhn (1962) in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” 
makes an opposite case. In his view, the evolution of scientific theory does not emerge 
from the straightforward accumulation of facts, but rather from a set of changing 
intellectual circumstances and possibilities (Kuhn 1962).  Ashford and Hall (2010) have 
outlined a series of policies, programs, and initiatives influencing technological, 
organizational, institutional, and social innovation that could affect the determinants of 
the willingness, opportunity/motivation, and capacity of the relevant actors and 
institutions to change in an evolutionary way:  
 
• Willingness 
- towards changes in production or services, in general (flexibility) 
- influenced by an understanding of the problem 
- influenced by knowledge of options or solutions (to encourage diffusion) 
- influenced by the ability to evaluate alternatives  
 
• Opportunity/Motivation 
- gaps in technological/scientific capability (in existing markets) 
- possibility of economic cost savings in existing markets or new/expanded 
market potential (competitiveness)  
- regulatory requirements (making new markets) 
- consumer/worker/societal demand (making new markets) 
 
• Capacity 
- influenced by an understanding of the problem 
- influenced by knowledge of options (to encourage diffusion) 
- influenced by the ability to evaluate alternatives 
- resident/available skills and capabilities (necessary for innovation) 
- role of outsiders (and the tolerance of deviants from the mainstream) 
 
Encouragement of revolutionary change adds important determinants to an evolutionary 
approach (Ashford and Hall 2010): 
 
• Willingness 
- Crises/Tipping points/Visionary leadership 
- towards changes in production or services (flexibility) 
- influenced by an understanding of the problem 
- influenced by knowledge of options or solutions (to encourage diffusion) 
- influenced by the ability to evaluate alternatives  
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• Opportunity/Motivation 
- Crises/Tipping points//Visionary leadership 
- gaps in technological/scientific capability (in existing markets) 
- possibility of economic cost savings in existing markets or new/expanded 
market potential (industrial competitiveness)  
- regulatory requirements (making new markets) Changing the rules 
- consumer/worker/societal demand (making new markets) 
 
• Capacity 
- influenced by an understanding of the problem  
- influenced by knowledge of options (to encourage diffusion) 
- influenced by the ability to evaluate alternatives 
- resident/available skills and capabilities (innovation) Building New 
Capacity 
- role of outsiders New actors, innovators, institutions, political 
agendas 
 
Crises (or tipping points) offer an opportunity for government, industry, firms, and 
society involving their planners, scientists, engineers, economists, lawyers, and others to 
promote new solutions. With regard to the 2008 financial crisis, there is currently a call 
for new (or re-) regulation, institutional arrangements, actors, technical capacity, and 
economic and political agendas. The old assumptions, rules, and arrangements are no 
longer deemed to be adequate. Similar realizations are needed regarding global climate 
change; other environment, health and safety challenges; and production, consumption 
and employment concerns. Crises -- or tipping point/overshoots (in the limits to growth 
context) – are system discontinuities. They may thus require revolutionary policy 
medicine. 
 
While all stakeholders are important, government (with other stakeholder input) will have 
to play the leading role in setting an agenda for transformations to a more sustainable 
industrial system. A major and obvious reason for this is that the incentives faced by the 
private sector – some have even argued its primary legal obligation to stockholders – is to 
maximize profit, and in the process of doing that, the private sector tends to externalize 
the social costs of its activities, or at least does not engage in activity that does not 
improve its revenues or reputation (Ashford and Hall 2010). Only government has the 
potential to represent all the interests of the various stakeholders – and future generations 
– in the sense of both effective and fair intervention. Until the recent financial crisis and 
the impending global climate imperative, government intervention fell into disfavor, 
spawned by the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions and their aftermaths. Today, things 
seem to have changed dramatically. 
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In general, successful sustainability transformations require (Ashford and Hall 2010): 
 
• transdisciplinary48 expertise for their design and implementation; 
• reconceptualizing the basis of the economy; 
• the avoidance of agenda and pathway capture or ’lock-in’ by incumbent actors 
and ideology; 
• technological displacement and substitution of new for old technology. This could 
include (1) new products, (2) shifts to product services, (3) new production 
processes, (4) new or altered services, and (5) new systems;49 
• in some cases, displacement of not only the dominant products and technologies, 
but also the incumbent firms, and public institutions; 
• co-evolution of technological and social systems – and institutions – 
complementary technological, organizational, institutional, and social 
innovations;50 
• the emergence of new ways to meet the basic needs of the society; and 
• system changes that cut across problem areas – competitiveness, environment, 
and employment – and therefore also cut across sectors and firm divisions, as well 
as government departments and missions. 
 
These are basic demands on transformations that are needed to achieve significant 
improvements in sustainability. These demands should, in turn will translate to successful 
policies, if the goal of sustainability is to be fulfilled.  
 
The discussions on economic growth (Chapter 2) and on innovation, creative destruction 
and green jobs (Chapter 3) raise a series of points for domestic government policy, highly 
relevant for sustainable development. In particular51: 
 
• Remove disincentives to hire labor. 
• Promote incentives to utilize labor. 
• Support research on mechanisms for job creation (i.e., including job design) that 
go beyond the usual fiscal and tax incentives. 
• Deliberate enhancement of the desirable aspects of employment and job creation 
through labor standards and protections (e.g., for health and safety), continuing 
education and upskilling, tax incentives to employers, unemployment adjustment 
policies – including re-education, and unemployment and income guarantees.  
• Stabilize the population.  
• Introduce more stringent environmental regulations, which allow for the 
internalization of environmental costs.  
                                                
48 Costanza and Daly (1991), in advocating the approaches fundamental to ecological economics, argue that 
sustainability requires a trans-disciplinary approach, as does Jansen (2003). See Ashford (2004) for a clear 
distinction between multi-disciplinary thinking and trans-disciplinary thinking. 
49 According to Ashford and Hall (2010), system innovations may be evolutionary; quasi-evolutionary 
(niche developments nurtured/guided by government); co-evolutionary with changes in societal demand; or 
revolutionary (involving the setting of demanding targets, anticipating nascent future needs, and changing 
the rules of the game).  
50 See Butter (2002) and Butter and Montalvo (2002). 
51 List partially adapted by Ashford and Hall (2010). 
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• Increase state investment in Green jobs, products and processes. 
  
Some proposals with regards to the disincentives to hire labor have been around for 
decades, namely (1) not to finance health care on a per capita basis, but rather as a 
function of sales and (2) not to finance similar reforms of payroll taxes that act as an 
disincentive to hire additional workers (Ashford and Hall 2010). Furthermore, a series of 
incentives could be instituted for the increasing utilization of labor. Examples include tax 
credits for new hires, tax credits for providing training and upskilling, and tax 
credits/accelerated scheduled deductions for the employment of labor to improve the 
firm’s health, safety, and environment (Ashford and Hall 2010). Standardizing a shorter 
work week while maintaining full wages could also be considered. 
 
Stabilizing the population, in a state where births plus immigrants equals deaths plus out-
migrants, is a key variable of sustainability (Daly 1998). Figure 3.1 has shown that the 
average GDP per capita had remained almost the same until the industrial revolution. In 
lack of any disruptive changes in technological innovation, any increases in economic 
welfare were absorbed by analogous increases in population. Some measures to control 
population growth would be necessary for a transition to sustainable development. Of 
course, as Sachs (2008) notes, fertility rates are a function of many variables, such as 
cultural norms, the availability of contraception methods, the educational opportunities 
and costs for children, the availability of social security etc. Policies to curb population 
growth include many possibilities and they range from the coercive Chinese system to 
complete laissez faire (Daly 1991). However, public policies designed to promote a 
voluntary reduction of fertility rates, according to Sachs (2008) can have an enormous 
effect to the wellbeing of present and future generations.  
 
A series of different points were raised in the analysis of Green jobs. In general, a 
significant state investment in green jobs, technologies and processes will be a key 
element for a transition to a sustainable economy. However, as discussed in Section 3.6, 
most of the studies focus on the amount of jobs that will be created in the short-run (or 
during the transition) instead of a “steady-state” amount of jobs, especially after 
accounting for the jobs that will be displaced in the various fossil fuels industries. 
Nonetheless, if matched with employment protection measures and safety nets for the 
displaced workers, Green jobs will have a significant qualitative impact to society and to 
the economy. The introduction of Green products52 will create a significant amount of 
jobs during the transition, have a positive impact on workers’ skills, decrease domestic 
and foreign consumption and be more environmentally and resource friendly. The 
displacement of Processes by Green processes53 will have similar effects as those of 
Green products, but will be more environmentally friendly and require fewer resources. 
Additionally, a series of system changes in which Green jobs are involved will also be 
instrumental for such a transition. The decentralization of food production and 
agriculture, the modular construction of houses, the partial shift from manufacturing to 
                                                
52 Green products are defined as more resilient and environmentally friendly products.  
53 A Green Process is any process with a) less worker, health and safety consequences and b) lower energy-
intensity 
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re-manufacturing all constitute possibilities of systemic change that can have significant 
technology and policy consequences for sustainability. 
 
Furthermore, the effects of growth (Chapter 4) and trade (Chapter 5) to sustainability 
were also examined in detail. The analysis conducted can lead to series of additional 
policy proposals: 
 
• Reform or replace the GDP Growth Paradigm54. 
• Institute significant employment protection measures, such as the minimum wage, 
social safety nets and employment protection legislation. 
• Propose an ecological tax reform (Daly 2008). 
• Adopt an eclectic approach in national trade policy, in line with the country’s 
specificities, comparative advantages and disadvantages and national interests. 
• Move away from the Washington Consensus paradigm. 
 
The institution of employment protection measures is key according to Ashford’s 
conceptualization of sustainability (Ashford and Hall 2010). Equitable and meaningful 
jobs that create adequate purchasing power are a central element of a sustainable society. 
Furthermore, employment protection measures guarantee the wellbeing of the citizenry 
by removing some power from the hands of corporate actors, which has dramatically 
increased after the erosion of countervailing power and the collapse of Galbraith’s “Iron 
Triangle” (Galbraith 1952).  
 
The ecological tax reform is a notion advanced by Daly (2008), and which could prove 
highly beneficial for a transition to sustainability. Specifically, it would require a shift in 
the tax base “from value added (labor and capital) […] “to that to which value is added”, 
namely the entropic throughput of resources extracted from nature (depletion, through the 
economy, and back to nature (pollution)”. Such a policy shift would internalize the 
external costs of pollution and ecological harm, but it would also raise revenue in a more 
equitable fashion, since it would price the “scarce, but previously unpriced contribution 
of nature” (Daly 2008).  
 
National trade policy is also central from a sustainability perspective. International trade 
should not be considered a goal in itself, but as a means towards the goal of increasing 
the welfare of the citizenry. As noted in Chapter 5, almost all of the developing country 
success stories (China, India, the East Asian countries etc.) involved partial and gradual 
trade and capital liberalization. On the contrary, the regions that blindly followed the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus were the ones that faced the most severe 
consequences (Latin America, Africa). A country’s trade policy should be eclectic, and 
take into account a series of national and external variables, such as the industries that 
will be harmed from trade openness and the capacity of the domestic market to 
reallocate/redeploy workers. 
 
                                                
54 Apart from the GDP alternatives explored in Section 4.1, Daly (2008) makes a different proposal: to 
separate the GDP into a cost account and a benefits account. These accounts should be compared at the 
margin and growth should stop when marginal costs equal marginal benefits.  
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Finally, a more stable international financial system (Chapter 6, Section 7.2) constitutes a 
sine-qua-non of a sustainable economy, and is, given the present situation, the first set of 
policies that will need to be adopted55: 
 
• Current Account Surplus countries need to spend more at home. 
• Increase the transparency and regulation of the “shadow” banking sector.  
• Fragile economic entities (“too big to fail”) should break early. 
• Increase minimum capital requirements. 
• Alter the composition of capital inflows on a coordinated basis. 
• Institute enhanced credit lines that nations could draw from in the event of a credit 
crisis, adding to their foreign exchange reserves. 
• Examine instituting a measure similar to the Tobin tax. 
 
On a final note, the elements of the ecological crisis at hand dictate that governments 
need to act quickly and in a coordinated fashion. The failure to integrate initiatives in a 
comprehensive manner has caused many good ideas to fail to meet their potential in the 
past. Failure in the present situation, however, is destined to become a synonym of 
collapse. Thus, what would translate these policies into necessary and sufficient action is 
that they need to be applied in an integrated approach, such that industrial, 
environmental, employment, and trade policies are co-designed and co-implemented. The 
complexity and inter-relatedness of the many forces and interests in modern society 
requires this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 These policies are elaborated in Section 7.2 
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